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PREFACE
This dissertation vnll focus on the subject of Soviet-American

detente.

It will

be demonstrated that the detente policy has caused

good deal of confusion regarding its true meaning both in theory

a

and in practice.

After analyzing the

most significant schools of

thought and different viewpoints in regard to detente, this dissertation will pose three major hypotheses.

These hypotheses will address

what this writer feels are the most critical aspects of Soviet-American

detente and will be assessed throughout the body of this study.

This

dissertation will place specific emphasis on the Soviet perception of
detente and, accordingly, will rely heavily on primary Soviet source

documentation
The first hypothesis will present the belief that detente was
a

political strategy that was created solely by the U.S.S.R.

Furthermore,

the Soviet leadership designed detente on the basis of revolutionary

Marxist-Leninist ideology; an ideology that serves as an important factor
in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

was not

a

It will

be shown that detente

policy that was developed jointly by the United States and

the U.S.S.R.

Rather, detente was conceived, implemented, and updated

ideological objectives
by the Soviet Union as a means by which long-term

could best be accomplished.

The United States, in the Soviet view,

detente that were established
never willingly agreed to the conditions of
by the Soviet Union.

continually
The Soviets argue that the United States

the unfriendly cold war
opposed the Soviet policy of detente and chose

policy of peace.
posture as an alternative to the Soviet
iv

It was only upon

reassessing the objective reality of the realignment of world forces
in
favor of socialism, the growing might of the Soviet Union, and the
inherent

weakening of and contradictions in the imperialist system that the United
States was forced to accept the Soviet policy of detente.
The Soviet Union not only created detente but built the policy
on the foundation of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

That ideology has done

much to define the scope and purpose of Soviet foreign policy in general
and detente in particular.

Detente was not specifically created as

a

means by which short-term objectives could be realized or the cause of

Soviet national interest served.

Rather, historical evidence suggests that

detente was designed as the catalyst by which long-term goals could be
achieved and the cause of communist ideological objectives addressed.
a

Thus,

presentation will be made in regard to the conflicting schools of thought

on the subject of ideology.

detente,

a

be argued that the central

It will

core of

commitment to the ideological goal of the worldwide victory

of socialism, has remained in existence throughout the long history of

Soviet-American detente.
The second major hypothesis presents the belief that detente was

created by V.I. Lenin in 1918, and has remained
Hence,

foreign policy to this day.

detente will be presented.

It will

a

a

constant factor in Soviet

detailed study of the history of

be shown that Lenin designed detente

as a means by which to accomplish eight (8) primary objectives.

provided the breathing spell,

solidate internal strength.

a

Detente

respite in war, by which Lenin could con-

Detente allowed Lenin to survive as an "oasis"

in a sea of capitalist-imperialist adversaries.

Detente gave Lenin the

military
means by which he could best prepare for the inevitable East-West

confrontation.

Detente provided the means by which Lenin could best

nations.
forestall the inevitable anti-Soviet alliance of imperialist
V

Detente afforded Lenin the opportunity to secure much needed Western,
and specifically American, economic assistance.

Detente provided the

means by which Lenin could exploit the existing contradictions within
the

imperialist camp.

Most importantly, detente provided the fulcrum by

which Lenin would achieve his ultimate goal of transforming the world in
the socialist order.
It will

be shown that Stalin and Khrushchev adhered to and

implemented the policy of detente as established by Lenin.

While making

basic alterations in the policy, both Stalin and Khrushchev maintained
the nucleus of detente and formulated Soviet foreign policy on the

basis of the detente strategy.

It will

also be demonstrated that Leonid

Brezhnev has maintained both the historical and ideological continuity
of detente to this day.

Evidence will be presented to support the thesis

that the detente of Brezhnev is far more effective than that of any of
his predecessors by virtue of the more advantageous and powerful

of the Soviet Union in world affairs.

It will

position

be shown that the achievement

of strategic parity by the Soviet Union and the augmented ranks of the

socialist commonwealth have made detente
It will

successful Soviet strategy.

maintaining the central objective of
been transformed from

a

a

very aggressive and highly

then be suggested that detente, while
a

worldwide socialist victory, has

defensive ploy to an offensive weapon.

The third major hypothesis will posit the belief that the Soviet

policy of detente has posed
United States.

It will

a

serious threat to the interests of the

be shown that the stated objectives of detente

are inimical to the United States and were designed to accrue unilateral

advantages to the cause of world socialism.

Moreover, the acceptance of

imposed by
detente by the United States, with the inherent limitations
to American
the Soviet Union, has made detente all the more dangerous
vi

interests.

It will

also be demonstrated that the U.S.S.R. has clearly

stated that detente will provide the catalyst for the further dissemination
of socialist influence and prestige to the direct detriment of the United

States.

Detente, in this view, has always provided the best conditions

for the proliferation of socialism and the construction of communism.
It will

be argued that the Soviet Union has used detente to

achieve the ultimate objective of gaining the worldwide victory of
socialism.

Within this overall strategy the U.S.S.R. has targetted the

specific objectives of further augmenting the ranks of non-capitalist
nations and of continuing the process of the realignment of world forces
in favor of socialism.

In

order to accomplish this objective the Soviet

Union has employed the strategic goal of realigning the Third World, or

developing nations, by way of national liberation movements, from the nonsocialist to the socialist camp.

Hence, it will

be argued that detente

imposes unilateral restraints on American action and allows for freedom
of action for the U.S.S.R. to pursue its foreign policy objectives.

Furthermore, detente does not allow for the preservation of the status quo,
the sustainment of the present balance of power, any convergence with the

West, the lessening of the inter-camp ideological struggle, or any long-term

rapprochement of sorts with the United States.

In fact,

in the Soviet

view, detente guarantees the antithesis of any of these and ensures the

shift in the status quo in favor of the "forces of peace,"

a

realignment

of the balance of power in favor of world socialism, no convergence with
the West, an intensification of the ideological struggle, and an irreversible

posture for the policy of capitalist decline and socialist gain.

vii

ABSTRACT
THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF DETENTE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
IDEOLOGICAL CONTINUITY OF THE POLICY OF PEACEFUL
COEXISTENCE FROM LENIN TO BREZHNEV
(May, 1981)

Stephen

R.

Willand, B.A., College of the Holy Cross

M.A., Center for Advanced International Studies, University
of Miami

(Fla.), Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Karl Ryavec

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the Soviet

perception of detente with specific reference to the conduct of Soviet-

American relations.

It is shown that the Soviet understanding of detente

differs significantly from that of the United States.

Moreover, the

Soviet view of detente has been translated from theory to practice and
now governs the scope of U.S. -Soviet, and East-West relations.

The first thesis presented is that detente was created by the

Soviet Union and was built on the foundation of revolutionary MarxistLeninist ideology.

It is demonstrated that detente was never mutually

designed by the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

detente was conceived by the Soviet Union as

long-term Soviet ideological objectives.

a

Rather, the policy of

means by which to achieve

The United States, in this

view, was forced to accept the Soviet policy of detente by virtue of the

objective factors underlying the growing might of the Soviet Union
and the alignment of world forces in favor of socialism.

Furthermore,

and posits
this dissertation differs with the "end of ideology" thesis

factor in the
the belief that ideology serves as an important determining
vi

i i

.

formulation of all Soviet foreign policy in general and detente in
particular.

It is shown that the ideological

of the worldwide

goal

victory of socialism has remained as the nucleus of the Soviet policy
of detente.
The second thesis is that detente was created by V.I. Lenin
in 1918, and has remained a constant factor in Soviet foreign policy to

this day.

It is demonstrated that Lenin utilized eight

(8)

criteria

to develop a defensive detente policy aimed at gaining the valuable

time necessary to strengthen the Soviet Union for the inevitable East-

West military confrontation.

Stalin continued the Leninist detente

strategy and greatly improved the position of the U.S.S.R. relative
to its chief imperialist adversary.

from

a

Khrushchev transformed detente

defensive maneuver to an offensive strategy aimed at effecting

incremental changes in the East-West balance of power without the need
for inevitable Soviet-American military confrontations.

Brezhnev, in

achieving military parity, made detente an aggressive strategy that
would serve the cause of world socialism to the detriment of the United
States
The third thesis is that detente has posed and will continue
to pose serious threats to the interests of the United States.

It is

shown that detente from the Soviet perspective guarantees an intensification
of the East-West ideological

struggle, the further decline of American

prestige, no convergence with the United States,

antagonisms,

a

a

deepening of class

repudiation of the status quo, and creates the best con-

communism.
ditions for the further growth of socialism and the building of

Rather than establishing

a

rapprochement between the United States and

on American
the Soviet Union, detente places unilateral restraints

ideological goals.
action and allows for the active pursuit of Soviet
ix

Detente is employed by the U.S.S.R. as the best means by which
to

achieve its final objective

-

the complete victory of socialism

-

by

its strategic objective of the further alignment of world forces
in

favor of socialism, and its specific strategy of aligning the developing

nations, through anti-imperialist national liberation revolutions, into
the pro-Soviet socialist camp.

X

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

ABSTRACT
Chapter
I.

INTRODUCTION

I

The Setting
Hypotheses to be Analyzed
Methodology: The Use of Primary Soviet Source Material
The Role of Ideology in the Formulation of Soviet
Foreign Policy
Review of Pertinent Scholarly Literature
Footnotes
.

II.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF DETENTE

Overview
The Long-Term Nature of Detente
Soviet Revisionism in Detente
The Present Version of Detente
The Irreversible Nature of Detente
Footnotes
IV.

.

11

.

.

14

THE IMPORTANCE OF DETENTE DURING THE BREZHNEV ERA
The American Perception of the Importance of Detente
The Significance of Detente: The Soviet View
The 1972 "Declaration of Basic Principles"
The Global Nature of Detente
Detente and the Pursuit of Soviet Objectives
Footnotes

III.

1
[

THE LENINIST PERCEPTION AND APPLICATION OF DETENTE
The Historical Setting
Leninist Ideological Revisionism: The Foundation
of Detente
The Early Months of U.S. -Soviet Relations
The Birth of Detente
1918:
The eight components of detente
1920-1921
The Revitalization of Detente:
Footnotes

xi

15
22
26
30

...

33
35
37
41

50
54
58

58
59
62
66
74
77
78
78
81

86
91

101

107
'^^^

V.

THE POLICY OF DETENTE AS IMPLEMENTED BY BREZHNEV

140

The Stalinist Perception of Detente
Khrushchev's Perception of Detente
The Brezhnev Adaptation of Detente, 1972-1976'
Detente as a breathing spell
The Soviet Union as a socialist oasis
Detente as a reaction to American military
superiority
Detente as a preparation for the final East-West war!
Detente as a reaction to a potential anti-Soviet
alliance
Detente as a means for securing Western economic
assistance
Detente as a means to exploit antagonisms within
the capitalist-imperialist world
Detente as a means for achieving the final victory
of socialism
The Limitations of Detente
Soviet Objectives Within Detente
Footnotes

......
[

*.

140
146
151

165
173
132
189

195

204
209

214
218
224
237

CONCLUSIONS

246

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

254

VI.

xii

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

We are living not merely in a state but in a system of
states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side
with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One
or the other must triumph in the end.
And before that end
supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet
Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.
-V.I. Lenin

The Setting

This dire warning was made by Lenin less than two years after
the October revolution of 1917 had swept him and his Bolshevik supporters
to the pinnacle of power in Soviet Russia.

During this time the

fledgling Soviet state was beset with many difficulties that threatened
its very existence as a functioning system of government.

These

problems made it equally difficult for the Soviet government of that
time to become

a

recognized world power conducting

realistic foreign

a

policy with the established nations of the world capitalist system.
Yet, while confronted with the socio-economic, political, and military

chaos engendered by World War

I

and the ensuing revolutions, civil

'

strife and civil war, Lenin, some three years before the official formulation of the Soviet Union, had already made it unquestionably clear
that Soviet relations with the West would merely be

phenomenon.

a

temporary

These relations, according to Lenin, would inevitably

terminate with the fatal demise of one of the conflicting systems.
a

Thus,

more ominous prediction was made by Lenin less than one year later:
1

2

2

As long as capitalism and socialism exist we cannot
live
in peace.
In the end one or the other will triumph
a funeral
dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over

world capitalism.'
It was, therefore,

a

basic belief of Leninist ideology that

a

cataclysmic clash between the two conflicting socio-economic systems was
unavoidable.

In Lenin's view the powers of the world capitalist-

imperialist structure simply would not submissively acquiesce to the
demise of their system.

Rather, these nations would employ any and all

strategic means at their disposal, including the waging of full-scale
war, to forestall the destruction of their dying socio-economic

structure.

Furthermore, Lenin reasoned that the extinction of the

capitalist-imperialist world order was not only historically inevitable
but was also predicted by the creation of its antithesis -- the communist

controlled socialist government of Soviet Russia.
While Lenin was certain that the Soviet state would inevitably be
forced to engage the West in

a

life and death struggle, he was equally

assured as to the ultimate victor in this unavoidable Armageddon.

So

as to leave no doubt as to which system of states would be vanquished
in this struggle, Lenin further stated:

Despite this (the backwardness of Russia) we are firmly
convinced that we are invincible, because mankind will not
break down under the imperialist slaughter, but will overWe are beyond imperialist dependence, we raised
come it.
before the whole world the banner of struggle for the complete overthrow of imperialism.
In a word, we are invincible, because the world proletarian revolution is invincible.
Such

a

despairing prognosis for the future of international

relations would hardly seem to be conducive to the maintenance of harmonious inter-state relations, especially between those states with

differing social systems of the East and West.

If one were inclined to

.

3

attach significant emphasis to these apocalyptic warnings of Lenin and,

more importantly, to transpose them to the present era of international
relations, one might then expect the contemporary international situation
to be governed by total

world.

In

animosity between the communist and capitalist

fact, one could reasonably argue that Leninist ideology

would preclude any future continuation of coexistence between the Soviet
state and world capitalism, since the long-term nature of their coexistence
from 1917 to today was purely unthinkable for Lenin.
Yet, the contemporary state of international relations, as it exists

more than sixty years after the formation

of the Soviet state, is far

removed from the situation as envisaged by Lenin.

To be sure, the Soviet

Union and the West, and most notably the United States, must still contend

with

a

series of crises and direct confrontations.

Yet no "funeral

dirge"

has been sung over either system as both the U.S.S.R. and world capitalism

have managed to co-habitate the same planet for

of time.

a

reasonably long period

What is more, the two global superpowers, one the acknowledged

leader of an ever-expanding, albeit polycentric, socialist-camp, and
the other the bastion of world capitalism-imperialism, have mutually

agreed to embark on
a

a

far-reaching course of action aimed at creating

mutual understanding between them and at establishing

of cooperation.

a

viable system

Hence, the United States and the Soviet Union since

1972 have negotiated, or are now negotiating, important accords of both
a

bilateral and multi-lateral nature.

For the most part, these agreements

have as their stated underlying motivation

a

movement away from the

of
aforementioned pessimistic view of world politics in the realm

socialist-capital i St relations
to the
How then does the present course of events correspond

4

pessimistic world view as espoused by Lenin?

Furthermore, how is it

that the Soviet state and the nations of the capitalist-imperialist

order have managed to exist side by side with each other for such
long period of time

a

a

thought that was unthinkable in Lenin's mind?

Has the present Soviet leadership altered and revised Leninist doctrine
so extensively and mellowed so far in their interpretation of the

seemingly intransigent communist view of the West to the point of becoming
"soft on capitalism" and of finding

very ideological antithesis?

a

permanent modus vivendi with its

Have they further, as they have been

accused by their most ardent critics within the socialist camp, become

revisionists in their own right, forsaking their duty as proletarian

internationalists so as to advance the objectives of the Soviet national
interest?

What have become of the behests of Lenin and, most importantly,

his dogmatic assertions that capitalist and socialist nations cannot

live in peace for

a

long period of time?

Have these stern ideological

tenets become victims of the lack of revolutionary zeal among the

faceless party bureaucrats who now hold the mantel of power in the

Kremlin?

Furthermore, has the present Soviet leadership supplanted

Leninist revolutionary ideology with the ideology of East-West convergence and/or indefinite coexistence?
In the minds

of many political observers the answers to the

questions posited above are in the affirmative.

Within the communist

reproach in this
world itself, the Soviet Union has not been above
regard.

for example,
Leading spokesmen in the People's Republic of China,

out" to the West and of
have long accused the Soviet Union of "selling
prol etarianism to the goals
sacrificing the objectives of international

Russian national interest.
of traditional and non-revolutionary

5

While claims and counter-claims of ideological revisionism exist

within the communist world, many political observers in the West, albeit
for different reasons, arrive at similar conclusions.

In this view,

the

Soviet Union either never strictly adhered to the revolutionary

ideology of Lenin or, in the face of

a

post-industrial thermonuclear

world, has realized that ardent Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideology
has outlived its usefulness.

The first theory has its roots in the earliest days of socialist-

capitalist relations with the formulation of the Soviet state and the
initial Western response.

Many Western nations, and most notably the

United States, failed to fully understand the revolutionary experiment

taking place on Russian soil.

The first official American response was

somewhat skeptical in nature and looked upon the Bolshevik party and
its extremist views on class struggle and revolutions as

phenomenon that could not exist for

a

a

short-lived

long period of time while basing

its existence on the foundations of a militant and fanatical

ideology.

3

The second school of thought, which will be analyzed in greater
detail

later, theorizes that the pragmatic concerns of

a

modern nation-

state supersede the concerns of political philosophy and form the basis
for the present era of international relations characterized by an
"end of ideology."'^

In this

light, the present Soviet regime has most

with
definitely foresaken the extremist objectives of Leninist ideology

attainable in the
the realization that they are no longer practical nor

present era of international relations.

National interests, traditional

not Leninist ideology,
power politics, and balance of power concerns, and
5

this regard.
form the basis of Soviet foreign policy in

Thus, it is

Soviet regime to co-exist with
quite natural in this view for the present

6

the West, at the expense of Leninist revolutionary thought, for it is
in the national

interest of the Soviet Union to do so.

While the Soviet

propaganda machine makes repeated assertions to the contrary, they are
dismissed, in this view, as ideological rhetoric that in no way forms
a

basis for the determination of Soviet actions.^
For whatever reasons, many Western analysts now believe that the

behests of Lenin and the dictates of his revolutionary ideology have

become lost in

a

maze of national interests and non-revolutionary concerns

that occupy the minds of the policy makers in the Kremlin.^
It is not surprising therefore, that few Western political

are willing to ascribe

a

analysts

great deal of credibility to the incessant

claims by the Brezhnev regime that the class struggle is intensifying,
that the ideological antagonisms between the two camps are becoming more

acute, and that the present era of international affairs is characterized
by the deepest form of ideological

struggle between the East and the West.

Such assertions are looked upon as mere ideological bombast,

a

g

necessary

component of the ritual performed by Soviet theoreticians and propagandists.
The world view, as espoused by Lenin and reiterated by the Soviet regime
to this day, is illogical, in the minds of many, in that it calls for the

ultimate defeat of the West, the intensification of the class and
ideological struggles, and the primary role of ideology and ideological

commitments.

Many analysts therefore, find it difficult to believe that

the ruling regime of

a

modern superpower, complete with extensive strategic

can be illogical
and conventional military technology and global influence

and irrational

in regard to its most basic and guiding political

philosophy.
cast
During the early Brezhnev years many observers

a

disparaging

7

eye on the role of ideology and saw the bureaucratic regime of Brezhnev
as providing the catalyst for an era when Soviet-American interests

would not be inimical and when
nations could be found.

a

permanent rapprochement between the two

It was here that a number of political

scientists,

journalists, and economists provided theories regarding the eventual
harmony that would exist between the two countries.

One of the more

popular schools of thought in this regard espoused the belief that

vergence of the two opposing systems was inevitable.

con-

a

Arguing that the

Soviet Union would most probably not return to capitalism and that the
United States would not embark upon communism, it became logical to assume
that the two states, in their own best interests, would converge on

middle ground and form

a

hybrid of the two systems.

with the uselessness of pursuing

a

a

The Soviet Union, faced

militant ideology, would find such

a

course of action to their benefit since it would, in the words of John
Kenneth Galbraith, "dispose of the notion of inevitable conflict based on

irreconcilable difference."

g

Yet, the Brezhnev Doctrine, the invasion of

Czechoslovakia, and the stigma of "neo-Stal inism" attached to the Brezhnev
regime re-emphasized the fact that the Soviet leadership was not interested
in any permanent ideological

coexistence or convergence of the two

ideologies.
In the early 1970's,

however, there was new evidence of

iation between the U.S.S.R. and the United States;

a

a

reconcil-

reconciliation that

culminated in 1972 with the visit of an American president to Moscow.
and,
When Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev concluded their agreements

most importantly, signed the "Declaration of Basic Principles,"
of Soviet-American relations was proclaimed.

a

new era

Concurrently, many observers

the two nations, the
saw the long-anticipated reconciliation between

8

cessation of ideological polemics between them,
and the beginning of

a

non-ideological age of harmony and mutual interests
in the conduct of
Soviet- American relations.

The catalyst for the rapprochement would

be the policy of detente, a policy that would,
it was claimed, bring to
a

halt foreign policies that were based on the belief
that irreconcilable

ideologies must exist, that each side must attempt to destroy
the other,
and that the differences between the two nations precluded
the attainment

of

a

permanent coexistence.
Detente, in the minds of many, would succeed where so many other

theories and policies had failed.

Detente would establish the "rules of

the game" whereby each party agreed to play within certain limits and,

always, avoiding

a

direct confrontation with the other.

Detente would

eliminate any aspirations of global hegemony on the part of either
country, establish clearly defined spheres of influence, and would emphasi
mutual

cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

Most

importantly, as we were told incessantly by the American architects of
the detente policy, detente would eliminate the possibility of

nuclear confrontation between the two global superpowers;

a

a

thermo-

confrontation

that would threaten the very existence of mankind.
The policy of detente, in this writer's view, cannot be expected
to achieve any of the aforementioned objectives.

If the stated objectives

of the detente policy are those of modifying the Soviet adherence to

ideological dogma, and compliance with the long-term goals of Leninist

ideology, then it has been and will continue to be ineffective.

If its

objectives are those of codifying rules, establishing spheres of influence
and setting limits on acceptable action by the Soviet Union, then it
will

be equally ineffective.

Detente, in this writer's view, will not

9

provide

a

viable deterrent to the pursuit of Soviet objectives that

are inimical to the best interests of the United States.

In fact, con-

tinued acquiesence on the part of the American government to the
policy
of detente, as witnessed from 1972 to the present, may well serve
to

enhance the prospects of continued unilateral Soviet advantages in the
realm of international affairs.
In

an attempt to support these claims, this dissertation will

certain significant areas of the policy of detente to
scrutiny.

a

subject

fairly detailed

Throughout this analysis heavy emphasis will be given to the

Soviet perception of detente.

It is clearly the goal

of this dissertation

to analyze Soviet motives and rationales and to reach some logical con-

clusions in regard to Soviet thought as it pertains to the detente
strategy.

It will

be important, of course, to examine the American

perception and understanding of detente quite closely as well; yet, this
analysis will be less intensive than the study of the Soviet viewpoint.
This dissertation will also provide an historical analysis of the

detente policy from Lenin to Brezhnev.

The major focus of the detente

strategy in the Brezhnev era will center on the period from 1972 to 1976.
It was during this time span that the Soviet leadership accorded the

detente strategy the highest level of prestige and when the American

government pursued the detente line with the most ardent vigor.
With the innauguration of President Carter in 1977 the American

perception and pursuance of the policy of detente underwent basic alterations that at first were very subtle, and most recently have been

somewhat dramatic.
and

a

The initial emphasis on international human rights,

less enthusiastic American pursuit of detente led many observers

to conclude that detente as

a

viable tool in the management of

Soviet-American affairs might quietly wither away as each side
reverted
to a Cold War relationship.

Recent events have added further fuel to

the fires of those writing the obituaries for detente.

The faltering

SALT negotiations, the crisis in Iran, the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan, and the ensuing American boycott of the Olympic Games in

Moscow have all contributed to the belief that detente had, in fact,
been eliminated from the list of foreign policy objectives of both the

U.S.S.R. and the United States.

The resignation of Secretary of State

Cyrus Vance, an acknowledged moderate in regard to the Soviet Union,
and the apparent victory of the "hardliners" epitomized by National

Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski have added further vigor to the
death of detente philosophy.

The innauguration of President Reagan has,

of course, also done much to inspire those who would write the final

epitaph of detente.
It is this writer's

belief that such

a

view is erroneous in that it

acknowledges only one perception of detente, the American, to the exclusion
of the Soviet understanding of the policy.

If detente did indeed die in

1979 or 1980 it did so only from the perspective of the American govern-

ment and Western political commentators.

vastly different.

In

The view from the Kremlin is

Moscow's view, detente was never meant to exclude

any of the animosities, conflicts, or crises in United States-Soviet

relations that now cause such concern in the United States.

On the

contrary, detente as the Soviet Union has consistently informed us, allows
for the intensification of the worldwide class struggle and the

strengthening of the ideological conflict between the world's two great
superpowers.

As

Leonid Brezhnev stated shortly after the departure from

Moscow of Richard Nixon:

.

n
striving for the confirmation of the principle of peacecoexistence, we recognize that successes in this important
matter in no way signify the possibility of weakening the
ideological struggle.
On the contrary, it is necessary to be
prepared that this struggle will intensify, will become a still
sharper form of the antagonism between the two social systems.
And we do not have any doubts about the outcome of this
struggle, for the truth of history, the objective laws of
social development are on our side.^*^
ful

The Soviet Union has claimed that there is little, if any,

difference in their perception of the policy of detente during the entire
Carter administration and the period from 1972 to 1976.

Nothing has

changed in the minds of the Kremlin leaders in regard to detente

's

goals

and objectives, its ideological content, or the acceptable foreign policy

actions that it permits.

What has changed is the American willingness to

fully accept the Soviet doctrine of detente and to make such an acceptance
the primary goal of American foreign policy.

Hypotheses To Be Analyzed

In this writer's view, the policy of detente,

as a process that

governs the relations between the world's two most powerful nations,

represents an important, if not the most important, aspect of international
relations.

Yet, at the same time, detente has been and will continue to

be a phenomenon that causes no small

amount of confusion and uncertainty.

These areas of confusion will be addressed in the form of three basic

hypotheses to be presented here and analyzed in detail throughout the

dissertation
The first hypothesis to be posited is that detente is

a

political

strategy that was designed and conceived by the U.S.S.R., that has its
theoretical foundation in revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology, and
that is governed to

a

large degree by the dictates of Soviet ideology.
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It will

be shown that detente was never a mutually
developed process

by the nations of the East and West in general, or the
Soviet Union and

United States in particular.
was born of necessity to

a

Rather, as will be demonstrated, detente

Soviet leadership that, while attempting to

prepare itself for an inevitable confrontation with the West,
desperately

groped for

a

process that would defer this confrontation to

advantageous time.
and fostered by

a

a

more

The detente scheme was written by the Soviet Union

realistic assessment by the Soviet ruling hierarchy

that they faced an insurmountable disadvantage in military and industrial

technology vis-a-vis the West.
and

It will

be shown that detente as a policy,

Soviet strategy for action, was designed by its creators as

a

a

means

by which long-term Soviet goals and objectives could be realized.

Furthermore, the ideological continuity of the detente process
from its original Leninist design to the present Soviet interpretation
will

be given special

emphasis.

It will

be argued that the most basic

component of detente is the goal of the ultimate defeat of the world

capitalist-imperialist structure, which was fashioned by the tenets of

Marxist-Leninist ideology.
The second major hypothesis posits the belief that the present

Soviet-American detente structure
of

a

is

policy that was originally developed in 1918 by Lenin.

Confronted

host of domestic difficulties, Lenin formed the strategy of detente

with

a

as

means by which to both postpone

a

the latest variation and maturation

a

direct clash with the West and

strengthen his country for the eventual pursuit of long-term and global
foreign policy objectives.

There is evidence that suggests that detente,

while adapting to the changing environment of international relations,
has maintained the essential

core of the Leninist detente to this day.
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The third hypothesis is that the Soviet
perception and application

of the detente strategy has posed and will continue
to pose

serious

a

threat to American interests and may accrue continued
unilateral advantages to the Soviet cause.
two hypotheses.

This thesis is directly related to the first

If the process of detente was designed by the
Soviet Union,

and if the nucleus of its development has been

a

hostile ideology with

stated objectives that are antithetical to those of the United
States,
then it is logical to assume that the process itself poses

United States.

threat to the

The Soviet perception of detente is replete with assertions

that the ideological
the West will

a

struggle will

intensify, the class antagonisms with

become more acute, and that detente was developed as

of Western weakness and futility, as well as

a

aimed at the ultimate defeat of the West.

a

result

drastic change in the

correlation of world forces in favor of the communist world.
the Soviets have told us that detente is

a

Furthermore,

strategy for struggle that

is

As such, it implies no conver-

gence with the West, utilizes economic and scientific competition, condones

Soviet-backed "wars of national liberation," allows for the expansion of
communist influence, permits "violent paths to power," is not applicable
to other socialist states, realizes a persistent danger of inter-camp wars,

condones continued Soviet military buildup, and calls for new and

strengthened roles for the Soviet military forces.

This theoretical

percep-

tion of detente by the Soviet Union has been directly translated into

practice.

The Soviet support of the MPLA forces in Angola, economic

assistance to the new Iranian government, Soviet activity in Ethiopia,
the invasion of Afghanistan, among other actions, were all undertaken

within the framework of the Soviet perception of detente.

In

short,

detente, in the Soviet view, sets no limits on hostile Soviet actions, and,

3
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in many ways, allows

for their more active pursuit.

American policymakers

have expressed the belief that short-term
or regional objectives and

victories by the U.S.S.R. do not warrant
the elimination of the detente
policy and, it is supposed, the consequent
renewal of the threat of

thermonuclear war.

As such, the process of detente
has hampered American

activities in the realm of foreign policy and
possesses the potential to
continue to do so in the future.

Methodology: The Use of Primary Soviet Source
Material
The serious student attempting to analyze Soviet
politics and

predict Soviet behavior has been consistently beset with

a

host of difficul-

ties not usually encountered by political scientists and
area specialists

who are not concerned with the political machinations of the Kremlin

regime.

Much of this difficulty, of course, stems from the very nature of

the Soviet political system which has all too often excluded or rendered

useless the traditional and accepted methods of analysis and observation

employed in investigative scholarship in other areas.

It has been

claimed that this lack of conventional research techniques in regard to
the Soviet Union has led to a good deal of Western ignorance of the

U.S.S.R.;

12

ignorance that may well have led to serious and costly miscalcu-

lations regarding Soviet motives, especially in the immediate post-World
War II years.

1

It was partially in response to the costly lessons learned in dealing

with the Soviet Union that the West began to devote

attention to scholarly investigation of the U.S.S.R.

a

great deal of
Thus,

a

large number

of research methodologies and paradigms of inquiry were created and serious
and sophisticated bodies of literature pertaining to the Soviet Union
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began to emerge.

""^

However, many of these research
models prove, in this

writer's view, to be unsatisfactory in
that they attempt to utilize

scientific discipline in an area that lacks
sufficient amounts of scientific dataJ"
A factor to be emphasized in regard to
any scholarly research on

the Soviet Union is that the Soviet regime,
through the dissemination of
the oral and written word, continually reveals

a

great deal about its

perception, goals, and objectives on even the most
crucial and sensitive
issues.

Thus,

a

careful analysis of official Soviet documentation
will

provide an accurate means of assessing present Soviet
views and of pre-

dicting future Soviet behavior.
The Soviet political system is, by its very nature, forced
to

reiterate the accepted political stance on any given issue throughout all
levels of its administration.

In so doing the Soviets provide outsiders

with an accurate account of what to expect.
for political

uniformity, or

Soviet political system.
is

a

""^

This is due to the necessity

pretense thereof, that is vital to the

The only manner in which this can be affected

to continually expound the policies and views of the Kremlin to the

point that there is no room for misapprehension at any level of the party
or governmental apparatus.

The oral and written word are not only the

means by which the Soviet regime can provide essential guidance at all
levels, but are also an effective means for avoiding confusion and

uncertainty in any new policy or program.

There have been very few major

changes or policy implementations that have not been foreshadowed by

extensive press campaigns and authoritative statements by the ruling
hierarchy.^''

If one is willing to read and scrutinize the often redundant,

polemical, and ideologically-charged mass of official Soviet documentation
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then

very accurate means of analysis, in
this writer's view, will be
1 p
employed.
a

Nowhere has the flow of official documentation
on the part of the

Soviet regime been as great as it has been
in relation to the subject
of
detente.

This is itself an aid to research.

A careful

reading of Soviet

speeches, press reports, and radio broadcasts
regarding detente has

offered observers an impressive amount of material
that
and authoritative.
is

a

is

both informative

Furthermore, especially as it relates to detente,
there

direct correlation between Soviet words and Soviet
deeds.

In nearly

every aspect of detente, Soviet policies and actions
have conformed very

closely to the definition and spirit of detente that has been
publicly
espoused by the Soviet government.

The Soviet government has not been

reluctant to tell us what detente means; we in the West, however, are often

reluctant to believe what they say.

The Role of Ideology in the Formulation of
Soviet Foreign Policy

Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement. .The role of the vanguard can be fulfilled
only by a party that is guided by an advanced theory
.

-V.I. Lenin

There is considerable debate regarding the role of ideology as
a

determining factor in the formulation of Soviet policy and as

a

variable that either should or should not be addressed in an analysis
of Soviet behavior.

It is certainly not within the scope of this

paper

to offer a definitive critique of this debate, the very subjective nature

of which precludes the attainment of any authoritative or final solution.

However, since the Soviet perceptions of detente, as seen through official

Soviet sources, form the main focus of this report, it

is

imperative that
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ideology and its influence on the conduct of Soviet actions
be clearly
defined.
As is the case with most debates of this nature, two
schools of

thought exist with viewpoints diametrically opposed to the other.
there are those that view Soviet ideology as no more than

a

First,

ritualistic

justification of action that is misleading and manipulative, as well as
being subservient to the more traditional considerations of national

interests and power politics as determining factors in the formulation of

Soviet foreign policy.

The antithesis of this argument is that ideology

provides the Soviet hierarchy with

a

theoretical blueprint that transcends

most other considerations and influences both the character and substance
of Soviet political

behavior.

For many, the relative importance of ideology

vis-a-vis more orthodox political considerations

is

a

fluctuating phenomenon

that is tempered by the substantive nature of the particular policy in

question and, as such, must be viewed as something other than either an
inflexible, ironclad dogma or an irrelevant, irrational political philosophy.
For those who view ideology as being subservient to the role of

national interest in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, complicated
issues of Soviet foreign policy, such as the complex question of the

Sino-Soviet rift,^^ are cast in frameworks that totally ignore any ideological
motivation on the part of either the Moscow or Peking regimes.

20

Furthermore, ideology, in this view is seen in the area of domestic

policy as

a

means of self-justification and/or manipulation that serves as

little more than

a

mechanism that can ensure compliance of the Soviet

masses with the policies of the Kremlin regime.
In regard to foreign

21

policy considerations this school of thought

often dwells upon the "instrumental" character of ideology.

In this

respect.

.
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"ideology serves foreign policy as justification
after the fact, while
the principal concern of Soviet policy-makers in
the realm of doctrine...

i

to retain a free hand for any opportune move,
unrestricted by possible

theoretical inhibitions."^^

Ideology, in this light, is not

a

national

guide to the operations of Soviet foreign policy at all, but
is rather

a

post facto legitimizer of actions governed by the cause of
national

interest.

Moreover, the invocation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, as

expressed by Alfred

Meyer, goes beyond the function of legitimizing

G.

Soviet actions and acts as

a

deliberate "deceptive smokescreen" used to

prevent others from understanding the true motivations underlying Soviet
actions

23

If detente has robbed ideology of its inspirational character as
a

guide to the conduct of foreign policy, it is quite natural that its

corollary function as

a

legitimizer of Soviet actions should increase.

Those who feel that detente has precipitated

importance of ideology see

a

a

further demise in the

directly proportional relationship between

the increase in the dimensions of detente and the need for

for the policies of the Soviet regime.

justification

This need, quite naturally, is

served by ideology which now, more than ever, functions as
for self-legitimization.

a

a

mere tool

24

Within the research framework of this dissertation ideology will
be viewed as an important determining factor in the design and conduct of

Soviet foreign policy.

This is not to say that ideology alone serves

as an inflexible guide to the pursuit of Soviet objectives or that all

Soviet activity flows automatically from that ideology.

Yet, at the same

time, it should be noted that there is evidence that indicates that

ideology still provides an inspirational source of guidance for the

19

decision makers of the U.S.S.R.
It will

be shown below that an important
feature of Marxist-

Leninist ideology is the commitment to the objective
of achieving the
final victory of socialism over capitalism.

have claimed,

25

Leading Soviet spokesmen

and noted Western commentators have observed,

that this

ideological goal of transforming the world in the socialist
order remains
as a central

component of long-term Soviet planning.

Specific Soviet

actions when examined within the confines of their own seemingly
limited

objectives and not as

a

small

part in a much larger, more elaborate scheme,

might very well seem to be dictated by the cause of national interest.
This is true because of the need for foreign policy to be adaptive to the

present historical environment in which it operates.

When the long-term

and ultimate objective of Soviet foreign affairs is disassociated from
its short-term or regional

national

interest.

goals, it is easy to confuse ideology and

For many, these two factors, far from being mutually

exclusive, operate together and often overlap.
It has

reality of

a
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been claimed by Adam B. Ulam that in the Soviet Union the

modernized and industrialized society clashes with the ideo-

logical premises and hence "the U.S.S.R. is bent upon ideological and power

expansion."

28

Perhaps the most concise manifestation of the problem of

national interest in respect to ideology was inadvertently made by Fred

Warner Neal in his testimony before

a

House subcommittee.

first stated that Moscow was motivated to embark upon

reasons of national

a

Professor Neal

detente policy for

interest, in this case, to insure national security

vis-a-vis both Peking and Washington.

In the very next sentence,

however,

it is claimed that "one of the reasons the Russians want to avoid war is

to further the chances of achieving communism in the world.

They reason

20

that it cannot be built on the ruins of

a

thermonuclear conf 1 ict

.

.

"^^

.

The fact that the ultimate end of communist
ideology cannot be achieved
in the aftermath of a catastrophic

of the contemporary means of

adversary.

It can

a

nuclear clash dictated the feasibility

detente with the major Soviet nuclear

be argued that the protection of Soviet
national

security, the advancement of Soviet influence, and
the augmentation of
Soviet power and prestige are not necessarily objective
ends of the Soviet
state per se but are instead the functional means for the
further advance-

ment of the communist cause.
ideology itself defines
in such a way as

In fact,

'national

one observer has noted that "Soviet

interest,'

'power'

and

'world revolution'

to make them virtually as indistinguishable and inseparable

as the three sides of an equilateral

triangle.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

views the Soviet commitment to the goal of the worldwide socialist victory
as

infusing Soviet foreign policy with

a

"sense of continuity in purpose,"

"universitality of goal," which clearly separates it from traditional

and

policies of power politics:

Admittedly, Soviet foreign policy, especially in its shortterm aspects, is concerned with national security, frontiers,
national power, etc. -- factors that inherently introduce
similarities with Russia's traditional concerns. Quite unlike
their predecessors, however, the Soviet leaders view these
issues in terms of certain long-range perspectives and not as
ends in themselves 31
.

While the Kremlin hierarchy may well have consistently manipulated
the masses, asking seemingly impossible sacrifices and demanding persistent

patience in the name of ideology, this does not mean that ideological

exhortation is
by

a

a

form of cruel chicanery perpetrated on the Soviet citizenry

handful of priviledged leaders who believe none of what they say.

As

the noted team of sociologists, Inkeles, Bauer, and Kluckhohn state, "the

leadership's use of ideology for cynical manipulation does not mean that

21

the regime does not take ideas as such
seriously

-

quite the contrary. "32

To think otherwise is to represent ideology,
in the words of R.N. Carew
Hunt,
"as a species of opium with which the
Soviet leaders contrive to lull

the

people while taking care never to indulge in
it themselves" thus attributing to them "an ability to dissociate themselves
from the logic of their

system -- an ability which it is unlikely they
possess.
It has

been noted that only

a

"^^^

serious setback, which would weaken

the Soviet position of influence and prestige, could
force the Soviet Union
to lose "its evangelical

fervor and sense of imperial destiny and resign

itself to function within the framework of limited objectives and
circumscribed ends."
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within

a

back.

In fact,

The present era of detente, and the immediate future

detente structure, would not seem to augur any such serious setevidence suggests that the successes enjoyed by the Soviet

Union in its foreign policy from 1972 to 1980 would seem to add to, rather
than subtract from, the momentum the Kremlin now has in the realm of

foreign affairs.

Summarizing the past decade of Soviet foreign policy,

Leonid Brezhnev, for example, can paint

a

picture of Soviet advances that

can only strengthen the Soviet position vis-a-vis the United States.

Citing

socialist gains in India, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf and elsewhere Brezhnev
claims that Soviet-styled detente not only strengthened the "unity of
the fraternal countries" but also served the interests of "the peoples

who have freed themselves from colonial oppression and are engaged in
the difficult task of constructing a new and independent life."

the U.S. leadership for "pursuing

a
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Denouncing

line aimed at undermining detente and

aggravating the international situation," Brezhnev can warn the United
States, as follows:

.
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...the present day colonialists run the risk
of miscalcu''^"^^'^ ^'"''"9
Prewar
years,
or even
Ih^-iQ.n.^'^^
n°
inthe
1950 s.
Dozens of previously dependent countries
have
gained experience in independent life and policy
..
They will
not so easily renounce detente for the sake
of American plans
for world domination.
For our part, we continue to favor the
development of peaceful cooperation of all sorts with
these

f

countries

.

.

This correlation of world forces in favor of socialism,
along with

the proliferation of socialist principles, the
strengthening of socialist

internationalism and others, are assertions that the Soviet Union
has
been making for some time now.

Taken in light of the present Soviet

position in international affairs, however, they show

a

Soviet position

that from Moscow's perspective is free of any serious setbacks or loss
of

influence and prestige.

Review of Pertinent Scholarly Literature

This dissertation will

attempt to provide

a

new perspective on

subject matter that is considered to be of great importance.

interesting to note, however, that while

a

a

It is

great deal of scholarly liter-

ature has addressed the topic of Soviet-American relations and of Soviet

foreign policy in general, very little has been written in regard to the
subject matter of detente per se

.
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Nostrand, 1960), Anatol Rapoport, The Big Two

:
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American
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Soviet-American Perceptions

:
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of Foreiqn Policy (New York: Pegasus,
1971), Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals
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America and Russia Since World War
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Hoffmann and Frederic
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(New York:
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Prager Publishers, 1971),

Fleron, Jr., eds. The Conduct of SoviPt
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The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press,
1967), Vernon A. Aspaturian, ed. Process and Power
in Soviet Foreign

Mlcz

(Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971).

Together these works con-

stitute an exhaustive study of nearly every facet
of U.S. -Soviet relations,
and posit varying claims in regard to peaceful coexistence,
the Cold War,

containment, Soviet expansionism, and the like.

Very few, if any, of

these works, however, directly address the subject of Soviet-American
or

East-West detente or coexistence in

contribution here is Albert

L.

York University Press, 1976).

Detente:

a

comprehensive manner.

A notable

Weeks, The Troubled Detente (New York: New

Other works include Gerald

L.

Steibel,

Promises and Pitfalls (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., Inc.,

1975), Jeffrey Simon, Ruling Communist Parties and Detente: A Documentary

History (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1975), and George Schwab and Henry Friedlander, eds. Detente in
Historical Perspective (New York: Cyrco Press, 1975).

those by Adam
K.

B.

Of all these studies

Ulam (especially his Expansion and Coexistence ) Zbigniew

Brzezinski, and George

F.

Kennan are considered by this writer to be

the most authoritative and informative.

The subject of ideology in the Soviet Union, and its role in shaping

foreign and domestic policy has received considerable attention in Western

scholarly literature.

The most authoritative of these, in my view, is

Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1962).

Other contributions include: Michel Tatu, Power in the
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Kremlin From Khrushchev to Kosygin (New York:
The Viking Press, 1968),
^^"'^^
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(New York: Collier Books, 1961), and "Ten
Theories in

^"
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Schapiro, The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union (New York:
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Random House, 1960), Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1967), Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics-The
Dilemma of Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), Alfred
Meyer, The Soviet Political System:
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An Interpretation (New York: Random

House, 1965), Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, How
the Soviet System Works

(New York: Vintage Books, 1956),

R.

Judson Mitchell,

"Continuity and Change in Soviet Ideology," Current History (October, 1975),
Bayless Manning, "Goals, Ideology and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs
(January, 1976), Jerry

F.

Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or

Pluralism?" Problems of Communism (March-April, 1972), Samuel
"National

Interest:

Sharp,

Key to Soviet Politics," Robert V. Daniels, "Doctrine

and Foreign Policy," R.N.
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Carew Hunt, "The Importance of Doctrine," Adam

Ulam, "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," all in Hoffman and

Fleron, eds. The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Aldine-

Atherton, 1971), Wolfgang Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism (New York: Holt

Rinehart and Winston, 1970), and Bertram
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Wolfe, "Communist Ideology

and Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs
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of literature provides

a

This body

thorough and complete presentation of the
role

of ideology and also represents

a

fairly wide spectrum of thought on the

structure of the Soviet political system and the
appropriate methodologies
by which to study it.

Of all these works, it is my belief that the
most

informative and accurate are those of Brzezinski and Carew
Hunt on the
subject of ideology and Conquest on the subject of investigative

methodologies.

.
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CHAPTER

II

THE IMPORTANCE OF DETENTE DURING THE
BREZHNEV ERA
The Soviet Union claims that detente
forms the very pillars on

which its foreign policy is constructed.

At the same time, the American

government has claimed that detente is the only sane
and rational
guideline for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
detente as

a

means by which to achieve communist objectives.

States, meanwhile, sees detente as
on expansionist goals will
as

a

The U.S.S.R. views

a

The United

means by which confrontations based

be eliminated.

The Soviet Union views detente

catalyst for the intensification of the ideological struggle.

United States perceives detente as
Moscow.

For

a

way to reach

a

The

reconciliation with

one it means change in the world; for the other, stability.

Both parties obviously have vastly different perceptions of the same policy
by which they have mutually agreed to abide.

Despite the major differences

their understanding of detente, leading spokesmen in both the Soviet Union
and the United States have agreed on one major point; detente is the single

most important policy in the realm of international relations.
This view was echoed incessantly in both Washington and Moscow from
1

972 to

1

976.

In the ensuing four years the Kremlin regime did not change

the party line in this regard and, to this day asserts that detente forms

the very nucleus of Soviet foreign policy.

On the other hand, the United

States has diminished its praise of detente in light of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which some American observers feel constitutes

flagrant violation of the principles of detente.
30

a

The Soviets, for their par

2
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see this action as perfectly consistent
with detente which never pre-

cluded and, in fact, fostered the
proliferation and expansion of the

peace-loving principles of socialist
internationalism.
Leonid Brezhnev has charged in this regard
that "imperialist and
Peking progaganda are del i berately and shame!
essly distorting the Soviet

Union's role in Afghan affairs."^

Brezhnev has also claimed that the stern

American response to Soviet activity has seriously
worsened the international situation.

In the words of Brezhnev:

Our Party's consistent and creative pursuit of a
course
aimed at peace, detente and disarmament and at the
implementation of the Peace Program advanced by the 24th and
25th
C.P.S.U. Congresses has made it possible to accomplish
a
great deal
But, unfortunately, as the 1970's end and the 1980's
begin the international situation has worsened appreciably.
The people ought to know the truth about who is responsible
for this.
I
can answer without reservation--the blame rests
with the imperialist forces, and above all with certain
circles in the U.S.

Brezhnev then can clearly identify the fact that the United States
did not understand the meaning of Soviet actions in Afghanistan, within

the framework of detente:

Today the opponents of peace and detente are trying to
capitalize on the events in Afghanistan. Mountains of lies
are being heaped up around these events, and a shameless
anti-Soviet campaign is underway. What actually happened
in Afghanistan?3
What actually happened, in Brezhnev's view, is that the Soviet
Union rendered support to "revolutionary Afghanistan" in the face of an

undeclared war being waged there by counter-revolutionary imperialist
forces.

The Soviet Union, of course, was asked to come to the defense of

the revolutionary forces in Afghanistan.

claim:

In summary Brezhnev can then
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For our part, we warned the parties
concerned that if
the aggression did not stop that we would
not abandon the
Afghan people in their time of need. And.
as is known, we
do what we say we are going to do.^
It will

be argued in greater detail below that
Soviet support for

anti-imperialist revolutionary forces in the developing
nations
only above condemnation by the United States, but

component of the policy of detente.

is

is

not

also an integral

The reasons for the recent American

re-assessment of the detente policy and the Soviet's unwillingness
to
depart from detente in 1980, however, are topics that are clearly
beyond
the scope of this present analysis.

The focus of the present chapter will

be on the period from 1972 to 1976 when the latest detente model
was

fully developed, and when both sides agreed that detente was on

a

level

of unmatched significance.

While present events may go

a

long way in reshaping the emphasis

placed on detente, it was the period under discussion here that provided

detente with the acclaim, support, and formal diplomatic recognition that
it still

enjoys in the minds of many to this day.

Moreover, this time span

manifested some of the misunderstandings of the policy that have caused

a

number of concerns and problems which still persist in 1981.
In addressing detente,

the political analyst could question how

detente,, with two vastly different perceptions, one being the near anti-

thesis of the other, became the most important component of the foreign

policy of two adversaries.

The answer, of course lies in the particular

interpretation of detente, as it exists in both Moscow and Washington.
In the first place,

view, is

a

it should be noted that detente,

in this writer's

very important variable in the present international arena.

rationale for this claim, however, is different from those of the
architects of detente, who are the objects of this analysis.

A

The
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representative sampling of authoritative
spokesmen from both Moscow and

Washington shows that detente, whether
understood or misunderstood, liked
or disliked, is viewed as

a

policy of great importance in both
capitals.

There has been no dearth of authoritative
spokesmen in both the

Soviet Union and the United States who, at the
risk of overselling their
product, sang the virtues of detente and acclaimed
it as

cedented importance.

It must be remembered, of course,

a

policy of unpre-

that more than one

political career has been gambled on the successful
acceptance of detente,
and many glowing assertions in this regard must be taken
with more than

one grain of salt.

The American Perception of the
Importance of Detente

Former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, one of the

main architects of the detente policy in the United States, and its most
ardent supporter, depicts the importance of detente in the following terms
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the world's fears of
catastrophe and its hopes for peace have hinged on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.
In an era when two nations have the power to visit utter
devastation on the world in a matter of hours, there can be
no greater imperative than assuring that the relationship
between the superpowers be managed effectively and rationally.

r

The perception of detente as the only sane alternative to the

waging of full-scale nuclear war appeared to be the highest accolade that
American proponents of detente could give to this policy.

At the same

time, this theme tended to epitomize the basic essence of detente as per-

ceived by American policy makers.

Of all the spokesmen in the United

States who repeated this familiar line, none was more persistent than

Kissinger:

6
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...But in the nuclear age, when casualties
in a qeneral
nuclear war will involve hundreds of
millions in a matter of
days the use of force threatens utter
catastrophe
It is
our policy to contain Soviet power without
global war to
avoid abdication as well as unnecessary
confrontation'
This is what is meant by the process
called detente.
One could logically argue that such

a

formula, that depicts

detente and thermonuclear confrontation as
mutually exclusive activities,
is overly simplistic.

detente or

a

To do so might give credence to the argument
that

thermonuclear war are somehow the only two options available

to American and Soviet decision makers.

Detente may be seen more

properly as something other than the sole variable preventing
the exacerbation of Soviet-American tensions to the point of provoking

exchange.

a

thermonuclear

Zbigniew Brzezinski, an outspoken critic of Kissinger-styled

detente, noted, in this regard, that "the alternative to detente is not
war but

a

variety of intermediate positions."

is, as Brzezinski

points out:

The crux of this argument

"When there was no detente, there was no

war either."^
Such an argument did not deter the American proponents of detente

from asserting that detente found its significance in its contribution
to the prevention of a thermonuclear holocaust.

This dictum became the

accepted stance of the Nixon and Ford administrations.
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Joseph

echoed by the

As
J.

Sisco:

Our efforts to strengthen relations reciprocally between
the United States and the Soviet Union must continue; for
this relationship will probably determine more than any other
single factor whether our hopes for peace and stability in the
world are eventually realized.^

Much the same view was expressed by Deputy Secretary of State

Kenneth Rush, who questioned the rationale for not pursuing

relationship with the Soviet Union:

a

detente
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Detente is founded on the belief that
when nations have
the power to destroy each other - and
the world - it is irrational to make the threat of holocaust
the only base for peace
relationships on a .ore Lble
'°

aXSsnive'bas?sT°''

Yet, more than anyone else, it was
Kissinger who presented the

most detailed defense of
all
a

a

doctrine that was not universally received
in

segments of American society.

Kissinger often repeated this line in

manner that left no room for misapprehension:
There can be no peaceful international order without
a
constructive relationship between the United States and
the
Soviet Union - the two nations with the power to destroy
mankind.'^

Moreover, detente in the view of the former Secretary of
State, was
the only feasible alternative facing American policy makers:
In the age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic equality,
the relaxation of tensions is the only responsible course and
the only policy that can be pursued by any administration
charged with the responsibility for the lives of Americans...
When both sides have the military power to annihilate mankind,
it would be utter recklessness to invite tension needlessly.''

This formula therefore, provided

perception of detente.

As will

a

capsule summary of the American

be seen below, the Soviets hold a similar

view, but with significant variations added.

The Significance of Detente
The Soviet View

:

The perception of detente as an immensely important doctrine
was not a characteristic that was indigenous to statesmen in Washington.

The Soviet ruling hierarchy, on

a

number of occasions, repeated the need

for pursuing a policy based on the formula of easing tensions and removing
the threat of thermonuclear war.

detente is

a

According to the official Soviet line,

course of action that must be implemented, and eventually

made irreversible, so that the two superpowers can move from an era of

3
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confrontation and threats of war to one of negotiation
and of stabilizing
peace.
In his

keynote address at the 25th Congress of the Communist
Party

of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev the General Secretary
of the C.P.S.U.
and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,
elevated this doc-

trine to the level of official policy:
...we have every reason to confidently state that the
improvement of the international situation is irrefutable
evidence that the securing of a permanent peace is not only
a good intention but a truly realistic goal...
The improvement in our relations with the United States
of America, the capitalist world's greatest power, has, of
course, been of tremendous importance in reducing the threat
of a new world war and of consolidating peace. ^2
It must be noted that the congresses of the C.P.S.U.

are generally

regarded as the most important forums for the Soviet regime to articulate,
in detailed fashion,

issues.

the official

policy line on all foreign and domestic

Moreover, the keynote address delivered by Brezhnev was acclaimed

as the single most important component of the Congress in regard to the

official Soviet perception of any issue.

Hence, when Brezhnev stated in

his address that "the main element in our relations with the capitalist

states has been the struggle to assert the principles of peaceful

coexistence,"

1

and that detente has helped to strengthen peace, "and

lessen the danger of the outbreak of

nuclear war,"

a

14

it then became

an accepted fact in the Soviet view, that detente was a policy of great

importance.
The Soviet Union, having become disenchanted with the foreign

policy of President Carter, unleashed

a

major propaganda fusillade against

the new American president in the early months of his administration.

This process certainly underscored the fragile and uneasy state of U.S.-

Soviet relations.

Yet, in no manner did the U.S.S.R. diminish the

o

7
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importance of pursuing the policy of detente.

Thus, Brezhnev, in discussing

Soviet-American relations on French television,
claimed:
The consolidation of peace is one of the
most important
guarantees of the greatest human right, the right
to live...
I
will say again and again:
The cause of peace and
detente must be the cause of everyone. What has been
achieved toward consolidating peace is not a limit,
but a
starting point for a new activity. 15

While watching the erosion of

a

more amiable U.S. -Soviet rapport

that existed during previous administrations, Soviet
commentators still

portrayed detente as

a

policy of unequalled significance:

The living process of detente, the development of
various forms of cooperation among states and the affirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations - this is a reality which is increasingly
determining the course and nature of events on the world
scene. 1

Brezhnev has also added

a

feeling of optimism, or hope, that

detente would not become stagnated with the changing of the guard in the
White House:
I
have had many occasions to talk about the favorable
influence of detente on the entire international climate.
see no reasons to make any changes in this estimate.
I
However, it would be correct to note that in some places detente
has engendered a certain complacency .1

The 1972 "Declaration of Basic Principles "

One of the major hypotheses of this report is that detente is
not a process that is limited to the present state of U.S. -Soviet

relations.

Rather, it will be argued that detente has been in existence

from the outset of the relationships between Soviet Russia and the United
1

States.

o

However, evidence suggests that the latest historical era in the

life of detente was given birth by the Brezhnev regime.

reached its full

consumation

This process

in Moscow in May of 1972 with the co-signing

9
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of the "Declaration of Basic Principles
of Mutual

Relations Between the

United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics."
This "Declaration of Basic Principles," more
than any other document, has

defined the nature, scope, and intent of detente.
and the reaction it has engendered, provides

As such, this document,

barometer for measuring the

a

perceived significance of detente.
Of the nine separate accords signed by Nixon and
Brezhnev at

the Moscow summit, the Soviet Union has attached the
greatest significance
to the "Declaration of Basic Principles."

Yuri

Chernov, in an authori-

tative Pravda article of June 15, 1972, asserted that this declaration
"deserves special attention above all else" in regard to the summit
talks.

U.S.S.R.

It was, as

Chernov declared, "the first document between the

and the U.S.A. to give international

legal

form to relations

between the two sides on the basis of the principles of peaceful

co-existence."

1

As such,

this document attains special significance

in the Soviet view:
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the
fact that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., the powers with the
greatest military potential, powers belonging to different
social systems, have agreed to, by what is for all practical
purposes, a treaty, to build their relations on this basis. 20

Georgi Arbatov, the director of the Institute of the U.S.A. of the

U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, and an acknowledged Soviet specialist on

American affairs saw the "Declaration" as

a

"far reaching document filled

with profound meaning," and one that "essentially formulates the international legal principles for relations between the two states."

21

Arbatov,

furthermore likened the document to the most significant events in the
history of U.S. -Soviet relations, claiming that the "Declaration of Basic
Principles" and the Moscow summit as

a

whole,

...may very well become a landmark
comparable in
significance to such events as the establishment
of diplomatic relations between the two countries
in 1933
and their
cooperation during the Second World War.
In other words
the results of the talks may open the
way to an important
shift in Soviet-American relations
.^2
^

Much of this euphoria has been tempered
by the realities of
events following the summit.

While many of the expectations of May
of

1972 have not been realized, the Soviet Union did
not diminish the

significance of the Moscow Declaration.

Brezhnev, in his address to

the 25th C.P.S.U. Congress reaffirmed the
importance of the document

calling it the main result "of the development of
Soviet-American
relations in the past five years. "^^

Likewise, Arbatov in

a

Pravda

article of April, 1976 asserted that "if we consider not only
the
number of agreements

(signed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.), but also

their substance, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of
such documents as the Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations

between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S..."^^
Detente, obviously, involves far more than the signing of

joint document.

Yet, it is testimony to the Soviet adherence

a

to the

concept itself that these accords are viewed as the most significant

agreement in the history of U.S. -Soviet relations.

In discussing Soviet-

American relations from 1972 to 1977, Soviet commentator Vladimir
Bolshakov cast that five year period in terms of the "five year anniversary" of the signing of the basic principles document:
It will be five years on Sunday since the General
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and the president
of the United States signed in Moscow the basic principles
of relations between the two countries.
The agreement .. .did a great deal to improve SovietAmerican relations, put an end to the cold war, and move
The main docufrom confrontation to mutual cooperation.
It bement was the basic principles of mutual relations.
came the political and legal foundation for the new
relationship. 25
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Soviet commentators, it can be reasoned,
look upon detente,
as defined

in the

"Declaration of Basic Principles." as

a

legalistic

endorsement by the United States of the Soviet
policy of peaceful
coexistence.

The American view is clearly different.

Brzezinski,

although critical of the policy, did not diminish
the significance of

detente as defined in the basic principles
declaration.

As

he claimed,

the declaration signalled "a significant
codification of the 'rules of
the game'

under which the rivalry is to be conducted" and
signifies "a

change toward

a

more mixed relationship."^^

In Brzezinski 's view the

declaration, and the summit in general, "suggest that the
cold war

is

gradually being transformed from an implicity apocalyptic conflict
to an
explicity relativistic competition

.

"^'^

Similarly, Richard Nixon viewed

the "Declaration of Basic Principles" as one of his greatest achievements
at the Moscow summit.

In a

report to the Congress, Nixon highlighted

the fact that the two countries have "established

ciples to govern our relations."

a

set of basic prin-

This, in the President's view, marked

the first time in the postwar era that the two countries had established
"a code of conduct that both sides

could accept as the basis for regulating

their competition and channeling their efforts toward more constructive

endeavors."

28

In this

light, Nixon sees the Moscow Declaration as the

ultimate achievement of the summit and

a

document that "can provide

a

solid framework for the future development of better American-Soviet

relations."

29

The Declaration is then coordinated with the overall

perception of the American government in regard to detente.
declared before

a

joint session of the Congress, the basic principles of

detente can deter the two countries from engaging in
in his words,

As Nixon

a

nuclear war and,

"in a nuclear war there could be no winners, only losers.

""^^
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The Global Nature of Detente

An important aspect of detente is its
ability to transcend a

bi-lateral Soviet-American relationship.

The Soviet perception of

detente allows for the dissemenation of socialist
principles, support
for wars of national

liberation, and the Soviet ability to "create
conditions

favorable for the spread of socialism."
undertakes
is

a

global significance.

From this perspective, detente

This worldwide significance of detente

also understood, but for different reasons, by the American
government.

Former Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth Rush, for example, was
able to

deny any limited Soviet-American interests in detente:
We strive for broader areas of detente in the cause of
global tranquility and heightened prosperity.
This in no way
is a condominium between the Soviet and American superpowers,
but an engagement in the interests of all. 31

Former president Gerald Ford, while acknowledging the necessity
of "pushing back the spector of nuclear war" by concluding bi-lateral
arms control accords,

32

maintained the belief that detente supersedes any

limited Soviet-American interests:
...it would be very unwise for a president, me or
anyone else, to abandon detente.
think that detente
I
is in the best interest of this country.
It is in the best
interest of world stability, world peace.
And for us to abandon this working relationship and to
go back to a cold war, in my opinion, would be very unwise
for us in the United States and the world as a whole. 33

One of the more important residual effects of detente is the

impact that it has had on the nations within the communist world.

It will

be demonstrated below, for example, that the U.S. -Soviet detente has had
a

direct bearing on the Soviet-Chinese relationship.

repeatedly charged that the U.S.
as a tool

is

of anti-Soviet activity.

The U.S.S.R. has

willing now to "play its China card"
It has also been claimed that the fear
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of a meaningful, and perhaps exclusive
U.S.-C.P.R. rapprochement was one

of the primary factors motivating the
Soviet Union to embark on the

latest detente course.

There are many who see the U.S. -Soviet
detente as having

a

tempering effect on Soviet relations with
the Warsaw Pact bloc of
countries.

This is often seen as the result of the
necessity for the

U.S.S.R. to maintain

a

reasonably moderate posture in the face of

Western demands for increased liberalization within
the Eastern European
area.

It has

been shown, in the past, that the Soviet Union
will not

tolerate direct or indirect manifestations of ideological
relaxation,
ideological schism, political laxity, or "liberalization" in
this region.

These costs appear to be too high

a

price for the Soviets to pay for any

positive image that might be deemed necessary during
detente.

In

a

period of East-West

addition, such factors are at odds with the scope and purpose

of detente which, in the Soviet view, does not allow for any relaxation

of ideological vigilance by the "fraternal countries" of the socialist

commonwealth.

Yet, as two noted specialists of Eastern Europe have

claimed, "detente has apparently affected intra-C.E.M.A. relations to
the extent that the Soviet pursuit of

a

positive image in the West

moderates their tactics, if not their ultimate goals.

""^^

Another important area in the sense of the global significance
of detente, outside of the bi-lateral U.S. -Soviet equation, is in the

realm of domestic policies within the U.S.S.R.
to the ideological

abroad.

backlash that is often

It can be argued,

Party requires

purity at home.

a

in this

a

Specifically, this relates

result of the easing of tensions

regard that the Soviet Communist

menacing foreign threat to fully maximize ideological
As was mentioned above, this is oftentimes a reflection
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of the manipulative and cynical aspects
of Soviet ideology that is

most clearly reflected in the domestic
affairs of the U.S.S.R.

For

a

good many years the United States played
the role of the foreign menace

quite admirably.

The United States was accused of being
the bastion of

decadent capitalist-imperialist oppression, the
suppressor of national
liberation movements, and the main obstacle to the
peace-loving foreign
policy of the Soviet Union.

During an era of detente, with its expansion

of political, cultural, athletic, and scientific
contacts, this foreign

enemy may well appear to be less ominous.
becomes necessary.

A domestic response then

Stated very simply this foreign/domestic equation

would read as follows:

the greater the relaxation of tensions with the

West and the greater the number of contacts with the West, the greater
is
the need to insure ideological vigilance and conformity within the realm
of socialist nations

in general,

and within the Soviet Union in particular.

We in the West may find that some of the tangible results of

Soviet-American detente outside of foreign policy, may well be the ideological retrenchment of the communist world,

ideological controls, and

a

a

reinforcement of "Stalinist"

tightening of the screws of conformity.

this light, Kissinger had no qualms about presenting

a

In

tempting array of

Western-styled innovations to the communist world, apparently regardless
of their consequences:

The winds of change are blowing from the West; the
ideals of liberty and the challenge of technical innovation come from the West.
The efforts of the Communist
countries to participate in the rest of the world after
decades of autarchy are a sign of the vigor and attraction
These are assets of our diplomacy
of our economic system.
which we should be prepared to use. 35

Many analysts saw the use of such "diplomacy" and the Soviet

response to it as the most important aspect of detente and the most
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significant development in regard to the
fate of Soviet dissidents,
intellectuals, and minority nationalities
in years.

Alexander

Solzhenitsyn has expressed his fears that
detente may well be "encouraging new acts of brutality and
persecution." This has become possible,
according to Solzhenitsyn when "any acts
of cruelty, and even brutality
by one side toward its own citizens
and its neighboring peoples is

hastily and near-si ghtedly accepted by the
proponents of detente as
way standing in the way of detente. '"^^

'in no

The importance of detente, in

the view of Sovietologist Klaus Mehnert,
rested with the fact that it may
well

serve as the fulcrum for such new acts of
persecution.

In

discussing

the plight of intellectuals. Professor Mehnert
claimed that it is

a

fact

that "the more there is detente (and that means, the
more Western ideas
come into the Soviet Union), the more repression the
Soviet leaders will
use against their intellectuals who are the people most
exposed to

Western ideas." 37

Similarly, David Zilberman, an emigre Soviet intellec-

tual, believes that detente is of unparalleled importance because of its

creation of increasing amounts of "compensative compression and growth
on

of tensions" within Soviet society.

In the same regard,

the fate of

the many diverse minority nationalities within the Soviet Union has been

seen as being subject to the whims of Soviet-styled detente:
If the process of detente is pursued without a keen
awareness of this multi-national complexion of the U.S.S.R.,
we may find ourselves by virtue of our economic contributions
guaranteeing the permanent captivity of the many nations of
the U.S.S.R.39

With these heavy prices, detente logically presents the United

States, in Kissinger's words with "one challenge unprecedented in its own

history and another challenge without precedent in the history of the
world."

40

Yet, the primacy of this challenge is represented in terms of

:
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the supposed consequence of its
failure; thermonuclear war:

Historically a conflict of ideology
interest such as now characterized the
has almost invariably led to war.
But
strategic equality, humanity could not
repetition of history.
War would mean

and geopolitical

international scene
in the age of
survive such a
mutual suicide.

Echoing the same theme, Winston Lord,
the former Director of
the Policy Planning Staff of the State
Department, has stated that this

repetition of history cannot be tolerated and
that it

is

imperative to

abandon the traditional oscillation between
relaxing and exacerbating
tensions
For Americans, the most fundamental

challenge is to
steady, long-term course with the Soviet Union
It is time we left behind our traditional
fluctuation
between euphoria and gloom, between good will and
indignation. 42

pursue

In

it exists

a

citing the "long-term" nature of the detente relationship
as
today, Lord has underscored one of the central considerations

of this process, its nearly-guaranteed existence in one form or another
for the foreseeable future.

Thus, Brezhnev can call for the creation of

an "irreversible" detente relationship, and

abandon this relaxation and return to

a

a

firm commitment to never

cold war era when as he stated,

disagreements are settled not by "peaceful political means," but by "force,
threats, and sabre rattling."

Those who see detente as the sole means of preventing

nuclear war have made this long-term characteristic
true by definition.

thermo-

fact that is simply

If the alternative to detente is nuclear war, which,

as the formula goes, would mean either mutual

of one system, then detente will

relations exist.

a

a

suicide or total destruction

be with us as long as Soviet-American

Hence, Kissinger can claim that "for the first time in

our history, we face the stark reality that the challenge is unending,
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that there is no easy and surely
no final answer.

m

.uch the same
manner, Marshall Shul.an sees the
evolutionary nature of detente
which
indicates that its final fruition
will be seen at some future
ti.e:

Under favorable conditions this
'limited detente' mav
evolve through the decades to a
later stage in which the
cooperative elements can be strengthened
and Jhe Soviet
Union can be drawn into a more
constructive role in workina
toward the strengthening of the
international syslem as
opposed to t e condition of international
violence and
anarchy which is the alternative
confronting the world.

^

Detente has also been seen as

presidential administration.

In

phenomenon that will outlive any

a

the words of former Assistant Secre-

tary of State for European Affairs,
Arthur

A.

Hartman:

This (detente in the face of Soviet
military might) is
not a problem which confronts this
Administration only
It
will be a problem for the next Administration
and the next
one after that.
Indeed, I think that it will be a problem
for Americans for at least the lifetime of
every person in
this room. 46

Detente is seen from

a

number of different perspectives.

While

none of these viewpoints agree on why detente is
of such importance,

they all concur in the fact that it is

Detente may be seen as the deterrent to

concept of great significance.

a

a

thermonuclear war, the fulcrum

for socialist expansion, the catalyst for ideological and
social repression,
or an irreversible and permanent fixture in international relations.

Yet, in all

these cases, the significance of detente is not overlooked.

This is certainly true of the Soviet perception.

For reasons to

be outlined below, the Soviet Union worked diligently to foster a U.S.-

Soviet relationship based on the principles of detente.
and objectives, it will

Soviet goals

be argued, could not be achieved with an antag-

onistic U.S. -Soviet posture.

Detente provided the means by which many of

these objectives could be realized without drastically increasing any
risks to Soviet interests.

It is

not surprising, therefore, that the

::

U.S.S.R. made every attempt to foster
an image of detente as the
single
most important phenomenon in international
relations.
In the words of
Arbatov

Restructuring of relations between the
the spirit of peace, greater
mutual
u'./.l:,' H
understanding
and cooperation has become one of
the ^cirainai
cardinal
questions of international life. 47
II

c:^?

n'''

^'J'V^u

Likewise, an influential Pravda editorial
signed by "commentator

expressed the same view:
In the overall process of positive
changes taking place
in the world, a significant place is
being held by U S S R
_

.

-

U.S. relations...
The strengthening of relations of peaceful
co-existence
between the states with different social systems
and the
development of mutually advantageous and constructive
cooperation between them is becoming the dominating feature
of the international situation. 48
•

In his address at the Helsinki

.

.

Conference on Security and Cooper

ation in Europe, Brezhnev highlighted the major accomplishment
of that

meeting
In our view, the main result of the conference is that
it is making international detente increasingly substantive.
It is precisely the materialization of detente that is the
essence of the matter... 49

A manifestation of the importance of detente in the Soviet view

was given with the publication of the new "Brezhnev Constitution" of the

U.S.S.R.

This document, which replaced the 1936 "Stalin Constitution,"

contained the first constitutional reference to foreign policy.
foreign policy chapter provided

a

The

concise capsule summary of the Soviet

perception of detente; its goals, objectives and significance:
The Soviet state shall consistently pursue the
Leninist policy of peace...
The foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. shall be aimed at
insuring favorable international conditions for the
building of communism within the U.S.S.R., at strengthening
the positions of world socialism, supporting the struggle
of peoples for national liberation and social progress.

48

preventing wars of aggression and
consistently implementing the principles of peaceful
coexistence of tates
with different social systems. 50
It is

understandable that Soviet commentators
would devote

good deal of time to analyzing the
new constitution.

a

Yet, it is signi-

ficant that the greatest amount of
attention was given to the foreign
policy section of the constitution.

The inordinate number of editorials

and commentaries that addressed the
foreign policy articles of the

constitution (encompassing but

2

of the 173 articles in the entire
docu-

ment) gave testimony to the level of
significance that the Soviet regime

attached to detente.

Thus, detente was referred to as

in the draft of the new constitution to the
rank of

a

a

policy "elevated

law of the Soviet

state's activity both in domestic and foreign
policy. "^^

From the Soviet

perspective, the new constitution, which "legislatively
enshrined the
goals and principles of the country's foreign policy
line" has made

detente

a

legal

Soviet commitment.

The ensuing chapters of this study will address the reasons
for

the Soviet insistence on maintaining detente and elevating it to
of law.

a

position

At the present time it must be remembered that this perception

was not unique to the Soviet Union.

Professor Fred Warner Neal

,

an

expert on Soviet-American affairs echoed the same theme:

consider the present movement toward an AmericanSoviet detente to be the most significant and salutary
development in American foreign policy since the end of
World War II.
The Declaration of Principles which President
Nixon signed in Moscow in 1972, provides, it seems to me, the
basis for ending the cold war... a definitive ending of the
cold war is about the best thing imaginable that could happen
for all of us.
And that is precisely what an American-Soviet
detente is all about. 53
I

Even Solzhenitsyn, with his grave concerns about the suppression

of human rights, can claim that "detente is not only necessary, but
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mankind's only salvation, and an
urgent need of our times, more
powerful
than the intentions and decisions
of individual
"^'^
political leaders

The Nixon administration provided
the most glowing praise for

that formed the core of its foreign
policy.

In the words of

a

...

procedure

Assistant

Secretary Hartman, detente is "a policy
of unique importance for all
of
us," and "the basic international
problem of our time

whole half century. .."55

-

perhaps of this

Kissinger, of course, was even stronger
in

his comments and felt that "the future
of mankind requires coexistence

with the Soviet Union" because, as he
claimed, "we owe future generations

more hopeful prospects than
Nixon, felt that, as

peoples had

a

a

a

delicate equilibrium of awesome forces. "^^

result of the new era of detente, "never have
two

greater challenge or

a

greater goal."^''

According to the

former president "an unparalleled opportunity has
been placed in America's
hands" which, in his words, could "lead the world up
out of the lowlands

of constant war and onto the high plateau of lasting peace. "^^

Much of this post-Moscow summit euphoria has, of course, been
lost.

Yet, as we have seen, the Soviet Union has not decreased its

emphasis on detente.

In the early months of the Carter administration

the same viewpoints were being expressed in regard to detente.

Brzezinski,

notwithstanding his direct criticism of Kissinger/Nixon-styled detente,
could still claim that detente provided "a truly creative and historically
novel

framework" for the conduct of U.S. -Soviet relations.

Carter

himself, although providing the catalyst for much of the de-emphasis of

detente from the American perspective, still felt that detente with
the Soviet Union was

and sincerely. "^^

a

policy that he would pursue "earnestly, constantly,

According to Vice President Mondale, detente provided

the forum by which the two countries could "talk where before it was only

possible to confront one another in
deadly and undiminished hostility.
And it is imperative that we continue
this dialogue, ever seeking
to
expand its depth and compass. "^^

Detente and the Pursuit of Soviet
Ob.iectives
The evidence presented would show that
detente, for

reasons, has been accorded

a

a

variety of

position of unmatched significance.

question that still remains is:

The

where does the true significance of

detente actually rest?
While this writer is in agreement with the fact
that Soviet-

American detente is of unique and unmatched importance,
the reasoning

outlined above

is

seen as insufficient.

In the first place,

detente

would not seem to be the only rational option available to
American

decision makers charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the
interests of the United States.

Nor does it appear that detente should

become an irreversible policy that will stay with us for the foreseeable
future.

Detente, it can be argued, should not be viewed as the only

defense against
Union.

a

possible thermonuclear confrontation with the Soviet

None of this is to say that an exacerbation of tensions in the

thermonuclear age

is

necessarily in the best interests of either side.

Yet, it would seem that the prevention of such

achieved by establishing

dependent on

a

a

a

holocaust could be

Soviet-American posture that

is

not totally

full-scale detente relationship as defined at the Moscow

summit in 1972 and implemented in the years following.

In short,

the

argument for detente, as depicted in the following formula, would seem
to be insufficient:
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Let us remember that we seek
detente with the Soviet
Urn on for one overwhelming reason:
Both countries have the
capability to destroy each other - and
most o^^he rest
of the wor d in the process.
Thus, both of us have an over^0 P-ven?

IIIT

c^tasL^phe^^sr^"
It goes

without saying that the preservation
of peace in the

thermonuclear age, and the prevention of
of importance.

a

thermonuclear exchange are issues

Yet, there are two caveats that
must be mentioned here.

Both of these considerations would, in
this writer's view, belie the belief

that detente solely serves the cause of
peace in the thermonuclear age,
and, as such, has no present alternative.
In the first place, any detente,

even on the most cordial and

harmonious of terms, cannot expect to eliminate the
areas of concern
that might eventually provide the basis for

a

direct confrontation.

There is no reason to believe, nor any concrete evidence
to suggest,
that the Soviet Union will acquiesce in any agreement that
would reduce
the level

of strategic conventional military parity that now exists

between the two rival superpowers.

It will

be outlined in detail

below

that Soviet foreign policy in the contemporary era of detente, requires
a

military equation that

West.

It is

threat of

a

is

based on nothing less than parity with the

precisely this parity that will maintain the constant

thermonuclear war.

Secondly, detente, by allowing incremental and "non-threatening"
forms of Soviet expansion, may eventually lead to

threat of the use of strategic weaponry may become
option.

position where the

a

a

very real American

Detente, as perceived by the Soviet Union, may very well exacer-

bate the tensions and animosities that it was created to eliminate.

Soviet perception of detente, as noted earlier,

is

based on:

The

the

improvement of the correlation of the forces in the world in favor of the
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socialist camp; the realization by
the West that any attempt
to thwart
socialist expansion is useless;
the realization of the
growing military
might Of the Soviet Union; and the
full understanding by the
United
States that it has no choice but
to adhere to the Soviet
policy of
detente with the socialist camp.
Furthermore, detente, according
to the
Soviet perception, creates favorable
conditions, not only for the

growth of communism within the U.S.S.R.,
but for augmenting the
principles
of socialism in those nations seeking
national liberation, and the
nations of world capitalism, as well.
It is

not surprising therefore, that

a

number of crises and areas

of direct conflict in American-Soviet interests
have arisen since the
1972 Moscow summit.
in particular,

in Iran,

Tensions in southern Africa in general, and
Angola

the October, 1973 Mideast War, the revolution
and crisis

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and others
have all served

as testimony to the Soviet need to fulfill

its expansionistic destiny.

These crises should not be seen as breakdowns in detente,
or

a

threat to

detente; they would more accurately be viewed as inherent
components
of the Soviet perception of detente.

Thus, the true importance of detente may be seen as resting with
the fact that it is

a

detailed Soviet blueprint for action.

Moreover,

detente in the Soviet view, is designed primarily to assist in the
expansion of Soviet prestige and power and the placing of the United
States under

a

system of unilateral restraints.

be fully respected.

Yet this respect should not be in the form of

commitment to an idealistic faith in
from the horrors of
the form of

a

As such, detente must

a

a

a

doctrine that can save the world

thermonuclear catastrophe.

respect that must be shown to

a

Rather, it should be in

formidable and worthy oponent.
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If detente is pursued within
the framework of the
Soviet perception then it could also be a
process that generates a
good deal of con-

cern and trepidation.

Detente could easily lead to

losses and constraints that could
spell
and eventual communist domination.

Union intends "to pursue

a

every region of the globe,

reflect

a

a

a

series of geopolitical

period of rapid Soviet
expansion

When Brezhnev claims that
the Soviet

policy of detente, striving to
extend it to
we in the United States might
do well to

moment before extending our full
support to his wishes.

It will

be shown below that the Soviet
cause has been served

very ably by detente.

To demonstrate this, and to show
how the Soviets

arrived at their perception and understanding
of detente in 1972, it
is

necessary to trace the historical development
of this process.

By so

doing both the historical and ideological
continuity of detente from
1918 to 1980 will be more clearly manifested.

In addition,

the motives

and aspirations inherent in detente from the
Soviet perspective should

become much more apparent.

5
2
3

FOOTNOTES:

Brezhnev, Pravda
^

^

^

,

CHAPTER

II

January 13, 1980,

p.

1.

Ibid.

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

5

^' '^^'^^'"Se'^' Speech
n
^^n?.
11, 1975, reported in the New

M
March.

delivered in Boston, Massachusetts
York Times . March 12, 1976,
4
p

Address made in San Francisco, California,
''^^^^'"ae'^February V'^^'L?U.S. Department of State, Bulletin
3
1976.
Vol. LXXIV,
~
No. 1913 (February 23, 1 976), p. 204.
.

'

Times

,

^"Detentes Supporters Under Fire in the U.S.," New
York
December 29, 1 975, p. 1.
g

Joseph J. Sisco.
Address made in Washington, D.C.,
May 4, 1976.
U.S. Department of State, Bulletin
Vol. LXXII, No
(May 26, 1975), p. 681.

1878

,

9

Kenneth Rush.
Address made in Greenville, Tennessee
May 26, 1974. Ibid., Vol. LXX, No. 1825 (June 17, 1974), p. 652.

^^Henry A. Kissinger. Address made in Los Angeles, California,
January 24, 1975.
Ibid
Vol. LXXII, No. 1860 (February 17, 1975), p. 198
.

''"'Henry A.

August 14,

1

975.

,

Kissinger.
Address in Birmingham, Alabama,
Ibid
Vol. LXXII, No. 1890 (September 1 5, 1 975),
.

p.

,

1

"Report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., Pravda
February 25, 1976, pp. 3-4.

,

1

^^

Ibid

.

,

p.

3.

Ibid

.

,

p.

4.

1

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, May 29, 1977, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Soviet Union Vol. Ill,
,

,

NO.

104 (May 31, 1977), pp. A2-A3.

^Sikhail Mikhaylov, "International Observers' Roundtable,"
Moscow International Service June 19, 1977, F.B.I .S.
Daily Report
Soviet Union Vol. Ill, No. 118, (June 20, 1977), p. A2.
,

,

,

54

:

392

,

55

L.I.

Brezhnev, Pravda, May 30,
1977,

p

i

'
politics from 1917
to the present.
.°^
In this Lai v^?. ^hp
°^ ^^^^^^e will be
seen as having its inception wUh
'"'^P^^°" with the ''''^'T'V
Ni xon-Brezhnev summit
of May 22-29,
1972 in Moscow.

ft

^^Yuri Chernov, Pravda

Ibid

,

June 15, 1972, p.

5

.

^^Georgi Arbatov, Izvestia

,

June 22, 1972

p

3

^^ibid.

24

Georgi Arbatov, Pravda

,

April

1976, p. 4.

2,

Radio Moscow, May 27, 1977, F.B.I.S
Union. Vol. Ill, No. 105 (June 1, 1977
p.

],

267..

C.P.S.U.." Pravda,

°'

February^S^'wlt'S'

.

bl.

^

Daily Report- Soviet

.

.J'^^^mew Brzezinski, "How the Cold War Was Played
Forei9n Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October,
r

"

•

1972), p. 207

^"^

Ibid
28

.

,

p.

209.

U-S

Foreign Policy for th e 1970's: Shaping A
Durable Pea ce.
Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the
^°'^?q7?
United States
S.S 3, 1973 n,^
May
(Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office),
p. 26.
,

.

^

29

"The Moscow Summit:
New Opportunities in U.S. -Soviet
Relations," Address by President Nixon before a joint
session of the
Congress, June 1, 1972.
United States Foreign Policy, 1972- A Report
of the Secretary of State (Washingtonr.nwov.nm'.n^ Printing
a Office,>
April
1973)
p. 613.
11

,

c;

,

31

Kenneth Rush.
Address delivered in New York City,
February 15, 1974.
U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. LXX,
No.

1811

(March 11, 1974), p. 239.
32

Gerald R. Ford, "State of the Union Address," January 22, 1977.
U.S^^Department of State, Bulletin Vol. LXXVI, No. 1963 (February 7, 1977),
,

33

No.

Gerald

Ford.
Interview on N.B.C. television,
U.S. Department of State, Bullet in, Vol. LXXIV,
1909 (January 26, 1976), p. 102.

January

3,

1976.

R.

=^

34

Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry,
"Soviet Pnlirv in r=^*
Europe." Current History. Vol. 69.
No. ^9 (October
IgTB)"
35

Henry A. Kissinger.

nJ"?89C rsZlllt;

Address delivered in Birminqham

]ri97^j!-p%^!--

-

mI51::

vol LXXIH.

36n

Letter from Alexander Solzhenitsyn
Regarding Invitation to
Appear Before Joint Subcommittee Hearings
on Detente and Human R^qhu
US. Congress House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Detente Hearing
before the subcommittee on Europe of the
Committee o n horeign Affai?
House of Representatives, 93rd Cong., 2nd
session,
1974, p.

"
'

'

556

37„

"Statement of Klaus Mehnert," Ibid

38

.

"Statement of David Zilberman," Ibid

280.

p.

,

.

p.

,

290.

39m

"Statement of Lev.

Dobriansky," Ibid

E.

.

,

362.

p.

40

o^^?nL^-

Address delivered in San Francisco, California
Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1913

'^^^^'"ge''-

pFe^ruIry 23, 19>6)!'p^^^^^^^
41

Henry A. Kissinger.
Testimony before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, March 16, 1976.
Ibid
Vol
LXXIV
,

No.

1920 (April 12, 1976),
42

'

486.

p.

.

Winston Lord.
Address delivered in Washington, D.C
1
1 976.
Vol. LXXV, No. 1954 (December 6, 1976),
Jbld
,

November

1

,

.

,

p.

681.

43

"Report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.," Pravda,
February 25, 1976, p. 4.
44

Henry A. Kissinger. Address delivered in San Francisco,
California, February 3, 1976.
U.S. Department of State, Bulletin
Vol. LXXIV, No. 1913 (February 23, 1976), p. 202.
,

45

Hearings

,

"Statement of Marshall
p.

D.

Shulman," U.S. Congress, Detente

,

31.

46

Arthur A. Hartman.
Address delivered in Houston, Texas,
March 4, 1976.
U.S. Department of State, Bulletin
Vol. LXXIV, No. 1919
(April 5, 1976), p. 434.
,

47

48

Georgi Arbatov, Pravda

Commentator, Pravda

,

April

2,

1976, p. 4.

January 1, 1976,

,

49

p.

4.

Leonid Brezhnev, "In the Name of Peace, Security and
Cooperation," Pravda August 1
Translated in the Curren t
1975, p. 1.
Digest of the Soviet Press (C.D.S.P.) Vol. XXVII, No. 31 (August 27, 1975),
,

p.

13.

,

57

(Draft)
Sld^Hj^Hhrs^^llr
'TV'^^'
=
Structure. Chaptar'4, Article'zs!
^^^^i'e'^r^^^^?! ^"'1'"""^
Vren,.va,

o!ne^'?ri9777p"l

June 14,^1977!°p'1:

Hearings "p^^ie""""^

"""^^'^"^^ Stronghold of Peace,"
Pravda.

of Fred Warner Neal." U.S. Congress.
Detente

"Letter from Alexander Sol zheni tsyn

March 4 ^197fi^^i^
(Ap^^ 5, 1976), p
56

^

'

'

^r"'?'

^^''^c'

^^^''^^^^

43^

.

,

p.

557.

Houston, Texas,
^ol
LXXIV, No. 1919
•

'

Henry A. Kissinger.

ibid

.

Address delivered before the 31st United

i^-'

!l:'"9l8lSX?ir]i76^!"p!°J^9.^^^^^'"^^^
57
9'*^^"

^07l''^u''t^:
M.V 22,
99
ciT- Foreign
r"^°^'^
May
1972, United States
Policy

,

^^""^^ reception in Moscow,
1972, p. 592.

58

Richard M. Nixon. Address delivered to joint session
of
Congress, June 1, 1972, Ibid
p. 613.
.

,

59

Zbigniew Brzezinski.
News conference in Washington, D.C.,
April 1, 1977.
U.S. Department of State, Bulle tin, Vol. LXXVI, No
1974
(April 25, 1977), p. 417.
^^Jimmy Carter, "Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress,
Human Rights:
Basic Priorities of U.S. Foreign Policy." Address delivered
to the United Nations General Assembly, March 17, 1977.
Ibid., Vol
LXXVI
No. 1972 (April 11
1 977),
p. 331.
,

^""waiter Mondale.
1 977.
Ibid

January 24,

.

,

Address to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels,
LXXVI, No. 1 967 (March 7, 1 977), p. 183.

Vol.

62

Henry A. Kissinger.
Finance, March 7, 1974.
Ibid

.

,

Testimony before U.S. Senate Committee on
Vol. LXX, No. 1814 (April 1, 1974), p. 323.

63

Leonid Brezhnev.
Interview with chief editor of Japanese
newspaper, ASAHI, F.B.I.S., Daily Report: Soviet Union Vol. Ill, No. 116
(June 16, 1977), p. R7.
,

CHAPTER

III

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF
DETENTE
It has

become quite fashionable for
political commentators to

write the final obituaries for
detente.

Detente. In this view, was

born in Moscow In 1972 and died
In Afghanistan in 1980.

Detente may or

may not have served Its basic
purpose, but In any event, it
the victim of a Soviet act of
aggression and

a

is now dead;

firm American response

to that act.

Such an argument appears to contain
two basic flaws, one of which
will

be the focus of this present
chapter.

The first concern is that

there is evidence to suggest that detente

is

not dead.

It is, to be sure,

being re-evaluated by the United States
and may, in fact, be diminished
in the American view.

view.

In

However, it

is

a

forsaken policy in the Soviet

good deal of enthusiasm.

cern addresses the birth of detente.
a

a

fact, detente from the Soviet perspective,
as will

below, is being pursued with

is

not

be shown

The second con-

Specifically, the claim that detente

policy that began in 1972 at the Moscow summit is

one that deserves

careful scrutiny.
As was mentioned above,

has generated no small

the concept of Soviet-American detente

amount of confusion.

Much of this confusion

rests with the fact that there is no consensus regarding the very meaning

of detente.

Thus, as we have seen, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.,

while pursuing objectives contrary to the interests of the other, simultaneously acclaim the virtues of

a

detente policy that governs their relations
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The specific area of concern
that has caused much of
the

present misunderstanding relates
to the role that history
has played in
the formulation of detente.
In short, this problem
is manifested by
the tendency of many observers
to perceive detente through
a perceptual

lens that virtually excludes
an assessment of the
historical

context in which detente has been
conducted.
is seen as

regimes.

a

novel

Detente, in this view,

policy that was designed by the
Nixon and Brezhnev

Detente has been seen as their attempt
to find

a

new and unpre-

cedented answer to the formidable
dilerrma of managing Soviet-American

affairs, and as an alternative to the
exacerbation of tensions and
mutual hostility that had marked their
previous relations.

However, there is evidence to show that
detente is

a

process with

which Soviet and American statesmen have
been grappling for some time,
and which had been

a

variable in U.S. -Soviet relations for

century before Richard Nixon set foot on Soviet
soil.

a

full

half

Detente, in this

view, was not born with the signing of the Moscow
Declaration of

Principles as many in Washington would have
be argued

us

believe.

Rather, it can

that it was conceived and put into practice as

and strategy in the earliest days of Soviet power.

viable tactic

a

As such, the

phenomenon of detente has deep historical roots that should be understood
if its present manifestation as the most significant aspect
of contemporary

interstate affairs is to be understood.
It could

be quite misleading to view detente as the brainchild

of the present Soviet regime, or as some totally unheard of concoction

of Soviet propagandists who arduously labored to devise

a

politically

and ideologically proper means of addressing the problem of handling

Soviet-American relations in the 1970's.

It would seem to be equally
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misleading to view detente as the
righteous and virtuous policy
devised
by American statesmen as the
only sane and sensible
.eans of conducting
relations with Moscow without
threatening the destruction
of civilization
by inviting a cataclysmic
thermonuclear holocaust. To
perceive detente
in either of these fashions
would be to ignore much of the
history of
detente.

Detente in respect to U.S. -Soviet
relations

is

by-product of
the unique tendencies that
characterized the formulation of the
tentative,
and often hostile, relations between
two nations espousing antithetical
a

and totally irreconcilable ideologies
and world views.
as the evidence below will

show,

a

Moreover, it was,

willful and carefully designed policy

of one system of government, whose avowed
aim and primary purpose was
the complete overthrow and final destruction
of the opposing socioeconomic

system.

It was,

in this

international affairs in

view, an attempt to effect
a

a

means of conducting

manner that seemed most conducive to realizing

that system's ultimate goals.
The process of detente, whether or not it has been
vigorously

adhered to by the nations of world capitalism-imperialism,
has been
nurtured and reared throughout the history of Soviet-American
relations
by the Soviet Union.

Detente has progressed to the point that we are

now witnessing its final fruition as the legally accepted norm by
which
both sides have agreed to conduct their mutual affairs.

In this manner

the present variation of detente can be seen as representing a victory

of sorts for the Soviet Union.

For fifty years the ruling hierarchy in

Moscow, and the most noted communist theoreticians in the world, had
been ardently proclaiming the correctness and objective necessity for
the policy of detente as the only rational means for conducting relations

among states with different
social systems.

In the face of this

unrelenting propaganda fusillade
directed at the righteousness
of the
peaceful- objectives of the Soviet
Union, the Western world,
and most
notably the United States, was
unimpressed.

In fact,

the United States

tended to ignore the concept and
avoided any outward manifestation
of
tacit approval or adherence to
this policy.
The present Soviet regime
can rejoice to some extent in
the fact that their program,
conceived
and developed in the Leninist
years, and meticulously bred to
its full

maturation in the ensuing half century,
has finally been accorded
complete
and total recognition by the West,
the very existence of which it
was

originally created to destroy.

When Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev

signed the "Declaration of Basic Principles"
in Moscow in May of 1972
and proceeded from the "common determination"
that there "is no alternative
to conducting their mutual

relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence,"

they did not create the process of detente.

Instead, as the ensuing

chapters will demonstrate, they merely accorded
official recognition and
formal acceptance to
a

vital and central

a

phenomenon of international relations that had been

part of U.S. -Soviet relations for more than fifty years.

The fact that the Soviet regime remained fully committed
to

detente throughout such

a

long period of time, which witnessed marked

fluctuations from eras of conciliation to eras of animosity between

Moscow and Washington, is strong testimony to the tremendous degree
of importance that the Kremlin has attached to this concept.

It is

important in this light to interject two caveats into the historical
and causal

links from detente under Lenin to detente under the present

Soviet leadership.
The first of these considerations has to do with the revisions
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which detente has undergone during
its lifetime.

To unequivocally

assert that detente politics of
1972 or 1980 and detente
politics of
1918 or 1921 are totally and completely
synonymous concepts, without
exhibiting the slightest variations
in theory and practice,
would be
to oversimplify,

it will

be demonstrated that detente,
as

functioning
process dominating the conduct of
Soviet-American affairs, has been
able to withstand the tests of time
by virtue of its ability to
adapt
a

and correspond to the ebb and flow
of the volatile shifts in the
atmosphere
of international relations.
At any given time the process
of detente,

viewed amidst the background of the existing
international environment,

may be quite accurately perceived as more
or less durable, intense, and
pragmatic than at another given time.

Although detente transcends the

usual concerns of short-term international
in mind that the residual

politics, it must be borne

effects of these particular actions and events,

and the political climate they foster, have
determined both the strength

of detente as well as the vigor and enthusiasm with
which it is pursued.
Crises, unfavorable political

incidents, wars, alliances, and political

leadership changes have all, at one time or another, proven to be
prime

determining factors in the creation of periods in which detente was
mildly pursued amidst an air of increased tensions and contravening
political

objectives.

At the same time, these variables have fostered eras in

which the limited goals of both sides were coincidental, thus producing
a

period of strong coexistence between the two as each strove to jointly

and harmoniously effect common ends.

Hence, it is not surprising that detente, as manifested during
the Soviet-American alliance of World War II, has been described as

period, albeit of extremely short duration, in which both nations in

a
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their united quest to crush the
.enace of Nazi Germany,
reduced tensions
and ani^sities to very lo«
levels.
This upsurge in the fortunes
of
Soviet-American coexistence, of course,
stood in marked contrast to
the preceding inter-war years,
when, although peaceful
coexistence was

inherent in the foreign policy line
of the Soviet Union, relations
were
continually strained. Here, both parties,
preoccupied with overriding
domestic difficulties and pursuing

a

foreign policy stance with objectives

inimical to the interests of the other,
found little common ground for

mutual understanding.

Similarly the high level of cooperation and
conciliation that
was witnessed in the struggle against
Hitler experienced

a

drastic and

predictable downturn in the immediate postwar years
as the Soviet Union
and the United States moved to the Cold War.

The Cold War years, replete

with the tensions, threats, confrontation,
saber-rattling, and short-lived
"spirits" of Geneva, Camp David, and Glassboro, would in their

turn,

give way to the antithesis of improved relations and negotiations
that we
are experiencing today.

The present variation of detente is itself under-

going the same oscillations and pendular shifts of its predecessors.
The October Mideast War, the crisis in Angola, Afghanistan and the

strategic arms impasse, have all contributed to the flux and reflux we
are now witnessing between high levels of vitality for detente and the

lowest stratum of Cold War-like animosity.
It is

important to remember that detente, notwithstanding the

above-mentioned fluctuations in U.S. -Soviet relations, permeated the
activity of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. from 1918 to the present.

Detente

may well have been weak or strong or passive or active during any one

year or period of years that spanned more than

a

half century of

.
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soviet-American relations.

Yet, the evidence suggests
that detente did

exist throughout this period and
provided perhaps the one co^on
thread
that has .arked Soviet foreign
policy from its earliest
years to conte.porary times «ith respect to its
relations with the United States.
As
will be seen below the form
that detente took during this
period changed
from a defensive ploy by Lenin and
Stalin ("peaceful cohabitation"),
to an

offensive strategy by Khrushchev
("peaceful coexistence"), to an
aggressive
offensive strategy by Brezhnev ("detente"
"relaxation, or reduction of
tension" )
The Soviet use of the terminology
involved in the subject of

detente deserves some attention in that it
both provides an accurate means
for measuring Soviet motives and underscores

dissertation.

In the first place,

a

central theme of this

it should be noted, as seen above, that

this writer employs the term detente to
describe the Soviet version of

policy from Lenin to Brezhnev.
reasons.

a

This is being done for two (2) principal

First, the term detente has become the accepted word,
especially

in the West, that is

used to describe the relationship between the nations

of the East and West in general, and the United States and
the Soviet
Union in particular.
in

implementing

a

Secondly, as will be argued below, the Soviet Union

contemporary policy of detente has maintained the most

important features of the original detente policy of Lenin.
None of this is to say that the Soviet Union has consistently

utilized the word detente to describe any particular era of international
relations.

In fact,

used the word at all.

Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev appear to have never

The usual terminology during the early years of

Soviet rule was mirnoe sozhitelstvo (peaceful cohabitation).

It will

argued below that this phrase, as an early variation of the detente

be
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terminology, was used to describe
an essentially defensive
strategy that
sought to gain a breathing spell
or a respite in war
for the Soviets.
In
later years, the Soviet Union
widely utilized the phrase
.irnoe sosushchestovavanie (peaceful coexistence).
As will be reasoned

^e^'Z^^^,

coexistence constitutes an offensive
Soviet strategy that implies
a
constant struggle with the West
with the objective of assuring
favorable
conditions for the worldwide victory
of socialism.
Contemporary Soviet
spokesmen often use the term razryadka

^^^ ^^'^^osti

,

or the phrase razryadka

(relaxation or reduction of tension).

The term razryadka

has almost always been translated
in the West to read detente.
is

literally defined in Western dictionaries,
e.g., Webster's Third New

International Dicti onary of the English
Language Unabridged
as the reduction or the lessening
of tension.)
is

(Detente

used by the Soviet Union to describe

a

,

rev.

However, detente

ed.

(

(1976),

razryadka

)

state of reduced tensions

(especially, reduced thermonuclear war tensions)
in international relations

resulting from the observance of the principles
of peaceful coexistence.
Thus, razryadka would seem to flow from the
phrase mirnoe sosushchestovavanie
and,

in effect,

be a component part of the latter.

Peaceful coexistence,

which the Soviets, in their view, have defined with
utmost clarity, then
becomes the most important of the three (3) detente-related
phrases.

Detente, it will be argued below, represents

a

logical extension by the

Brezhnev regime of the Khrushchev policy of peaceful coexistence.
will

It

further be reasoned that Brezhnev, with the establishment of thermo-

nuclear parity, the realignment of world forces in favor of socialism,
and other factors felt it necessary to add an image of reduced tension
and threats and increased Soviet cooperation and friendliness to the

peaceful coexistence formula.

It will

also be shown that Brezhnev, in

the implementation of detente,
never reduced, and actually
strongly

reinforced, the primacy of the
peaceful coexistence
characteristics of
intensifying the political, economic,
and ideological struggles,
of
eliminating the international
stat^M, furthering the expansion of
socialism, providing the best conditions
for communist construction,
and preparing the way for the
eventual worldwide victory of
socialism.
To separate detente from peaceful
coexistence, or to ignore the

relation between the two, can, quite
naturally, cause confusion.
Kissinger, in discussing detente, was
using

a

term that would appear to

be very pleasant and non-threatening
to an American audience.

face of

a

In the

thermonuclear capacity that could destroy all
of mankind, as

Kissinger often claimed,

a

detente, or relaxation of tensions, would
seem

to be a most appropriate policy.

However, it will be argued below that

the Soviet Union, by not using detente in
isolation from peaceful

tence has

Henry

a

coexis-

far different connotation of the same term.

One need also be mindful of the fact that

a

number of tactical

variations have been implanted in the Soviet strategy of
detente over
the years.

These changes have further differentiated present-day

detente from the process that was established by Lenin.

It will

be

argued below that the Soviet ruling hierarchy has revised and altered
basic components of detente politics to better suit the modern world of

thermonuclear technology.

Yet, while the U.S.S.R. has interjected basic

strategic alterations in the tactical means of the detente process, the
final ends for which this strategy was initially created have not been

changed.

Throughout the entire history of U.S. -Soviet detente, the

primary rationale for the inception of detente politics, the creation
of advantageous conditions for the strengthening of communism and the
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dissemination of socialist principles
to the direct disadvantage
and
eventful demise of the
capitalist-Imperialist
system, has not been

el

iminated.
The second consideration has
to do with the unprecedented

significance that one should properly
attach to the present era of
detente.
It has been noted earlier
that this writer is committed
to
the view that the contemporary
U.S. -Soviet detente is the
most important
facet of international relations
of this or any other age.
However, if

detente, as seen today, is

a

direct descendant and historical
maturation

of a fifty year old policy with deep
and lasting historical roots,

then it is important to reiterate why
the latest variation of this

process is significantly more important
than any of its earlier stages.
Detente, as we have correctly been told,
has confronted the

United States with

a

challenge unprecedented in its history.

Yet, much

of this reasoning is based on the assumption
that the challenge with

which we are faced is primarily concerned with
the prevention of nuclear

war and its almost certain devastation of modern
civilization.
However, the relative significance of contemporary
detente can
also be seen as

a

direct result of the strategic parity that now exists

between the two superpowers.

Throughout all previous stages of detente

the process was almost always conducted between two vastly
unequal parties

With the United States enjoying an inordinate military superiority, the

Soviet Union, in the initial phases of detente, had to set certain limits
on acceptable expansionist policies while struggling to overcome the

awesome gap in the relative military prowess of the two adversaries.
Even after emerging from the second world war as

a

bona fide military

power, the U.S.S.R. constantly had to be mindful of the superior military

-ght
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Of its chief rival.

While asserting itself
™ore aggressively

in the world arena, the
Soviet Union could never
fully challenge the

united States until
be realized.

a

drastic altering of the
strategic balance could

In the early 1960's the
U.S.S.R.

achieved such

a

balance.

purported to have

Consequently. Moscow embarked
on

aggressive, if not somewhat reckless,
course of action.

alleged equality in strategic
weaponry was shown to be

a

fairly

When this
a

sham, however,

much Of the lifeblood of Soviet
aggressiveness had been sapped, and
the
Kremlin again became preoccupied
with erasing the American nuclear

advantage.
The present Soviet leadership is
not confronted with such an

overwhelming dilemma.

By most accepted standards the
U.S.S.R.

has

achieved strategic parity, and can therefore
act in the world arena as

a

co-equal, with the United States vis-a-vis the
relative military capabilities of each side.

While this balance of power quite naturally
raises

the specter of nuclear war, an important
asset from the Soviet perspective,
is the

increased flexibility and risk-taking potential that
it affords

the Kremlin.
Thus, during the present era of detente the Soviet
Union has

shown an increased willingness to embark on

implementing

i

a

course of action aimed at

ncremental' and gradual changes in the East-West equation

to the direct detriment of the United States.

While these alterations

in the framework of world politics, which are advantageous for
Soviet

purposes, are being realized, the U.S.S.R. for its part can rattle the
saber of nuclear confrontation as
any direct American response.

a

tempering and moderating factor to

Hence, the awesome destructive power of

thermonuclear weapons, and the effective equivalence of the world's two

nuclear superpowers have served
as factors 1n both
the level of
aggressiveness of any given policy
objective and in the .illtancy
of
its elicited response.
We in the West have shown
to such a formula.

a

willingness to give our tacit
approval

American policy makers have
exhibited

a tendency to
place strategic arms control and
reduced thermonuclear hostility
on such

a

high plateau of priorities that
any "minor" area of concern
could

be sacrificed on this

altar of peace in the nuclear age.

Hence, in

the case of Angola, in the face of
serious encroachments by the Soviet

Union and its Cuban ally in that nation,
the United States pursued

a

policy that, in effect, stated that this
area was not strategically

important enough to warrant

a

response that would either threaten the

ongoing strategic arms negotiations or invite
between Moscow and Washington.

Such

a

a

direct confrontation

reaction on the part of the

American government might well serve to foster an
era in which the fear
of a nuclear exchange can act as the catalyst
for the further dissemin-

ation of Soviet influence, as outlined in their program
of detente.
the past detente provided the Soviet Union with

a

breathing spell,

In
a

respite in war as Lenin described it, whereby the young Soviet
state
could concentrate its efforts on strengthening its power and
overcoming
the massive gap in the scientific-technological, and military capabil-

ities, vis-a-vis the West.

All

of this was done in preparation for the

inevitable and fatalistic confrontation with the capitalist powers.
The present era of detente, pursued in the environment of nuclear parity,

may well provide the fulcrum, without the necessity of

a

direct

catastrophic confrontation, by which the ultimate objectives of Soviet
ideology may be more easily and gradually realized.
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The history of Soviet-Z^erican
relations, with the notable
exception of the mercurial period
immediately following the
Bolshevik
revolution, can be seen as the
history of detente.
Yet, it is obvious
that such a view is not uniformly
held by all observers.
Detente is
still often referred to as a new
or unique phenomenon engendered
by the
needs of the international

political environment of the
1970's.

In the

official

report of the Secretary of State for
1972, for example, it is
noted that the Moscow summit,
highlighted by the "signing of a
declaration embodying twelve basic principles
of relations," had "helped to

usher in the beginning of
a

reference to

of the general

a

a

new era in U.S. -Soviet relations

.

Such

"new" era of U.S. -Soviet relations
was characteristic

theme espoused by the American government
in the days

immediately following the Moscow summit.

In

his address to a joint

session of Congress upon his return from the
Soviet Union, Richard Nixon
fostered the same view of detente as

a

unique and unprecedented process:

The foundation has been laid for a new relationship
between the two most powerful nations in the world.
Now it is
up to us, to all of us here in this chamber, to
all of us
across America, to join with other nations in building a new
house upon that foundation, one that can be a home for the
hopes of mankind and a shelter against the storms of conflict.^

Much of the substance of this view can be explained by the need
for political bombast on the part of the president, and by the general

state of euphoria that permeated the immediate post-summit days.
it is still

clear that detente was being defined as

a

Yet,

process born of

the contemporary political milieu and, as such, constituted an unheralded

phenomenon.

In

his report to the Congress nearly

a

year after the

conclusion of the summit, Nixon asserted that this new era should be

all-inclusive since, "it

is

not

a

question of whether certain elements should

be separable, or conditional, but whether we wish the entire process of

a

broadly based new relationship with
the Soviet Union to unfold.
^ore
Importantly, the former president
inexorably linked this "broadly
based
new relationship" to the central
themes elaborated upon in
the "Declarati

of Basic Principles."

In

describing the Moscow Declaration,
Nixon

accorded it the following place of
Importance:

a

This far reaching step placed
all our other efforts on
broader foundation. A new relationship
would require new

^e":"eit:rira^^;^^::^staJL:ni--°----^^^^
These principles are
commentary on the past.^
It

a

guide for future action, not

a

must be remembered that the "Declaration
of Basic Principles"

entails the primary elements of detente.

Thus, when Nixon claims that

the declaration is representative of
"new attitudes and aspiration,"
he is only representing, at best, one-half
of the bi-lateral

that of the American perspective.
was

a

became

equation;

The doctrine of detente, it is argued,

symbol of Soviet attitudes and aspirations long
before the term
a

fashionable addition to the American political lexicon.
In much the same manner, Arthur Hartman, the
then Assistant

Secretary of State for European Affairs, made detente synonymous
with
"new" period of U.S. -Soviet relations:
I
am convinced that it is important for us to understand the circumstances that have led to the beginning of this
new period in relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union and to ask ourselves hard questions about the meaning and
durability of these relationships that we sum up in the word
"detente." 5

Such

a

representation of detente can lend an air of misappre-

hension to the policy as we have come to know it today.

To ignore the

historical roots of detente and perceive it as something new, might be
to ignore much of the underlying Soviet motivation for this process

that the Kremlin has manifested for more than fifty years.

a

It is

interesting, in this light to
ask just what the "newness"
of this relationship actually
is.
There is no doubt that the
U.S. govern
ment, through its authoritative
spokesmen,
Of the™onuclear technology.

Hence, in

a

is

referring to the new period

lengthy address, devoted

solely to an exposition on the
detente posture between Moscow
and
Washington, Henry Kissinger elaborated
on the unique feature
of contemporary international life:
There is one central fact that
distinguishes our era from
previous historical periods; the
existence of enormous^
destructive weapons that can span unlimited
distances almot
instantaneously.
No part of the globe is beyond
reach
No
part of the globe would be spared the
effects of a y^-'crai
general
nuclear exchange. °
al

There is certainly no question that the
emergence of vast nuclear

capabilities has added an unprecedented dimension
international affairs.

to the conduct of

Yet, this does not necessarily imply that
the

process of detente, pursued within this environment,
represents

unique formula in itself.

What is new, in this writer's view,

a

is

new or
the

aforementioned strategic parity that has transformed the
latest variation
of detente into

a

significant facet of contemporary world politics.

Throughout Soviet history the Kremlin leaders have constantly

asserted that their pursuit of peaceful coexistence represented

a

direct

continuation and fulfillment of an ideological doctrine established by
Lenin.

In

order to leave no room for misunderstanding, the Soviet press,

on the very day of the signing of the "Declaration of Basic Principles,"

implacably linked the present process of detente with that which was
established by Lenin:
The great Lenin put forward and fully substantiated the
principle of peaceful coexistence among states with different
social systems.
In the very first hours of Soviet power, while
addressing the Second Congress of Soviets, he said: "We reject
all clauses concerning robberies and violence, but we shall

step from Its

'

eo ogical

n

With Richard Nixon still

i

ie

tu7T'''"^

1n Moscow, about to give
his

formal

approval to the principles of
detente, the Soviet hierarchy
left no doubt
that the American president was
extending diplomatic recognition
to a

Leninist policy that the Kremlin
was faithfully and diligently
implemeriting

:

Backin the early

days of the Soviet state, its
founder

bilUy

of the peaceful coexistence of
countries with different
^^"^ore, the Soviet Union is ready
In^ll
I'.deepen
to develop and
relations of businesslike cooperation
advantageous ties with states of the other
social
8

system

Such

a

perspective, while exhibiting

a

accuracy than the aforementioned American view,
number of misleading tenets.

greater sense of historical
is

still

imbued with

a

The Soviet perception of detente, although

much closer to the truth by virtue of its
recognition of its historical
context, still posits some very convenient lapses
of memory and indulges
in a

bit of historical revisionism, something not
altogether foreign

to Soviet propagandists.

There is evidence to show that the present

variation of detente differs in fundamental ways from the theory
as

established by Lenin.
In the first place, at the time of the Second Congress of Soviets

the policy of peaceful coexistence, despite the contrary claims of con-

temporary Soviet spokesmen, not only did not exist but represented the
antithesis of the Leninist view in respect to relations with the capitalist
world.

The first months of Soviet-American relations, as will be discussed

in detail

below, were not characterized
by any Leninist desire
to
co-habitate the globe with the
enemies of socialism.
Rather, it was an
era noted for the intransigent
view of Lenin pertaining
to his belief
that the immediate overthrow
of the opposing system
should be implemented
Detente should not be seen as a
process created immediately
after the
Bolshevik seizure of control.
It could, .ore accurately,
be viewed as

strategic concept that was fully
developed by Lenin only after
the
Soviet leader, confronted with the
failure of the socialist
revolution
in Germany, realized that tne
primary Soviet objectives could
not be
a

achieved without the breathing spell
that coexistence would provide.
Secondly, the present variation of
detente differs fundamentally
from the Leninist conception of the
doctrine in relation to the emphasis,
or lack thereof, which is attached
to the issue of war and its inevita-

bility and necessity.

The basic difference in this respect
rests with

the fact that the present concept, especially
after the 20th C.P.S.U.

Party Congress of 1956, constitutes

a

strategic theory that denies the

necessity of waging total war between the nations
of socialism and

capitalism (although the continuing possibility of such
not ignored).

a

conflict is

The Leninist concept, on the other hand, gave priority

to the objective necessity and inevitable eventuality
of a final

Armageddon between the two systems.

In this manner,

the surviving

system, which historical objectivity dictated would be the Soviet state,

would transform the world by implanting its way of life on the ruins of
the vanquished.
The third basic alteration has to do with the nature of detente
as a temporary or perpetual

foreign policy stance of the U.S.S.R.

The

present leadership, it will be argued, has made detente the primary and
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fundamental guideline to which
all aspects of Soviet
foreign policy are
to be subordinated.
As such, the concept
Is permanent in essence,
since as a mode of conducting
relations with different
social systems,
it will only cease to function
when there Is no opposing
system with
Which to relate, i.e.. when the
complete and final victory
of socialism
and the total defeat of capitalism
have been realized.
Lenin, however,
clearly perceived detente as a
strategy that was transient
in nature, as it
was designed as a response to
a specific and limited
situation at a
"

particular time.

When, In the Leninist view, the
Soviet state had

strengthened itself sufficiently during
the respite of detente, the
policy would be discarded and the two
systems would engage in their life
and death struggle.
The present Soviet contention that
detente constitutes

a

direct

continuation of Leninist policies, notwithstanding
the obvious differences that have manifested themselves over
the years, is

that still

possesses more truth than fallacy.

In fact,

to assume that Lenin, a most resolute
pragmatist and

a

viewpoint

it may be safe

strategist always

a

mindful of the need to alter or compromise
principles and theoretical

beliefs, might very well approve of the strategy
of detente politics as

practiced by the present Soviet regime.

The current manifestation of

detente has not abandoned the basic Leninist ideological tenet
of altering
the world in the communist order.

As such,

it can be seen as a strategic

concept adhering to the behests of the founder of the Soviet state.
It is

important to ask ourselves now, in just what manner we have

arrived at the present epoch of Soviet-American detente.

How has this

policy evolved and matured over the years to the point that we are now

witnessing its fruition as the accepted form of governing the behavior

between the world's two nuclear
superpowers?

The answers to these

questions can be ascertained by
an elaborate and
detailed examination
of the history of detente as
a concept of managing
East-West, and .ore
specifically, U.S. -Soviet relations.
The ensuing chapters will
therefore, serve as an inquiry,
that
will focus on an historical
analysis of the process of
detente from
1918 to the present.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE LENINIST PERCEPTION
AND

APPLICATION OF DETENTE
The political philosophy of
V.I. Lenin

subject.

Lenin not only revised

a

is

a

very complicated

good deal of Marxism, but
added

prolific body of theoretical literature
of his own.

a

It can be argued

that the combination of the two, or
Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet
ular, formed the basis of the
ideological content of detente.

v

ernac-

For all

intents and purposes, however, detente
bears the distinct imprimatur of
Lenin, who was faced with the formidable
challenge of making

theory work in the face of

a

a

revolutionary

hostile world.

In order to fully understand the
intricate complexities that

dictated the necessity for Lenin's formulation
of detente, one should
subject two important variables to an in-depth
examination;

1.) the

tumultuous historical setting in which the process was
born, and 2.) the

fluctuating characteristics of Leninist ideology which, in
response to
this particular historical environment, provided both
the rationale and

justification for
the West.

a

strategy of action based on reducing tensions with

Primary emphasis will be given in this chapter to the adaptive

qualities of Leninist ideology that allowed for the creation of detente.

The Historical Setting

One is hard pressed to depict accurately in words the chaos and

turmoil that accompanied the fall of the Czarist autocracy and the eventual
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seizure of power by Lenin and
his Bolshevik cohorts.
The holocaust
Of world War I and the
concomitant political, social,
and economic
disarray engendered by that
conflict had all but reduced
the Russia of
1917 to a prostrate nation.
The military situation
was one of complete
turmoil.
The disillusioned Russian
anny, having suffered
intolerable
losses of human life, became a
disorganized and bedraggled
fighting
force that could offer little,
if any, resistance to the
crushing enemy
onslaught.
Internally, the turbulent storm
of discontent forecast a
far more onerous turn of events
fnr fho
+ -;««
evfejnts Tor
tne ovtc
existing
government.

With the

near complete breakdown of governmental
control, the destruction of

communications and transportation, and
widespread problems of famine,
disease, and social upheaval, Russia in
1917, it can be argued,

represented one of the most complete cases
of turbulence and social
collapse ever suffered by

a

modern government.

This situation was further aggravated by
the existence of

number of diverse revolutionary political
parties.

a

While often working

towards self-exclusive ends and engaging in bitter
and violent conflicts

among themselves, these forces managed to manipulate
the frantic convulsions of wartime Russia and the disillusionment
of the masses into an

effective revolution that destroyed the Czarist monarchy.

However, the

fall of Czarism and the ensuing reigns of the Provisional
Governments,

with their weak and ineffective coalitions of irreconcilable
individuals
and parties, failed to stem the tide of revolutionary fervor and agitation

that had swept the country.

The new government also decided to continue

Russian participation in the war.

In so doing,

the Provisional

Government

sowed the seeds of its own destruction and provided the catalyst for the

metamorphic transformation of power into the hands of

a

relatively small

band of conspiratorial
revolutionaries who. to this
day, have not
relinquished their control.

The governments of the West,
and most notably the
United States,
apparently possessed little
understanding of the complicated
and diversified events that were unfolding
in this traumatic
drama in Russia.
Guided by a perspective that
was dictated by the exigencies
of the First
World War, American politicians
and policy makers had little
time to concern themselves with the bizarre
and puzzling series of
revolutions
and ensuing governments on Russian
soil, except as they pertained
to the
pursuance of the war itself. As though
no drastic alteration of the
basic structure of Russian power
had ever occurred the United
States

seemed to look upon the new regime as

a

manifestation of Czarist Russia

without the person of the Czar.
Hence, the United States wasted little
time in extending formal

diplomatic recognition to the new government
based on the hope that "the
cordial relations existing between the two
countries continue" and "prove

mutually satisfactory and beneficial

.

"''

Likewise, President Wilson,

amidst the background of the chaos and havoc of
post-Czarist Russia,

expressed both the "deep friendship of the American
people for the
people of Russia," and his hope that they would find "the
best and most
practical means of cooperation between the two peoples in
carrying the

present struggle for the freedom of all peoples to

summation."

2

a

successful con-

This policy seemingly involved a continuation of policies

pursued with Nicholas II.

It also apparently ignored the horrendous

series of misfortunes that the Kerensky government was experiencing.
The catastrophic military losses suffered in the new offensive, the

further spread of famine and governmental collapse, the armed uprisings

81

and revolts, and the Increased
disenchantment of the «sses,
all combined
to render the Provisional
Government useless and
Interjected a new and
volatile variable into the already
advanced state of mass confusion
that existed on Russian soil.
This new factor, of course, was
the formidable rise of the

Bolshevik Party which, through its
irrepressible and tenacious leader
V.I.

Lenin, called for an immediate and
violent revolution, not only in

Russia, but throughout the entire
capitalist world.

This new Bolshevik

phenomenon, as will be explained below, would
confront the United States
with

a

heretofore unseen foreign policy dilemma.

of Leninist ideology, the new Soviet
government

Guided by the dictates

would add

a

complicated,

and often misunderstood, variable to the
overall pursuit of American

objectives.

The Bolshevik Party first irritated the United
States by

refusing to continue military participation in the
war.
added insult to injury, and no doubt confused

a

The Soviets then

good many people, by

asserting that their revolution would not be complete until it
had

successfully crumbled the pillars of the American government itself.
The means by which Lenin was able to seize power and maintain it

during these turbulent years is
its own right.

a

fascinating historical pnenomenon in

The main focus of this chapter, however, is on the flexible

aspects of Leninist ideology that allowed for the formulation of detente.

Leninist Ideological Revisionism
The Foundation of Detente

By

:

carefully analyzing Leninist ideology, in regard to its

flexible and adaptive qualities, three areas of detente will be more
clearly understood.

First, the necessity of creating detente, from

Lenin's perspective, will be demonstrated.

Secondly, the changing
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characteristics of detente, that became
obvious during Lenin's lifetime,
will be highlighted.
These two characteristics
will

then shape much

of the ideological content of
detente that persists to this
day.
As will

be shown below, Marxist-Leninist
ideology has exhibited

the ability to be adapted to

a

format that can conform to many
prevailing

historical or political situations.

This is not to say that Marxist-

Leninist ideology has been totally
perverted, or that its basic
fundamentals
have been eliminated.
At the same time, however, it
cannot be seen as an
overall

inflexible or ironclad dogma with no room
for interpretation and,

in some cases, revision.
in the ensuing chapter,

The present Soviet leadership, as
will be shown

steadfastly adheres to the most crucial and

fundamental principles of the ideology of
Marxism-Leninism.

Yet, in

regard to specific details of action, the ideology
in many aspects appears
to serve more as

a

blueprint for acceptable activity than as

guide to specific behavior.

It can

prescriptive

a

be demonstrated that Lenin opened

many of the floodgates of human voluntarism and permitted
the interpretation and alteration of ideology.

This was seen by Lenin as

a

means by

which he could both seize power in economically backward Russia,
and then

formulate

a

foreign policy for

a

socialist state in the midst of an

unreceptive capitalist world.
Marxism, as

a

reflection of socialist theories originally espoused

by Marx and developed by his followers and successors, utilized

scientific principles that were based on
historical and economic determinism.

a

a

commitment to the laws of

A socialist revolution,

in this

sense, would occur first in the most advanced states of Europe.
the basic preconditions for

a

socialist transformation, including

class conscious and exploited proletariat,

set of

a

Here,
a

state of high capitalist
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productivity, and an advanced
level of Industrialization,
would first
be realized.
These factors would Inevitably
lead to the Increased
.Isery
of the proletarian class and
the eventual "dialectical
leap" whereby
capitalist would pass into the
higher for. of socialise.
A™ed uprisings,
«ars. riots, strikes, revolts,
conspiracies, propaganda, and
assassinations
were of relatively minor importance
in this body of thought.
While these
variables may exist in any era
of socialist transformation,
they would
be subordinated to the more
crucial factor of advanced
capitalist

development.
Lenin adhered to the spirit of these
laws of Marxism.

In fact,

Lenin dismissed any "nonsense" about
"Russia, for instance, being able
to avoid capitalist development,
jump out of capitalism, or skip
over it,
by some means other than the class
struggle on the basis, and within the

limits of capitalism. "2

Thus, it would appear to have been
incumbent

upon Lenin to show that capitalism had
indeed become fully developed in

Russia in 1917.

Earlier, Lenin had made

a

rather unpersuasive attempt to

chart the progress of capitalist development
on Russian soil from 1895
to 1898.^

In

1917, in the face of the lack of the precondition
of advanced

capitalist development, (e.g., Russia's small proletariat
and capitalist
class, rural-based economy, etc.), Lenin asserted that
"objective con-

ditions show that the war has accelerated the development
of capitalism

which advanced from capitalism to imperialism, from monopoly
to state

control."

5

Lenin, however, apparently realized that the development of

capitalism in Russia had not reached its fullest proportions as envisioned
by the laws of Marxism.

It was

imperative therefore, for Lenin to inject

the hand of human intervention and voluntarism as an alternative to any

ng.d determinism.

To this end. Lenin would
"bring" the revolution
to
Russia, and bypass some of
the essential economic
requirements.
This
would be done by use of his
dedicated corps of clandestine
and con-

spiratorial revolutionaries and
propagandists who would serve
as contriving
agitators in "rousing political
discontent among all classes,
rousing
the sluggards, pushing on
the laggards and providing
a wealth of material
for the development of the
political consciousness and
political activity
of the proletariat."^
It was a belief of Lenin
that the "only serious
principle the active workers of
our movement can accept is
strict secrecy,
strict selection of members and
the training of professional
revolutionaries,"^
who, as he had earlier stated,
would "devote to the revolution
not only their
spare evenings but the whole of their
lives. "^ The revolution had
therefore,
been given a push by the Bolshevik
Party which was aware of the
backwardness
of Russia as well

as

its total

then, would "go among all

lack of socialist revolutionary
zeal.

They

classes of the people as theoreticians,
as

propagandists, as agitators, and as organizers,"
bearing

in mind

Lenin's

behests that "the principal thing is propaganda
and agitation among all

strata of the people."^

In

this and many other ways, such as his revolu-

tionary alliance with the peasantry which Marx
and Engels had denounced as
"reactionary," and his belief in the primacy of the
need for violent and
armed uprisings, Lenin gave his revolution
reality.

a

much-needed touch of pragmatic

By so doing, he effectively bypassed some of the more
basic

teachings of Marxism and brought

a

socialist transformation of power to an

underdeveloped, agrarian-based, and rural country.
The most crucial aspects of the Leninist revision of Marxism, in
this writer's view, occurred in the treatment that Lenin accorded the

theories of imperialism, war, and the forcible exportation of socialist
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revolutions abroad, all of which
played

formulation of the policy of detente.

a

critical role In the initial

In .uch the same
man,^r

that

contemporary Soviet propagandists
justify their "Independent
elaboration"
of Marxist-Leninist Ideology.
Lenin had little difficulty
In explaining
the need for updating Marxism
in the "era of Imperialism."

Lenin

Incessantly criticized those who
would "fix for all time the
point of
view Marx held in a different
epocji." as an attempt to
use the Utter
of Marxism against the spirit
of Marxism.

"''O

m

this light, Lenin

showed the proper relationship of
Marxism to the revolutionary
struggle
in Russia.

We do not by any means look upon
the theory of Marx as
something final and inviolable; on the
contrary, we a^e convinced that it only laid the cornerstone
of the science wMch
Socialists must advance in all directions,
if they do not want
^^^'"^ ^^^^
independent
elabora^
J?n^^
M
tion
of Marx's
theory is especially necessary for Russian
Socialists since this theory provides only
the general guiding
principles which in detail must be applied in
England in a
manner different from that applied in France,
in France in a
manner different from that applied in Germany,
and in Germany
in a manner different from that applied
in Russia. ""^

Lenin, as contemporary Soviet leaders, claimed
that "we are

Marxists and we take as our basis the Communist
Manifesto "^^

However,

.

as

he admitted earlier,

those "who are in the least acquainted with the

actual state of our movement cannot but see that the
spread of Marxism
was accompanied by

a

certain lowering of theoretical standards

.

"""^

It

can be reasoned that this lowering of theoretical standards and
independent

elaboration of Marxism provided Lenin with the theoretical basis for formulating the policies that guided Soviet relations with the West; policies
that would eventually lead to the strategy of detente.
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Jh^arly

Months of U.^

-^2:l::tJVTj_^

The first Official action
in the history of
Soviet-y^erican
relations took place the day
after the Bolshevik
seizure of power on
November 8, 1917. At that time
the Second All-Russian
Congress of
Soviets issued the "Decree on
Peace." The new Soviet
government, disavowing any allegiance to the
Czarist wartime alliance,
called for all
belligerent parties to submit to
"the immediate opening of
negotiations
for a just and democratic
"^^
peace.
At the same time, the Soviet

government instructed its military
authorities to enter into preliminary
negotiations with the military
representatives of the Central Powers.
The objective of these negotiations
would be the immediate ceasing
of
all military operations on the
Russian front and, if need be, the

establishment of

a

separate peace treaty between Germany
and Soviet Russia.

The American response to this action
was stern.

committed to

a

The United States,

military victory over Germany, could not
but "categorically

and energetically protest against any
separate armistice which may be

made by Russia.

"''^

Thus, the United States announced an embargo
on supply

shipments to Russia and warned that "the exports
to Russia will be resumed
only after the formation of

a

steady government which can be recognized by

the United States, but if the Bolsheviks will
remain in power and will
put through their program of making peace with Germany,
the present embargo
on exports to Russia will

remain in force. "^^

Furthermore, the new

Soviet government was reminded of the treaty of September

precluded any separate armistice.

5,

1914 which

The United States warned the Bolsheviks

therefore, that "any violation of the treaty by Russia will be followed
by most serious consequences."^^

Undaunted, Lenin pursued the negotiations with Germany.

Against

majoritarian opposition within his
own party.^^ ^enip then
submitted
to the treaty of Brest-Li
tovsk.
The
initial phase of U.S. -Soviet

relations was overshadowed therefore,
by the hostility and
animosity that
resulted fro. different perspectives
on the need to pursue
military
operations against the Central Powers.

Notwithstanding the obvious impact that
it had on the exacerbation of tensions between the United
States and Soviet Russia, Lenin's

"Decree on Peace" should be noted most
for the apparent contradiction
that it represents in Leninist ideology.

Here was

a

revolutionary

obsessed with the need for violence, armed
revolutions, and revolutionary
wars as important determinants in any
socialist transformation.

Yet, his

first official proclamation after assuming
control of the seat of

Russian power was one that called for peace and
hostilities.

termination of military

a

This apparent paradox is easily dispelled
upon

a

closer

examination of the ideological thought of Lenin in regard
to the topic
of war.

It was this view of war that dictated the strategy
pursued by

the Bolsheviks during World War I, and also provided the
guiding principl
for the formulation of the policy of detente.

The subject of war and peace constituted

Leninist ideology.

addition,

In

a

a

major portion of

good deal of Lenin's philosophy

regarding war has, to this day, lingered in the official volumes of

communist doctrine.
Lenin adhered to the definition of war developed by Clausewitz.
Hence, he could claim that,

"

as applied to wars, the main thesis of the

dialectic is that 'war is simply the continuation of politics by other
(i.e., violent) means

'

.

"

Lenin further felt that this view was "always

the standpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded every war as the
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°f the politics of the given
interested

powers.""

Furthermore, Lenin applied this theory
to the peace that would
ensue
after any war:
Just as all war is but the
continuation by violent means
Of the politics which the belligerent
statesVn th cla ses
^^^rh^^e been conducting for many years
o the
''''''' '''' ^han a summing
u
up
andd' registration
List?a?? n ir/.
of the changes in the relation
of forces
consequence
ol,
the
g^ven wa? 2^

Lenin had not always subscribed to the
belief that wars, especially
of an international magnitude, could
provide the needed stimulus for

socialist transformation.

His vacillation in this regard
provided one

of his first cases of "lowering of theoretical
standards."

of the Russian Social

a

As a delegate

Democratic Labor Party to the 1907 Congress of
the

Second International, Lenin agreed with the
resolutions of that conference
that called for the immediate termination of any
international war.

Such wars, in the view of the International, could not
assist the world

socialist movement.

Rather, they could only succeed in causing greater

hardships and agonies for the already oppressed masses.

clearly sided with those who believed that
as World War I, must be opposed by all

a

Hence, Lenin had

worldwide conflagration, such

Marxists with

a

resolute and

unyielding pacifist stance.
Lenin, however, proved his mettle as one of history's greatest

opportunists, and quickly saw the inestimable revolutionary value provided
by the massive spread of the world's first international military holocaust.

As the First World War brought its unparalleled destruction and devastation

throughout the entire European continent, Lenin devoted all his tireless
energy to
war.

a

campaign that would eliminate any pacifist stance toward the

Lenin replaced this view with revolutionary action aimed at

,

transforming the conflict into

a

socialist revolutionary war
that not

only would topple the Czarist
monarchy, but would herald
the complete
downfall Of the entire world
capitalist system.
In addition, Lenin
argued that any imperialist alliance
during or after this war was
temporary in nature, as murderous wars
between them were inevitable:
Peaceful alliances prepare the
ground for wars

and in

the other, giving rise to alternating
forms of peaceful
and non-peaceful struggle out of
one and the same bali
of
economics

r^KTit^^

i:S"or]"pom?^5r^

The first four months of U.S. -Soviet
relations were characterized
by the Leninist quest to export the
new socialist revolution to the

nations of the West.

Overcome with the euphoria that accompanied
their

swift acquisition of power, the Bolsheviks
wasted few diplomatic courtesies
and points of protocol

in their attempt to topple the
governments of the

capitalist-imperialist system.
It is

not surprising that American statesmen were quite
aghast

when listening to this steady flow of unheard of
progaganda from

a

government that stood for every policy and belief that was inimical
to
the interests of the United States.

Here was

a

government that had

repudiated all codes of ethics and morality, outside of their own, and
denounced them as "a deception,

a

fraud, which clogs the brains of the

workers and peasants in the interests of the landowners and capitalists."^^
The Soviets had deprecated the notion of

a

God as "a complex of ideas

begotten by the cross submissi veness of man, by external nature and
by class oppression

-

ideas which tend to perpetuate this submissi veness

to deaden the force of the class struggle."

accurately saw

a

The United States quite

nation, in Soviet Russia, which was unheralded in its

own obsession with war, violence, terror and an indomitable passion to
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export its successes to every
non-socialist nation on the
globe
Furthermore. Lenin let it be known
that this exportation
of the socialist
transformation would not involve
peaceful methods.
As Lenin claimed:

"the proletariat cannot
achieve victory without

Of the bourgeoisie, without
forcibly

s

breaMnaJhej:esisMce

uppressing its enemi..

..^^

:„

regard to the United States. Lenin
was emphatic on the need
for violence.
Lenin felt that "the replacement
of the bourgeois by the
proletarian
state is impossible without a
violent revolution." and that
"today, both
in England and America, the

'precondition of any real people's
revolution'

is the breakup, the shattering
of the

'ready-made state machinery. '"^5

Lenin and his Soviet spokesmen were
also something less than

courteous in other remarks about the
United States in this early period.
In his treatise State and Revolution.

Lenin had clearly marked the United

States as one of the most obvious examples
of

a

ruthless state serving

as the instrument for the exploitation
of the oppressed classes.

This

was true, according to Lenin, by virtue
of the government's "direct corrup-

tion of officials" and by "the alliance of the
government with the stock

exchange."

26

Furthermore, Lenin castigated the United States for the

unprecedented extremes of its class contradictions:
...America has become one of the foremost countries as
regards the depth of the abyss which divides a handful of
brazen billionaires who are wallowing in dirt and in luxury
on the one hand and millions of toilers who are always on the
verge of starvation. 27
When President Wilson sent his message to the new Soviet govern-

ment expressing his solidarity with the Russian people in their "attempt
to free themselves forever from autocratic government and become masters

of their own life,"

28

the Bolsheviks responded in

a

manner that the

American chief executive had never before experienced.

The Soviets

91

caustically replied that they take
"the opportunity of
President
Wilson's message to express to all
peoples, suffering and dying
from
the horrors of imperialist war,
its warm sympathy and
its firm belief
that the happy time is not far
distant when the laboring
masses of all
the bourgeois countries will throw
off the yoke of capitalism
and

establish

a

socialist state of society.

"'29

^he Soviet preoccupation

with the exporting of their revolution
would cloud every issue of early

Soviet-American relations, and would come
to an end only after Lenin
realized that this "happy time" might
well

be in the very distant future.

1918:

The Birth of Detente

Most Western experts on Soviet foreign policy
characterize the

year 1921 as the starting point for
policy objectives.

a

basic re-aligning of Soviet foreign

Consequently, 1921 is often seen

peaceful coexistence became

a

Adam

B.

Ulam labels 1921 as

the time when

viable alternative to the heretofore

inalterable policy of revolutionary confrontation.
Expansion and Coexistence:

as

In his classic

The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967
a

"watershed in Soviet internal as well as

external politics" as it ushered in an era that "witnessed the elaboration
of

a

new pattern of Soviet foreign relations

saw 1921 as

a

""^"^
.

Likewise, George Kennan

time when "relations with the Western governments achieved

a

new seriousness in the eyes of the Soviet leaders; and they now allotted

a

high priority to their development."^"'

It would be difficult to dis-

pute the claims of such noted scholars that 1921 marked an important and

critical time in Soviet history.

To be sure, this year was highlighted

by the beginning of a new era in the theoretical and practical

of the Soviet world outlook.

formulation

However, there is evidence to show that the

.

Kremlin hierarchy, as early as
March of 1918 with the
signing of the
treaty of Brest-Li tovsk had
already started the process
of realigning
Soviet foreign policy.
At that time Lenin, as
will be presented below,
realized that a detente relationship
with the West in general,
and the
United States in particular, was
necessary.
,

The detente of 1918 can be seen
as
in nature.

a

policy that was unilateral

This detente did not include
the full

ramifications of the

policy that would be developed later
(e.g. formal diplomatic
relations,
treaties, reciprocal trade, etc.),
but entailed a detente from
the
Soviet perspective.
pursue

a

Lenin was convinced that the new
Soviet regime should

policy of coexistence based on

including the objective reality that

a

a

number of realistic assessments,

breathing spell was needed for the

implementation of internal consolidation.

Yet, no Western government,

due to their preoccupation with the war and
their basic mistrust of the

Bolsheviks, would engage in any reciprocal relationship
with the Soviet

government at this time.
Lenin, in his frenzied quest to implement
in all

a

socialist revolution

parts of the capitalist world had hinged much of his
hope on the

success of an immediate uprising in war-weary Germany.

It was

here,

in Lenin's view, where the entire fate of the European
socialist trans-

formation was being determined.

If Germany had met with success from

Lenin's perspective, then the worldwide socialist transformation might
well

have been realized as an immediate goal of his revolutionary party.

As Lenin declared:

If the German revolution were to break out and triumph
in the coming three or four months, the tactics of an immediate revolutionary war might perhaps not ruin our socialist
revol ution 32
.

However, Lenin realized that the prospects for an immediate

German uprising were not
good.

He then stated that
"it would be

absolutely impermissible tactics
to stake the fate of
the socialist
revolution... merely on the chance
that the German revolution
may begin
in the immediate future,
within a matter
of weeks.

be a reckless gamble.

Such tactics would

We have no right to take
such risks. "33

^he
fact that the global socialist
transformation depended on the
events
in Germany, and that this
revolt was not forthcoming
as planned, then
became a matter of official
policy.

At all events, under all
conceivable circumstances if
the German revolution does not
come we are doomed
The revolution will not come as
quickly as expected
History has proven this, and we must
be able to take this,
as a fact, to reckon with the
fact that the world socialist
revo ution cannot begin so easily
in the advanced
ou tr es
as the revolution began in Russia. 34

"

Lenin was also aware that

made it imperative to secure

a

a

number of internal difficulties had

breathing spell and to postpone any

external revolutionary activity for the
time being.

With the outbreak

of the civil war in Russia, Lenin, although
convinced of the ultimate

Bolshevik victory, was forced to concede that
"some time must inevitably
elapse, no little exertion of effort will
inevitably be required,

a

certain period of acute economic dislocation and
chaos, which accompany
all

wars, and civil wars in particular, are inevitable,
before the

resistance of the bourgeoisie is crushed. "^^

In addition, as

Lenin

admitted, his government was plagued by sabotage and terror
from the
newly disenfranchised bourgoisie.

This sabatoge had, in his words, "proven

so stubborn and capable of assuming such diversified forms that the

fight against it will inevitably require some more time, and in its

main forms, is hardly likely to end until several months have passed.
Lastly, Lenin had to take note of the critical food situation and the

"'^^

danger of famine and concede th;it
that

"

+
the

^

organizational problems of
the
socialist transformation of
Russia are so immense
and difficult that
their solution.. .Will also
require a fairly long
time.''37
,,,,

required then was

"certain amount of time,
several months at least
during which the hands of the
socialist government must
be absolutely
free to achieve victory
over the bourgeoisie
first in our own country
and to launch far-reaching
mass organizational work
on a wide scale. "^^
Lenin then announced, in detailed
form, in his article "The
Immediate
Tasks of the Soviet Government,"
a policy that can be
equalled with
detente, in its earliest form:
a

make use of the respite given
us by the combination of
''''
''''
-°-ds
nict d^bfthP
'i: ^"^^'^^ ''^y
organism
of
RnH r.nH K
T""
-'^^"^
revUa}
without
which
a re ? ?nto'c"^
countries defense potential is inconceivable
It also goes without saying
that we shall be able to
render effective assistance to the
socialist revolution in
the West, which has been delayed
for a number of reasons
only to the extent that we are able
to fulfill the task °^
of
organization confronting us. 39

T

,

To do otherwise, in Lenin's view, and
to embark upon

a

course of

direct confrontation with the West would be
of the utmost folly.

While

answering "the human yearning for the beautiful,
dramatic and striking,"
it "would totally disregard the objective
balance of class forces and

material factors at the present stage.
of class forces on the issue would be

necessary for Lenin to enter

a

To ignore the objective balance
a

fatal error. "^°

Thus, it was

period of detente, and to direct the

energies and activities of the new government to the formidable
array of

enemies, both of man and nature, that had aligned themselves against
the Bolsheviks.

To do this Lenin created the world's first detente be-

tween the two conflicting socio-economic systems.

This detente, although

.

temporary 1n nature, would then
become

a

™ajor component of Soviet

foreign policy.
The concept of detente, in
view of this evidence,
was not coincidental with the formulation
of Soviet Russia, as
contemporary Soviet
historians would have us believe.
The evidence would also
show that it
was not designed at the same
time as the implementation
of the New
Economic Policy, as some Western
observers claim.
Rather, it can be

reasoned that it was

a

product of the Leninist realization
that the mass

of serious domestic problems had
made co-habitation of the world
with
the capitalist powers an unfortunate
though temporary necessity.
This

program was detailed in its entirety
by G.V. Chicherin in his
report on
foreign policy to the Fifth All-Russian
Congress of Soviets.
This report

deserves some attention on our part here
since it graphically outlines
the basic principles of detente that
would remain uniform for decades to

come.

According to the Soviet Comnissar for Foreign
Affairs, "in the

period following the conclusion of the Brest
treaty, Russia's foreign

policy has gone along lines different from those
followed in the first
months after the October revolution. "^^

Chicherin then fully enunciated

the meaning of this difference:

At the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 the basic
feature of our foreign policy was the revolutionary offensive.
It took its bearings from the immediate prospect
of the world
revolution, for which the Russian revolution was to serve as
the signal
...For the last four months it (Soviet Russia) has been
compelled to pursue the aim of pushing off and postponing the
dangers threatening it from all sides, trying to gain as much
time as possible. .for the new forms of political and social
relationships established by the Soviet Government to take
root among the popular masses of Russia.
The position of Soviet Russia between two imperialist
coalitions, like being between two fires, is extremely difficult, but we can say with full confidence that the best and
indeed the only way that we can overcome this position is by
.

:
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internal consol I'dation
.and bv the re. ^-^^tforce for the protection o?
'
the concues^rorn"
V^'^''^
The nearer we come to rean,?n„ ™'?''^^5ts of our revolution.
position abroad : 1 °bet
r f re on oolir*''
dependent on
our internal policy. 42 '
.

.

It is

debatable as to how long this
period of detente was to
last, or exactly what its
full dimensions and
parameters would be. The
key variable, outside of
internal consolidation and
a military resurgence, was the now less than
enthusiastic prospect of other
socialist
revolutions.
As Chicherin declared, the
Soviets were resting and

recuperating but still "awaiting the
moment when the proletariat of
other
countries will help us to complete
the socialist revolution we
began in
43
n
October."

Much the same sentiment was expressed
by Lenin when he

claimed
^ beleaguered
H./\^''\"°V^"''^
detachments of the international

fortress until other
socialist revolution come
to our rescue.
But these detachments exist they
are more
"^'^^'"o^s than ours, they mature, they
they becomi
stronger as the bestialities of imperialism
continue. 44
,

However, such incantations may have served
as no more than an

exercise in the ritualistic recital of propaganda
verbiage paying homage
to a long-awaited dream that had been dashed
upon the rocks of the

failure of the worldwide socialist revolution.

The Soviet government,

although paying lip service to the cause of global
socialist transformation, had already begun to test the waters of reciprocal
economic and

trade relations with the United States in the Spring of 1918.

Chicherin

in his aforementioned report had alluded to the Western willingness
to

engage in normal state-to-state relations in the economic realm, and
claimed that "instead of

coalitions would prefer
conquests."

45

a

a

policy of robbery, these elements in both
policy of trade, of concessions and economic

Earlier, Trotsky, as Soviet Commissar for War, had

addressed an appeal to the United
States government, through
Colonel
Robins, the head of the American
Red Cross mission in
Russia, in which
he inquired as to "what kind
of support would be furnished
particularly

and especially by the United
States," should the German
government break
the treaty of Brest-Li tovsk in
order to renew "its robber's
raid."^^

Incidentally, Trotsky had earlier
stated his belief that the United
States was, or would soon be, interested
in developing an economic

rapport with the new Soviet regime.

According to the Commissar for War:

America can be tolerant with regard
to the existence of
the Soviet Government, since it is
satisfied with the exhaustion of the Allied countries and
Germany.
Apart from
^'^
interested in investing its capital in

Russia'^47^"

Lenin himself, on May 14, 1918 gave his
official stamp of

approval to the normalization of trade relations,
in

a

lengthy and elab-

orate plan for Russian-American commercial
relations that he sent to
Colonel Robins.

In this

plan Lenin, in great detail, delineated

a

system

of trade whereby the fledgling Soviet state would
gain much needed "tools
of production" by granting concessions to the United
States for the

development of Russian raw materials.

According to this preliminary

plan, Lenin fully realized that "without the assistance of
countries,

which are producing

a

large quantity of the tools of production for

agricultural purposes as well as parts of railroad stock, it will not be
easy

for Russia, and she will not be able with any degree of speed to

overcome all the difficulties of re-establishing the economic life of the
country."

48

Furthermore, Lenin acknowledged the fact that the United

States, as the nation that was not ravaged during the havoc of World
War I, would, if it so desired, become the leading trading partner with

Soviet Russia.

Lenin fully conceded the fact that Germany, the chief

.
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commercial dealer with pre-war
Russia, had been so devastated
by the
war that it was •'compelled to
surrender her leading place as
the source
for the economic life of Russia
for the next few years to
a country
which has not been disorganized as
much as Germany by the war.
Only
America can become that country. "^^
Aware that Russia would be unable
to pay for the American products
imported by his government, Lenin
de-

vised

a

system of economic concessions, which
would be repeated and

emphasized with greater intensity in 1921
with the implementation of
the more elaborate coexistence strategy.

The May, 1918, plan for paying

the United States called for the following
concessions and guarantees to

America, which could:

...participate actively in the exploitation of the
marine
riches of Eastern Siberia, of coal and other mines,
as well as
in the railroad and marine transportation
construction in
Siberia and northern European Russia.
Especially in the construction of the Northern Sea route with the Enisei River,
the
improvement of water routes, building of ports and using
of
the water power, there is great need.
As security of payment for products brought into
Russia,
America could be given the privilege of participating in certain construction enterprises. .The United States could also
participate on a large scale in the development of certain
well-known extensive agricultural tracts, by introducing
modern methods, receiving in return a large proportion of the
products
Further, Russia guarantees that the military stores which
are on hand in Russia will not be sold to Germany, and that all
war materials which were manufactured in England and America for
Russia will be transferred to the United States. 50
_

.

As

early as the Spring of 1918, Lenin had conceived and graphically

detailed both the imperative need for

a

period of detente as well as the

course that this policy would take in the economic realm.

If we assume

that Lenin was quite serious in his belief that the economic revival of

Soviet Russia was of utmost paramountcy, and that he honestly wished
to enlist the direct participation of the United States in effecting this

goal, it is logical to further assume that the policy of coexistence
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was to be Of

a

fairly long duration.

As Lenin explained,
the internal

and economic difficulties
confronting his government
were of such

magnitude that
the..

rather long period of time
would be required to solve
It can then be logically
reasoned that in 1918 Lenin
had created
a

and substantiated the policy
of detente that, while being
relatively

temporary in nature, would,
nonetheless, serve

as

the main determinant

of Soviet foreign affairs for
the foreseeable future.

Moreover, detente

would continue until such time as
the new government could
fully consolidate its economic and military
power.
These variables would come to
the
fore again in 1921 when Lenin, further
convinced of both the failure and
poor prospects of an immediate socialist
revolution outside of Russia,
and of the need for Western credits
and economic assistance, would
advance,
in greater detail,

a

blueprint for coexistence with the powers
of the

capitalist-imperialist system.

However, it would be incorrect to ignore

the fact that only four months after the
Bolshevik takeover Lenin had

already acknowledged the urgency of effecting
in order to forestall

a

much needed breathing spell

any immediate confrontation with the West.

The

preliminary plan for U.S. -Soviet commercial relations,
drafted by Lenin
and presented to

a

representative of the American government, bears

testimony to this early realization on the part of the Soviet
leader.
On the same day that Lenin publicized his plan for economic

relations with the United States, he addressed the Central Executive

Committee of the Soviet government.

Here, he presented

a

sober and

realistic assessment of the present Soviet conditions and outlined

a

course of action that would be followed for an indefinite period of time.
Taken together, these two reports, delivered on the same day, will provide us with

a

complete enunciation of the Leninist policy of peaceful

coexistence including the underlying
motivation and rationale
for the
policy as well as the manner
in which it would be
pursued.
In his report to the
Central

Committee Lenin acknowledged
the

fact that the socialist
revolutions in the Western
capitalist states
had stalled.
Therefore, he claimed that "for
a number of reasons
of an
economic and political character
which you are aware, the
different
rate of development, the difference
between conditions here and in
the

West, our Socialist republic
remains, for the time being, an
oasis in
the middle of a raging sea of
imperialist rapacity
With the hopes
.

for an immediate revolutionary surge
in Germany diminished, Lenin,
as
he reported,

had to resort to

tactics against the West.

a

strategy of waiting and employing new

According to Lenin, the Soviets had to
hold

on to and consolidate their present
position "until our ally, the

international proletariat, catches up with us

-

and it undoubtedly will

although incomparably more slowly than we would
have liked.

We must

stick to our waiting tactics and exploit the
conflicts and antagonisms

among the imperialists, slowly accumulating strength
and maintaining
the oasis of Soviet power in the middle of the
raging imperialist

sea."

These particular "antagonisms"

Lenin would delineate in 1921.

were identical to those which

In the first place,

Lenin recognized

"the struggle between Germany and England on the western
front, which
has reached the limit of ferocity," and secondly the severe antagonism

between Japan and America which had only been "concealed for the time
being by their alliance against Germany. "^^

At this time, Lenin was

still totally committed to the view that the imperialist powers would,

sometime in the future, align themselves in

a

joint and massive assault

on the government that had dared to construct a socialist socio-economic
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system.

However, Lenin reasoned that
the imperialists were
locked in
their own life and death struggle
for the moment, and
consequently, had
precluded any chance of an imperialist
alliance.
This condition had
afforded the Soviet regime a life
saving respite.
Faced with this
situation. Lenin had but one choice
in regard to the tactics
and strategy
his government would employ:
...we shall do everything to
prolong that brief and ore
carious respite which we got in
March, for we are f??mlv
convinced that we have tens of
millions of workers nd
gathering new st?en ?h nd con'.luT."
solidating'''r\''l
the Soviet power with every week,
every month that
the respite lasts, and within
whom the determination ?s
^°
^'^^ decisive battle when external
w!c'h^
forces
descend upon ^^t
the Socialist Soviet Republic. 54
If we sum up the arguments advanced
by Lenin in his two statements

of May 14, 1918, we will find
policy.

a

complete portrait of the Leninist detente

This strategy was based on the convictions
that; 1.) the Soviet

republic urgently and desperately required

a

breathing spell,

by which the new government could concentrate
all

a

respite

its efforts at consoli-

dating its power and overcoming the awesome political,
social, and

economic problems which confronted it in the domestic
sphere; 2.) the

worldwide socialist upheaval, especially
a

in Germany,

had been delayed for

number of reasons, thus forcing the Soviet government to remain
isolated

in an

imperialist world and compelling it to render little, if any,

meaningful assistance to the cause of global revolution; 3.) the inordinate East-West military imbalance and the relative anemia of the Soviet
armed forces made it impossible for the Bolsheviks to engage in any

military confrontation with the West, and underscored the need for

a

drastic realtering of the East-West military equation; 4.) the prospect
of

a

final and fatalistic military confrontation between the powers of

capitalism and socialism was guaranteed as an historical inevitability;

102
5.) the capitalist-imperialist nations
would eventually for.
an alliance
and launch an offensive
against Soviet Russia, an
offensive that could
not be precluded by detente,
which was geared to
preparing for this

inevitability; 6.) Lenin could
not effectively restore
economic stability
to his country without
securing the much needed
economic assistance
and trade credits from the West,
and specifically from the
economically
powerful United States which
possessed the most advanced level
of

scientific and technological expertise,
and which was the least
impaired
of the warring nations of World
War I; 7.) the Soviet government
could
prolong this life-saving respite by
exploiting and manipulating the

inherent contradictions in the imperialist
camp and by doing all in its
power to transform these contradictions
into open warfare between them so
as

to postpone the eventual

anti-Soviet alliance of imperialists; and

8.) the socialist system would inevitably gain

the capitalist-imperialist system.

a

complete triumph over

The tactics of waiting and consolidatir

strength were therefore, logistical components
of
the final destruction

a

strategy that had

of capitalism and the concomitant socialist trans-

formation of the world as its ultimate objectives.
A major hypothesis of this dissertation is that
detente in

1972 was a continuation of the detente of 1918.

Detente, it will be

shown, was created by Lenin and developed by Stalin, Khrushchev,
and

Brezhnev.
will

In

fact, the detente of 1980, though tempered by recent events,

be viewed as a direct descendant of the policy conceived by Lenin

less than one year after the Bolshevik seizure of power.
It is

important therefore, to analyze the eight major components

of the Lenin detente of 1918.

By so doing, the historical continuity

in detente from 1918 to the present will

be more clearly manifested.

.
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The different eras of detente,
and most importantly the
Brezhnev era,
will be discussed in some detail
below.
However, a cursory glance at
these periods would be in order here,
in light of the eight
initial

factors that originally governed the
creation of detente in 1918.

The

main focus in this brief overview will
be on the similarities in
the
basic constitution of detente as practiced
by the four major Soviet
regimes
In the first place,

it should be noted, as will

be discussed

below, that all eight variables that served
as motivational factors for

detente in 1918 were identical to those that
provided the stimulus for
the same policy in 1921.

At that time, it was still

necessary for Lenin

to secure a breathing spell with the West in
order to focus on the goals

of internal consolidation.

This was especially true in the light of

the further domestic problems caused by the civil
war.
a

in

The prospects for

European socialist revolution appeared to Lenin to be even more
remote
1921

than they were in 1918.

The imperialist nations had also escaped

from the First World War unscathed, in terms of any Bolshevik-styled

upheaval.

The East-West military equation, which would determine the

outcome of the inevitable inter-camp war, was still heavily weighted
in the favor of the capitalist-imperialist camp.

The possibility of

an anti-Soviet alliance among the Western nations was

a

more ominous

threat by virtue of the fact that the capitalist-imperialist nations
were now free of the war.

The Soviet regime was still desperately in

need of Western trade and economic benefits and, while trying to secure
them, was mindful of the urgency of exploiting the contradictions and

inherent antagonisms in the imperialist camp.

Finally, the Soviet

leaders in 1921, as they were in 1918, were convinced of the inevitability
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of the historically-guaranteed
triumph of the socialist
transformation,
and the ultimate defeat of the
antithetical socio-economic
system.

These eight variables, which dictated
the efficacy of pursuing

policy of coexistence in 1918. were
very similar to those which
made
detente a primary requisite for the
formulation of Soviet foreign policy
during the Stalinist years.
There would, of course, be obvious
a

tactical variations injected into the
politics of detente during this
era.

The Stalinist period covered nearly
thirty years of Soviet history,

and witnessed, among other things, the
transformation of the Soviet state

from an "oasis in the raging sea of imperialism,"
to the acknowledged
head of

a

system of socialist countries.

However, at one time or

another, the policies of rapid industrialization,
forced collectivization,

socialism in one country, capitalist encirclement, the blood
purges,
the alliance of World War II, the tremendous Soviet
wartime losses, the

American nuclear capability, and

a

host of other factors all contributed

to the utmost urgency of maintaining

Lenin in 1918.

a

detente posture as outlined by

The Khrushchev years, for their part, saw the policy of

detente being transformed from

a

tactic of waiting and consolidating

strength to an offensive strategy, whereby the concept of coexistence
itself, would serve as the stimulus for the dissemination of socialist

influence.

This period witnessed the demise of three variables in the

Leninist formula.

The Soviet Union no longer had to consolidate its

strength internally, was not isolated as
not adhere to the theory of wars as

of historical development.

a

a

socialist oasis, and did

fatalistically inevitable guarantee

Yet, at the same time, the strategic

military superiority of the United States, the existing possibility of
a

reckless anti-Soviet thrust by the imperialists, the need for expanding
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economic contacts with the West, the
urgency of exploiting the
antagonists
of the imperialist world, and the
dictates of the ideology of
world

domination remained fixed in the Soviet
strategy of detente during
Khrushchev's tenure in power.
The present regime, as we have
seen, has further altered some
of

these principles of detente.

The major revision, in this
writer's view,

is concerned with the "correlation
of world forces," an important
con-

sideration for Soviet theoreticians from the
very inception of Soviet
power.

This equation has finally, from Moscow's
point of view, been

weighted in favor of world socialism.

With the achievement of an effective

strategic parity with the United States, the Soviet
Union, unlike past
years, is not overwhelmingly concerned with erasing
an awesome gap in
the military capabilities of the two competing systems.

However, much

of what Lenin said in 1918 can, with a good deal of
accuracy, be applied
to the present situation.

Contemporary Soviet leaders must, as they have

often repeated, guard against

a

possible imperialist attack.

The

capitalist world, hopelessly frustrated by the advancements of the
socialist camp, might very well attempt one desperate, and fruitless
assault in order to thwart the unstoppable march of communism.

The

present leadership is also cognizant of the urgent necessity of infusing
mass amounts of much needed Western scientific and technological

advancements into the Soviet economy, and of expanding reciprocal trade
and economic agreements with the West.

Brezhnev, although somewhat less

obtrusive than Lenin, has also realized the need for exploiting every

manifestation of antagonism and conflicting interests among the powers
of world imperialism.

Finally, the present Soviet government has rein-

forced its belief, based on the convictions of Marxist-Leninist

.
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Ideology, that, through gradual
and incremental changes,
the capitalistimperialist system will inevitably
give way to the communist
world
order
For

a

number of reasons, however,
the detente policy of
1918.

although fully defined and elaborated
by Lenin, was never fully
incorporated into a bi-laterial and reciprocal
code of conduct with the
nations
of the West.

The apparent reason for this was
that no nation of the

capitalist system was either willing or
able to entertain any thoughts
of entering into

with

a

a

mutually acceptable political or
economic arrangement

revolutionary government that had vowed to
destroy it.

be reasoned that there were two
elemental

It can

factors that prompted this

unreceptive stance on the part of the Western
powers and precluded any
meaningful rapport on their part with Soviet
Russia.
the capitalist nations were still
and placed

a

In the first place,

concerned with the First World War,

premium on effecting changes that would permit the

Russian military forces to reopen the Russian front.

Thus, in no way,

would the creation of amiable relations with the government
that had

closed the Russian military theater and induced

a

potentially fatal

military predicament in the West, have served the primary interests
of
any country in the Allied camp.

Secondly, the nations of the West

held nothing but the most utter contempt for the Bolsheviks and looked
upon their government as some form of temporary madness that, in due
time, would give way to more responsible and traditional forms of leadership.

Lenin and his henchmen were, it was held, nothing more than

fanatical, conspiratorial terrorists whose reign could never stand the
tests of time.

When the Russian people came to their senses the Bolshevik

faction would, in this view, be overthrown.

Both of these perceptions
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would Change in 1921.

The governments of the
West, free of their

conmitment to the war, and more
inclined to believe, in
light of the
Red Army's victory in the
Russian civil war, that
the Bolsheviks were
there to stay, were more receptive
to negotiating with the
Soviet
government.
The fact that the West was
not receptive to the
Soviet
overtures for detente in 1918,
however, does not mean that
detente did
not exist then.
Similarly, the United States may
not be strongly
pursuing detente today in the wake
of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan;
yet detente, as will be shown, still
exists in 1980.
A major theme
of this study is that detente is
policy.

a

long-term and fundamental Soviet

Detente was designed and implemented
by the Soviet regime as

the best means by which it could
protect, and eventually expand upon the

revolutionary gains that it had achieved.

From the Soviet perspective,

there would be no major qualitative changes
in the basic composition of

detente from 1918 to 1921.

It will

be shown that the primary difference

in the policy would be in the more receptive
response given to it by

the nations of the West.

The Revital ization of Detente:

1920-1921

The two and one-half year period from the ratification of the

Brest-Li tovsk treaty to the winter of 1920-1921 witnessed

a

low level

of understanding in the relations of Soviet Russia and the non-socialist
nations of the world.

For the reasons outlined above, the capitalist

nations were unwilling to conduct anything resembling amiable relations

with the new and radical Soviet government.

The strains in Soviet-Western

relations were manifested in many ways by the policy of intervention in

Soviet Russia;

a

policy that did little to enhance the possibilities of

fostering

a

mutual detente.

The Allied Intervention
1n Russia is

a

subject that is far too complex
for any lengthy discussion
here.
It
1s interesting, however, to
examine the effects that
/taerican participation in this joint Allied venture
had on the Soviet policy
of detente
with the United States.

Contemporary Soviet historians are
fond of portraying American
intervention in terms of an attempt by
the United States to assist
in

the overthrow of the Soviet regime.

Such

a

view engages in

a

bit of

historical distortion that is not
altogether foreign to Soviet

propagandists.

Historical evidence indicates that
the United States

was the last of the Allied powers to
concede to the policy of interventi
and did so with the incessant urging
of the British and French

governments.

Moreover, it can be shown that the United
States pursued

objectives in Soviet Russia that were directly
related to the final

consummation of World War

I.

The United States sent

a

total of 3,950 troops under British

command to the northern Russian port of Arkhangelsk.^^
of this small contingent were to:

The objectives

1.) safeguard the 162,495 tons of war

supplies from German acquisition;^^ 2.) forestall any German
advances
in the northern regions of Russia;

3.)

preclude the establishment of

a

German submarine base at Murmansk or Petchenga,^^ and 4.) keep the

northern front open in the hopes of eventually persuading the Soviets
to re-enter the war.

The American forces dispatched to Siberia were sent with

a

set

of objectives that were less clearly defined than those in the north.
As the coimander of the U.S. contingent in Siberia, General William S.

Graves, stated,

"I

was in command of the United States troops sent to

Siberia and

I

.ust ad.it,

do not know what the
United States was trying
to accomplish by military
intervention. "^^ Officially,
the United
I

States attempted to achieve three
basic goals in Siberia:

tection of

a

stockpile of war munitions;
2.) assisting

1.) the pro-

legion of

a

Czech-Slovak troops in leaving Soviet
Russia, and 3.) guarding
sections
of the Trans-Siberian Railway.
Unofficially, however, the United
States was alarmed by the presence
of some 72,000 Japanese troops
there,
and hoped to discourage any military
designs by Japan with the existence

of

a

strong American military contingent.
As a contributing factor to the
development of hostile Soviet-

American relations, the American intervention
should have been
of little concrete substance.
not look upon it as such.

a

variable

Yet, the Soviet government of Lenin
did

The Bolsheviks immediately launched
an

intensive propaganda campaign against the United
States and claimed that

America was trying to kill the infant Soviet state.

Such

a

view was

epitomized by Chicherin in an official protest that he
sent to President
Wilson.

Chicherin first reminded the American chief executive of
his

promise "to collaborate with Russia in order to obtain for her
the

unrestricted and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her political development and her national policy."

Chicherin

then listed the tangible results of this pledge of good will:
In fact this

collaboration took the form of an attempt,
first on the part of the Czech-Slovak troops and later, in
Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, and the Far East, of your own allies'
troops, to force on the Russian people the rule of those
oppressing and exploiting classes whose power was overthrown
by the workers and peasants in Russia in October of last
year .61
Lenin further claimed that, "Wilson proved to be

a

fool," and

that "the roots of Wilson's policy amounted only to the piffle of

no
parsons-petty Bourgeois phrases-and
the utter failure to
understand
the class struggle.
The United States' response
typified the level
of animosity that existed between
the two countries.

In the words of

Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby,
"the existing regime in
Russia
is based on the negation of
every principle
of honor and good faith,

and every usage and convention underlying
the whole structure of inter-

national law."^^
Lenin was aware, however, that U.S.
-Soviet relations, regardless

of the animosities caused by the intervention,
had to be immediately

re-channeled into the detente framework that he
had created in 1918.
In Lenin's mind there were now two
decisive factors

that compelled him

to embark on a more energetic and substantive
form of detente with the

United States.

The first of these centered on Lenin's accurate
assess-

ment that the imperialist countries would be more receptive
to the
Soviet overtures for initiating traditional forms of
diplomatic relations.
In addition,

the nations of the West would now find it to their

advantage to expand what could prove to be mutually beneficial economic
and trade agreements with Soviet Russia.

The Bolsheviks had demonstrated

by this time that they were not the leaders of

a

"short-lived" fanatical

movement, but were the recognized heads of the Russian government.
nations of the West, if indeed they wished to conduct

would have to do so with the Bolshevik regime.

a

The

Russian policy,

Having survived the

Allied intervention, and having defeated the formidable array of antiBolshievik forces

in the civil

war, the Soviet regime had dispelled

any hopes, certainly for the time being, that their government would

soon be overthrown and replaced with

a

more amiable political organization.

Furthermore, Lenin reasoned that the potential exploitation of the vast

Ill

resources of Russian raw materials
now, .ore than ever,
loo.ed as an
attractive temptation for the
economically ravaged combatants
of the
First world War.
Thus, Lenin reasoned that
the mitigating circumstances
that induced the West to ignore
his original detente
plea in 1918 had

dissipated to the point that the
nations of the capitalist
system would
now be forced to both recognize and
negotiate with his government.
The second consideration is that
Lenin, after carefully analyzing
the internal and international
situation of the Soviet state,
deduced

that peaceful coexistence, even more
so than in 1918, was

necessity for his government.

a

compelling

For a number of reasons, which
will

be

detailed below, Lenin realized that the
detente of 1918 had not, by 1920,
solved the problems to which the detente-inspired
respite was addressed.

Consequently, Lenin felt that the policy had to
be extended and revitalized
This is not to say that Lenin altered or
revised his detente strategy,

since, as was outlined above, the basic principles
of the policy were not

changed.

However, the intensity and vigor with which the
coexistence

plan was pursued had been noticeably increased.

Lenin was now confronted, as he had forecast, with the further

proliferation of economic and social dislocation caused by the waging of
a

fierce civil war.

This, coupled with the already existing breakdown

of communications, and transportation, and the general state of economic

instability made for

a

rather unenviable domestic environment.

This

situation was further aggravated by the great famine which plagued the
country, and by the shattering reality of political discontent that was

manifested by the Kronstadt rebellion.
of

a

Lenin also knew that the prospect

worldwide transformation had grown dimmer during this time.

war had not, as he had hoped, sparked

a

The

revolutionary upsurge in the West,
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and the socialist parties there,
unwilling to employ the
Bolshevik

tactics Of terror, violence, and
illegality, had forced Soviet
Russia
to remain as an ''oasis" for some
time to come.
The urgent necessity
of securing foreign credits and
of engaging in a beneficial
trade
relationship now became all the more
imperative for Lenin if he were
to meet with any success in completing
the objectives of internal

consolidation and of restoring the economic
vitality of the nation.

It

can be argued that the most important
realization by Lenin at this time
was the potential anti-Soviet alliance
that could be

termination of the First World War.

a

result of the

Lenin felt that the imperialists,
at

the first given opportunity, would unite in

destruction of the socialist intruder.

a

joint venture aimed at the

Yet, as he mentioned during the

war, "the imperialist war, which has divided the
imperialist powers into
two hostile groups locked in

life and death struggle, has for the time

a

being, and in the given conditions, made this alliance
of the imperialists
of all countries impossible. "^^

Now that World War

I

had ended there

was nothing to prevent such an alliance, and it behooved
Lenin to augment
and replenish the tactical strategy he devised to postpone this

occurrence.

The Bolsheviks were compelled, in their view, to exploit

and utilize every contradiction and antagonism that existed in the

imperialist camp and to instigate and generate inter-imperialist
hostilities so that the imperialists, in the interest of protecting their
vested economic interests, might more readily fight among themselves.
The end of World War

I

was the one factor that apparently

worried and distressed Lenin the most in regard to the disastrous effects
it held for his socialist government.

The imperialists would never

quietly acquiesce in the demise of their system, which was heralded by

:
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the formation of a socialist
state.

Rather, they would, in
Lenin's

mind, resort to any and all means,
now that the war was over,
to crush
the Bolshevik regime. That such
a view was basic to
the Soviet world
outlook was reinforced by a resolution
of the Seventh Communist Party
Congress
At this time, when the era of
socialist revolution has
opened recurrent military attacks
on Soviet Russi
the
imperialist states (both from the West
and the Ea t) are
historically inevitable. The historical
inevitabil ty of
such attacks
given the extremely acute stage now
reached
both in the internal class relations
and in'the international
situation may at any moment, perhaps in
the immediate future,
perhaps within the next few days, lead to
an imperialist
offensive against the socialist movement in
general and against
the Russian Socialist Republic in particul
ar .65

Reasoning on the basis of the theories he
espoused in Imperialism

,

Lenin in late 1920, concluded that an "economic
war," fostered by the

imperialist quest to protect their own interests,
was just around the
corner:

That war is brewing, that war is inevitable, is beyond
doubt. .anybody who studies the history of economic
relations and diplomacy cannot entertain the slightest doubt
that an economic war is ripe and is being prepared
pol itical ly.66
.

Lenin also felt that the lack of proper party organization and

cohesion and the existence of "bureaucratic distortions" (all summed up
in the "sickness"
As

he claimed,

of the Party) would help foster this imperialist thrust.

"undoubtedly, the capitalists of the Entente will try to

take advantage of our Party's sickness to organize

a

new invasion."^''

That the future inter-camp war was inevitable, and that the termination
of World War

I

had hastened its development, was

paramount importance in 1921.

a

Leninist dictum of

However, Lenin reasoned that the nearly

prostrate Soviet state in 1921 was no more ready to wage this cataclysmic
fight to the death than it was in 1918.

To do so would have been, in

.

Lenin's view, an inexcusable and
fatal error.

Fully aware of the

military inferiority of the Soviet
regi.e, Lenin, in 1920,
declared that
"to accept battle at a time when
it is obviously
advantageous to the
enemy and not to us is a crime;
and absolutely worthless
are those
political leaders of the revolutionary
class who are unable to 'tack,
maneuver^and compromise' in order to
avoid an obviously disadvantageous
battle.

Lenin needed time, much more time
than his coexistence policy

of 1918 had allotted him, in order
to fulfill the tasks of military

preparations and combat readiness needed for
the impending intercamp war.

a

successful conclusion of

Thus, it was incumbent upon Lenin
to

maintain an absence of war for an extended
period of time and to engage
in peaceful

relations with the imperialist world.

he reasoned,

This was necessary,

in order to utilize Western economic
resources and expertise

to both support his policies of domestic
reconstruction and military

efficiency, and to ready himself and his nation for the
inevitable
showdown
Therefore, in 1921 Lenin, with great finesse, and in carefully

elaborated detail, again launched his peace campaign which, in the main,
amounted to
detente.

a

more vigorous and intensified version of his earlier

Lenin attached the greatest significance to this policy and

devoted the majority of his time and his energy toward the acceptance and

correct application of his strategy by his fellow Bolsheviks.

There

still existed many elements in the Party who desired more orthodox
and revolutionary methods and who viewed detente as no more than

tactical selling out of basic Bolshevik principles.

a

Thus, it was

incumbent upon Lenin, in his usual virulent manner, to denounce any
such radical beliefs.

It was also necessary to convince all

Party
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members of the correctness of the
policy of adopting tactical
flexibility and compromise of principle
in regard to the strategy
pursued
at

a

time of relative weakness.

Lenin began his campaign
with

a

caustic

denunciation of the "left wing"
elements of the Party:
Genuine revolutionaries have most
often broken their
necks when they began to write
"revolution" with a capital
to something almost divine^
^o
lose their heads, to lose the
ability in the coole Jand
most somber manner to reflect, to
weigh up and ?o
ce?uin
at what moment, under what
circumstances and in which sphere
IS necessary to act in a
revolutionary manner
nd w
n
t
IS necessary to adopt reformist
action. 69

n

Furthermore, in Lenin's view the revolution
would perish if the
Party leaders "lose their sobriety of
outlook and take it into their
heads that the 'great, victorious, world
revolution' can and must solve
all

problems in

a

revolutionary manner under all circumstances and

spheres of action.

all

"''^

To rely on such revolutionary and radical

principles was an unpardonable mistake for
Lenin.
'takes such

a

a

As

he stated,

"whoever

view into his head' must perish, because he invents
some-

thing stupid in connection with

of

in

a

fundamental problem; and in the midst

fierce war (and revolution is the fiercest sort of war)
the penalty

for stupidity is defeat.

"'^^

Coexistence with the West would require

a

classic case of Leninist compromise, fluctuation, and alteration of
principles.

Lenin, unable, to condone the beliefs of those who would

remain steadfast in their adherence to firm convictions, made this theme
one of his favorite subjects, and one on which he dwelled at great lengths

History, according to Lenin, "knows all sorts of metamorphoses," and to
"rely on firmness of convictions, loyalty, and other excellent spiritual

qualities is not being serious in politics."

72

For Lenin, it was

imperative to combine such firmness of conviction with the necessary

adaptiveness to the present negative situation, such as the military
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weakness of the Soviet state.

The Bolsheviks .ust
adhere to the belief

that "the strictest loyalty
to the ideas of co..unis.
.ust be combined
with the ability to make all
the necessary practical
compromises, to

maneuver, to make agreements, zigzags,
retreats and so on."^^
The entire phenomenon of
coexistence, although the only
sane
and logical method of conducting
international relations, was, as
Lenin

admitted,

a

defeat of sorts for his Party, in
that it represented

a

somber realization of the fact that
the "complete (i.e., worldwide)

victory of socialism" was

a

matter of future concern.

It was

important

therefore, for Lenin to make his Party
learn from such defeat and use
it as

a

catalyst for future successes:

Do not be afraid of admitting defeat.
If we agreed with
the point of view that, like the surrender
of positions
admission of defeat gives rise to despondency
and relaxation
ofeffort in the struggle, we would have to say that
revolutionaries who give way to such despondency are
not worth a damn. 74

This view is synonymous with the position held
by Lenin in

March of 1918, when faced with the failure
of the immediate German revolution, he advanced his original concept of detente
as

a

result of

a

defeat:
The most serious defeats await us, because we have no
army, because we have no organization, because we cannot
solve these two problems all at once.
If you cannot adjust
yourself, if you cannot bring yourself to crawl on your belly
in the mud, you are no revolutionary, but a chatterbox, because
there is no other way, because history did not work out so
agreeably as to start the revolution in both countries simultaneously. 75

According to Lenin, it was precisely this kind of "defeat" that
had confronted the Bolshevik Party in 1921 and it became apparent to him

that the time had come for the Soviet revolutionaries to "crawl on their

bellies" and abandon any attempt to reinstill the radical and violent

revolutionary policies that had characterized their first few months
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of existence.

placed

a

Whereas in the past the Bolsheviks,
as Lenin claimed, had
premium and "the main weight of
emphasis on the political

struggle, on revolution, on winning
power, etc." it was now
imperative
"shift the weight of emphasis to
peaceful, organizational,

to

work."^^

'cultural'

Lenin further reasoned that this
peaceful work should not be

limited to the domestic policies of the
Soviet state.

Instead, it

would pertain primarily to foreign affairs,
where the Bolsheviks had
to conduct nonviolent and productive
economic relations in order to secure

much needed western assistance.
Lenin, "must become
a

a

The "proletarian state," according to

cautious, assiduous and shrewd 'businessman,'

punctilious wholesale merchant

-

otherwise it will never succeed in

putting this small-peasant country economically on
its feet."''^
to leave no doubt as to the ultimate objective of
such

a

So as

policy, Lenin

graphically illustrated the aims of the peaceful "merchant and
businessman"
approach:
Under existing conditions, living as we are side by side
with the capitalist (capitalist for the time being) West,
there can be no other way of transition to communism. .no
matter what the costs, no matter how severe the sufferings of
the transition period may be - despite disaster, famine, and
destruction, we shall not lose heart and shall carry our
cause to a triumphant conclusion .^^
.

Lenin was fond of using realistic historical analogies to illus-

trate and clarify his particular philosophy.

It

is

not surprising

therefore, that the detente strategy was heavily imbued with such allegorical
comparisons.

If we take the time to examine one of these lengthy Leninist

expositions we will obtain
it.

a

clearer picture of detente as Lenin saw

Lenin was particularly impressed with

a

certain incident in the

Russo-Japanese War of 1905, whereby the Japanese General Nogi had
captured Port Arthur,

The main importance of this episode is that it

occurred in two distinct stages, as the celebrated Japanese cormander
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was forced to alter his tactics
in ine
the miH<:t
midst n-P
of the operation.
The
original strategy was one of
direct assault and storming
of the fortress
which resulted in a smashing
Japanese defeat with heavy
casualties. The
general, faced with the hopelessness
of winning by direct
assault was
forced to alter his strategy and
employ the lengthy and arduous
policy
of seige tactics.
This approach, while delaying
the realization of the

ultimate objective, and forcing the

cinder

to "retreat" and formulate

new approach, ended, as Lenin
claimed, "in complete victory,
although
it took a much longer time to
achieve than was anticipated."^^
The

a

parallel to be drawn from this analogy
by the Bolshevik readers
was quite
clear.
If one were to substitute the
world capitalist-imperialist

system for Port Arthur and replace General
Nogi with the forces of
socialism, then one would have the policy
of detente and the struggle

against imperialism that Lenin was forced to
wage in 1921.

As

Lenin, in

summation of his historical metaphor, concluded:
If an army which had become convinced
that it is unable
to capture a fortress by direct assault said
that it refused
to leave the old positions and occupy new ones,
refused
to

adopt new methods of solving its problems, one would
say about
such an army that if it has learned to attack but has
not
learned to retreat at the dictates of certain severe conditions
itwill never win the war. Wars which began and ended with an
uninterrupted victorious advance have never occurred in world
history, or else they have been very rare exceptions .80
Lenin had earlier claimed that

a

"revolutionary epoch" was to

his Party what "wartime is to an army," and that the revolutionaries must

"extend the ranks of our army, increase it from peace to war strength,

mobilize the reservists, call up those on furlough, organize new
auxiliary corps, units, and services."

81

Now, it was incumbent upon

this army to adopt new tactics and concern itself more with the peaceful

operations of

a

nation that was not at war and which could not use the
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tactics Of direct and forceful
assaults.

It was necessary
therefore,

to "master all methods of warfare."
and. if the Bolsheviks
were able'
to do so. they, as Lenin claimed,
will "certainly be victorious,
because
we represent the interests of the
really advanced and really
revolutionary

class, even if circumstances do not
permit us to use weapons that
are
most dangerous to the enemy, weapons
that are most swift in dealing
mortal blows."
If Lenin were unable to employ
such lethal weapons, due to the

weakness of his "army," he would have to
formulate
forestall the impending attack by the
imperialists.

a

new arsenal to
Lenin

reasoned that

the best way to effect this end was to
make it economically unfeasible
for the capitalist powers to attack by
entangling them in

lucrative economic concessions.

a

system of

Thus, the policy of extending concessions

to the West appeared to be a dual-edged strategy.

It not only would pro-

vide Lenin with the industrial and technological
assistance he needed
for the task of economic reconstruction, but would also
act as

against any immediate imperialist aggression.

a

buffer

As Lenin stated in a

speech in November, 1920, the capitalists are still seeking pretexts
for fighting and for destroying the Soviet state.

However, "if they

accept the proposals and agree to concessions it will be harder for them.
On the one hand we will

have the best conditions in the event of war;

on the other hand, those who want to go to war will not agree to

concessions."

83

It was logical

for Lenin to assume that concessions, as

an economic incentive for the capitalists, are "an economic and political

argument against war," and that "from the point of view of the danger of
a

collision between capitalism and bolshevism, it must be said that

concessions are

a

continuation of the war, but in

a

different sphere."

84
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This position, which is characterized
by the paradox of building

a

military capacity with the aid of those
countries against who. the
capacity would be used, is best summarized
in a dispatch sent by

Chi Cher in to the Allied governments:

Since the capacity for resistance of
the enemies which
Soviet Russia has to fight depends entirely
on the aid which
they receive from the Allied Powers,
and since these are therefore Its on y real adversaries, it is
precisely to them that
the Russian Soviet Government addresses
its statements concerning the concessions which it would be
possible to make with
the object of putting an end to all
conflicts with these
powers .85
Lenin then clearly delineated the second edge
of this two-edged

sword of detente; that of restoring the economic
productivity destroyed
by the war.

According to

a

decree of the Council of People's Commissars,

the "process of restoring the productive power of
Russia, and with it
of world-economy as a whole, can be greatly accelerated
by means of

attracting foreign public and municipal institutions, private
undertakings, joint-stock companies, co-operative and workers' organizations
of other states, to the business of extracting and working up the
natural

wealth of Russia." 86

Furthermore, these proposals were directed

primarily toward the economically powerful United States, which possessed
an "abundance of free capital," making it especially attractive for

American capitalists to "exploit the natural wealth of the vast expanses
of the RSFSR.

"^^

Lenin realized that Soviet Russia, in order to build

industrialized sector,

a

strong

(on which the socialist revolution was to be

founded in the first place) required both the technology and widespread

application of vast amounts of electricity.
is

As Lenin claimed,

"communism

the Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country."

Otherwise, he reasoned "the country will remain

a

smal

1

-peasant country.

.

and that we must clearly realize.

-'^^

The importance of the
application

of electricity as the stimulus for
transforming the economic basis
to
one of large-scale industry was
not underestimated by Lenin.
As he

claimed, "only when the country has
been electrified, when industry,

agriculture and transport have been placed
on the technical basis of
modern large-scale industry, only then
shall we be finally vi ctorious
Lenin was quite aware of the fact, however,
that the electrification goal

"without the help of foreign capital and
means of production," could not
be realized and, as he further stated,
1.90

for It."

"to obtain assistance we must pay

The United States was the most prosperous of
the capitalist

states and therefore, the logical choice as the
most obvious source of

economic assistance.

Yet, as Lenin asked in

a

order to enlist the Americans we must pay them:
And what are we to pay them with?"

rhetorical fashion, "In
They are businessmen.

Lenin concluded that there was no

choice as to the form of payment, since he could not pay for the
much
needed assistance with gold, ("we cannot throw gold about."), raw

materials ("we have not yet fed all our own people"), or grain ("we are
bargaining for every trainload of grain"):
What then shall we give? Rubbish? They have enough
rubbish of their own.
They say let us trade in grain; but
we cannot give grain.
We are therefore solving the problems
by means of concessi ons 91
.

There are two interesting aspects of this concession policy of
Lenin that have

a

direct bearing on his views towards detente.

In the

first place, Lenin argued that it was imperative to continue the fierce

ideological and political struggle with the West during the era of
peaceful coexistence.

The economic arrangements and agreements made

with the imperialists were but another manifestation of this unceasing
war.

It was

important therefore, to insist that such agreements be
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negotiated and implemented "on terms
carefully formulated so as to
ensure that the conditions in which
these concessions are operated
do not in any way conflict with the
economic and social
92

Soviet Russia."

order of

Furthermore, these concessions would
bring the

Soviet republic in direct confrontation
with the West, whose governments
would be allowed to interject capitalist
practices on Russian soil.
Thus, Lenin would claim that "concessions
are also

a

form of struggle,

they are the continuation of the class struggle
in another form, and
under no circumstances are they the substitution
of class peace for
class war."
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Concessions, in this light, were "nothing but

of war," and while the Soviets had
it was

a

a

new form

"vast deal to gain from concessions,"

important to remember that these agreements merely highlighted

and underscored "the military rivalry of two methods,
two formations,

two kinds of economy

are the stronger."
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-

communist and capitalist, we shall prove that we
Thus, it can be reasoned that detente of 1921 did

not imply any de-emphasis of the class struggle.
an intensification of the ideological

Rather, it incorporated

competition between the two com-

peting socio-economic systems who, for the time being, had to coexist at

close quarters.

The second note of interest concerns the duplicity of

Lenin in playing upon the cupidity of the enemy to whom these economic

concessions would be granted.
of

a

This point is illustrated by the case

certain American industrialist Vanderlip who travelled to Moscow

to negotiate a concession to "exploit oil, coal, and the fisheries of

the Primorye Region and Kamchatka."
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Vanderlip insisted on negotiating

long-term contractual arrangements, during which time the Soviets
could not exercise an option of buying them back.

This was done

despite protestations to the contrary by the Soviet representative

A.I.

Rykov.

Unable to resolve the impasse,
Rykov wrote to Lenin for

instructions and received the reply,
"you will concede
for the concession.

a

50-year period

Lenin, it can be argued, felt
that the Soviet

Union would not tolerate

a

fifty year period of capitalist
intrusion,

and based much of his ideological
reasoning on the assumption that
the

capitalist system would soon be overthrown
and destroyed.

Yet, it was

perfectly consistent with the Leninist strategy
of detente to simultaneously strive for the inevitable collapse
of capitalism in the not too
distant future and concede long-term contractual
guarantees in order
to enlist immediate assistance.
It was

equally justifiable for Lenin to augment his
detente by

entering into alliances with any and all imperialist
states in order to
use one nation, or bloc of nations, as

a

threat by another group of imperialists.

counterbalance to any potential
As Lenin claimed, "to carry

on a war for the overthrow of the international
in Lenin's view was

"a

bourgeoise,"

a

war which

hundred times more difficult, prolonged, and

complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars," and to "refuse
beforehand to maneuver, to utilize the conflicts of interests (even
though temporary) among one's enemies, to refuse to temporize and com-

promise with possible (even though transitory, unstable, vacillating
and conditional) allies

-

is

this not ridiculous in the extreme?"^^

Moreover, this policy of transitory socialist-imperialist alliances
required

a

constant sense of shifting, changing, and adapting to the

particular international environment at any given moment.

To refuse to

enter into such alliances with the "imperialist robbers" was, in Lenin's
words tantamount to extremism:
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Is

it not as

though, when making a difficult ac-rpnt
of an unexplored and hitherto
inacLsible mouJta n we
were to refuse beforehand ever
to move in zigzags
ever
to retrace our steps, ever to
abandon the coSr e ""^^
once
selected to try othersT^S
From Lenin's perspective this
policy had seen its practical

adaptation as early as 1918 when the
Soviets "shook hands with the
French monarchist although we knew that
each of us would readily hang
his partner."
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Yet, whether or not Lenin would
have relished the

"hanging of his partner," he knew that
their interests coincided for
the moment.

Lenin next claimed that "to throw back
the rapacious

advancing Germans we made use of the equally
rapacious counterinterests
of the other imperialists thereby serving the
interest of the Russian
and the international socialist revolution.

"""^^

However, such an alliance,

in Lenin's view, was purely temporary in nature
and served only one short-

term objective.

Thus, Lenin, with no qualms, could state:

would not hesitate a single second to come to the same
of an "agreement" with the German imperialist robbirsT
should an attack upon Russia by Anglo-French troops demand'
I

l^ind

An agreement of this kind would require the most inglorious

and humiliating compromise which, as the "compromise" of Brest-Litovsk,

would yield tremendous benefits; most noticeably the respite it would
provide for the tasks of socialist construction.

As

Lenin depicted in

analogical form:
Imagine that your automobile is held up by armed bandits.
You hand them over your money, passport, revolver and automobile.
You are spared the unpleasant company of the bandits.
That is unquestionably a compromise. .Our compromise with the
bandits of German imperialism was a compromise of such a kind.^^^
.

These compromises and alliances might have appeared to the most
radical of Bolsheviks to be unacceptable tactics, as they involved

surrender not only of principles and convictions but

a

good deal of

a
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territorial sovereignty as well.

alliances as

a

Lenin, however, saw these
temporary

new form of struggle.

If properly manipulated,
they

would prove to be invaluable assets
to the cause of socialist
proliferation in a global sense. As Lenin
claimed, the Soviets must employ
these
new tactics, not for the purpose of
reconciliation "but for the purpose
of converting every and all form, new
and old, into a weapon for
the

complete, final, decisive, and irrevocable
victory of communism. "^^^
The teeth of this new weapon would be
exposed in the form of exploiting
the antagonisms of the imperialists.

No matter how much the economic

plan of concessions made it unfeasible to
attack Soviet Russia, the

imperialists, if not fighting among themselves,
would eventually see
the urgency of jointly destroying the center of
of government.

This realization then became

a

a

new and inimical form

canon of Leninist coexis-

tence ideology:
...the fundamental thing is the rule which we have not
only adopted theoretically, but applied in practice, and
which will be our rule until the final victory of socialism
throughout the world, that is: to exploit the contradictions
and antagonisms between the two imperialisms, between the two
systems of capitalist states, inciting them one against the
other.
So long as we have not won the entire world, so long
as, from the economic and military point of view, we remain
weaker than the rest of the capitalist world, so long shall
we keep to that rule: we must know how to exploit the contradictions and antagonisms among the imperialists .104

Lenin attached the utmost urgency to this topic of exploitation
of antagonisms as he knew that the Soviet state was still
to wage a

1

in no condition

ife-and-death struggle in the military realm with any one of

the advanced capitalist powers.

He was also aware that the exploitation

of imperialist contradictions as but one manifestation of his detente

strategy, had yielded impressive results already, and to

a

large degree,

had been the one variable that had preserved Soviet existence.

As Lenin
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claimed, "had we not adhered to
this rule, every one
of

us would have
long ago been hanging from an
aspen tree, to the satisfaction
of the
capitalists. "^05 The most noticeable
result of this strategy was
the

chance it afforded Lenin to launch
his detente policy of
1918.

Lenin

let it be known that the success
of that policy and the
breathing spell
it created, would serve as

a

model for Soviet tactics in
1921:

Wetook advantage of the hostilities between
the two
imperialisms in such a way that in the long
run both lost
Germany got nothing from the Brest-Li
tovsk Peace except
several million poods of grain,. ..but
we gained time, in
the course of which the Red Army began
to be formed.. That
on which our antagonists counted,
the rapid collapse of
the Soviet power in Russia, did not
eventuate.
It was just
this period which history accorded us
as a breathing space,,,,
that we took advantage of in order to
consolidate ourselves
,

"

It now remained for Lenin to define
exactly which antagonisms

and contradictions his country had to exploit.
ical

In

answer to his rhetor-

question, "are there such fundamental disagreements
in the contemporary

capitalist world which we must exploit?", Lenin listed
three areas of
major concern to which the Bolsheviks must address themselves
immediately.
"The first, and the closest to us," according to Lenin,
"are the

relations between America and Japan.

War is being prepared between them.

They cannot live peacefully together in the Pacific. "^°^

It was

imperative

therefore, for the Soviet state, at the same time that it was

wooing the United States to invest its capital in Russia, to do all in
its power to exacerbate U.S .-Japanese tensions to the point that

war would break out between them.

a

major

If the Soviet republic, due to a

number of internal problems, was forced to coexist with the "imperialist
robbers," it would be tolerable only if they would slaughter each over.
As

Lenin asserted, "if we are obliged to tolerate such scoundrels as

the capitalist thieves, each of whom is preparing to plunge

a

knife into

us, it is our direct duty to make
them turn their knives
against each
1 08

other."

The second area of antagonisms
concerned the United States

and the rest of the capitalist world.

As Lenin asserted,

"'America is

strong, everybody is now in her debt,
everything depends on it, everybody
hates America more and more, everything
indicates that America cannot come
to terms with other countries, because
the most profound economic

differences divide them, because America is richer
than the others.

"""^^

The third antagonism that had to be exploited
and utilized for the

Bolshevik cause centered on the Entente and Germany,
as

Lenin phrased it, by the Versailles treaty.

nation "crushed,"

a

In a bit of prophetic

realism Lenin reasoned that Soviet Russia and Germany
terms and form

a

mutual pact.

would soon come to

As Lenin deduced, Germany "cannot endure

the Versailles treaty, and it must seek an ally against
world imperialism,
for although itself imperialist, it is being throttl ed

.

"^

^

°

This, in

Lenin's view, was the only manner in which his country could break out
of the oppressive ring of capitalist encirclement.

It was

the only way

in which they could survive in an imperialist-dominated world, and the

only means by which the Soviet state could prolong the invaluable respite
that detente of 1918 had afforded it.
Lenin

This tactical consideration of

was something that he clarified in no uncertain terms:
We are at present between two foes.
If we are unable
to defeat them both, we must know how to dispose our forces
in such a way that they fall out among themselves; because,
as is always the case, when thieves fall out, honest men

come into their own.^H

Throughout this entire period it was extremely important for
Lenin to establish and maintain an outward manifestation of friendliness

with the capitalist world.

Lenin, as he claimed, needed the extension of

the respite he was enjoying, and he knew that the Soviet regime could
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not endanger it by presenting

i^age to the West.

a

radical, bellicose, and
revolutionary

It was clear to Lenin that
he had no choice but to

exploit and utilize the antagonisms
and contradictions among
the
imperialists.
These contradictions, as he reasoned,
would prove stronger
and more intense than the fundamental
contradiction that existed between
the capitalist system as

socialism.

a

whole and the lone representative
of world

However, if the Soviet Union were seen
as hostile, violent,

and uncompromising the imperialists might
very well embark upon

course

a

of action aimed at silencing forever this
radical source of difficulty.

Therefore, Lenin utilized the occasion of one
of the first formal postwar conferences, in which the Soviets sat side
by side with their capitalist

adversaries, as

a

vehicle for formally launching the "new" posture
of the

Soviet peaceful businesslike image to the West.

In his

draft of

a

speech to be delivered at the opening session of the
Genoa Conference in
April, 1922, G.V. Chicherin had included

a

number of militant remarks

regarding the inevitability of violent wars, the Soviet belief in
violence,
and the need for pursuing armed struggles.

In a message passed on to

Chicherin before he delivered his speech to the conference, Lenin made
a

number of drastic revisions, which he hoped would have

on the future course of capitalist-Soviet relations.

a

telling effect

Lenin eliminated

any and all remarks that he felt might arouse suspicion on the part of
the imperialists, and emphasized the fact that "having come here as

merchants, we positively consider it our duty to give our fullest support
to any attempts at a peaceful settlement of outstanding problems."

According to Lenin "all mention of 'inevitable forcible revolution and
the use of sanguinary struggle' must definitely be thrown out,... the words

stating that our 'historic conception includes the use of forcible measures'

Should definitely be deleted

.the words about our
historic conception

being definitely based on the
inevitability of new world
wars should
be definitely deleted."

In

summation Lenin concluded:

Under no circumstances should
such frightful words be
into the hands of our oppon^nt^ We '^i'
rS'^^
ents
should
confine ourselves only to mentioninq
thaf
the views of the Communists do not
coincide
views
beginn ng negot at ons
"%l""\n''V'^'
with
but that we consider it our duty,
in order ?o a
e e
the economic agreement we are
desirous of concluding, to do
everything in our power for the broadest
possible fu fillment
of at least a certain part of this
pacifist program. 112

wt?e

This pacifist stance would only be the
side of the Leninist

strategy of detente that would be exposed
to the view of the capitalists
While conceding to the economic wishes of
the imperialist states,

while entering into alliances and pacts with them,
while clamoring for
diplomatic recognition, and incessantly promising
to refrain from interfering with their internal sovereignty, while pursuing

a

foreign policy

of peace, Lenin was doing all in his power to both instigate
wars among
the capitalists and to incite domestic upheaval in all the
nations of
the imperialist system.
a

Lenin, as he stated, was constantly waiting for

"spark" to kindle the conflagration of violence and revolt that would

lead to the socialist transformation.

Since there was no

way of tellini

where this spark was, he realized that the Bolsheviks "must with the aid
of our new communist principles set to work, to stir up all and sundry,

even the oldest, mustiest and seemingly hopeless spheres," in order to

fulfill the tasks of "complete socialist victory

.

"^

Lenin knew that

the revolution in Russia had been achieved with the relative ease

primarily because the capitalist and bourgeois elements in his native
land had not become fully entrenched, due to the absence of the full

development of capitalism.

The situation in the advanced capitalist
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states was quite different.

The powerful bourgeois
elements there had

shown an obstinate and effective
resistance to any change, thus
making
illegal, clandestine, surreptitious,
and conspiratorial activity
the

only effective means of achieving
success abroad.

What is more, Lenin

further lowered the "theoretical
standards" of Marxism and set his
sights
on countries that had not even entered
the capitalist stage of development.
In view of the necessity of gaining
allies during this era of coexistence,

Lenin proceeded from the proposition that
"with the aid of the proletariat
of the most advanced countries, the backward
countries may pass to the

Soviet system and, after passing through

a

definite stage of development,

to communism, without passing through the
capitalist stage of development."""^^

This is perhaps the essence of what detente really
was for Lenin, and
still

is

for contemporary Soviet leaders;

a

sophisticated and complicated

deception based primarily on duplicity, cunning and actions
aimed at
luring the unwary nations of the capitalist system into disadvantageous

circumstances that would hasten their ultimate demise.
It would be worthwhile,

by way of summation, to outline the

basic elements of the Leninist detente before moving on to the later
stages of historical development.

This is important because Lenin laid

the foundation of this strategy in such

a

manner that subsequent Soviet

leaders, in their interpretation and application of detente, would be

making alterations in

a

strategy that had evolved and matured long before

their assumption of power.

Immediately after seizing power in Russia, the Bolshevik Party,

overcome with the euphoria of its success, concentrated its efforts at
stimulating socialist upheavals in other countries, and most notably
in Germany,

based on an exploitation of the war weariness and general
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disillusionment of the masses.

However, in 1918 Lenin,
upon realizing

that the Bolshevik revolutionary
experience would not be
duplicated in
the near future, yearned for a
breathing spell, a respite
with which he
hoped to achieve the goals of internal
consolidation and economic reconstruction that he would need for a
successful consummation of the

impending imperialist-socialist war.
although marked by

a

This initial phase of detente,

good deal of diplomatic hostility
and general

unreceptiveness by the capitalist states,
lasted until the winter of 19201921 when it became apparent that a longer
respite was needed and that
a

concomitant modus vivendi had to be found.

his detente policy of 1918, Lenin adopted

Reinforcing and intensifying

a

1

which coupled with economic concessions and

a

would preclude an imperialist invasion.

Such

ive-and-let-live ethic,
peaceful outward stance,
a

policy would also prolong

the much needed breathing spell, and allow the inherent
contradictions
and antagonisms of the capitalist system to intensify
and hasten its

ultimate collapse.
Detente can be seen therefore, as

a

self-serving strategy con-

ceived, implemented, and developed by the Soviet regime.

It is aimed,

according to the Leninist formula, at effecting situations and environments
that are advantageous to the Soviet cause of increasing its relative

strength vis-a-vis the West.

Furthermore, detente, although addressing

itself to all nations of the "other" socio-economic system, has always

considered the United States, the Soviet's most formidable economic and

military adversary, as the one nation

that must be defeated if peaceful

coexistence is to achieve its full and complete victory.
a

policy characterized by

a

Detente is also

very high degree of tactical flexibility,

alteration, compromise, and adaptation.

The policy of detente was designed
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to achieve prolonged periods
of peace, whereby the
weakened socialist
state could gain strength.
Yet, peace, as Lenin
told us, is no more
than a respite between wars, and
a war, in whatever
form it might take,
was purely inevitable in Lenin's
mind.
Lenin realized that it was

necessary to swallow his pride, to
alter his principles and
to endure
the humiliation of living and working
with the capitalists until
his

socialist state was strong and capable
of challenging its enemies.

Yet,

he never lost faith in his conviction
that "as soon as we are strong

enough to defeat capitalism as
the scruff of the neck.""^^^

m

a

whole, we shall immediately take it
by
the final analysis, this can be
seen as

the ultimate concern of detente, the basic
and inalterable principle on

which the policy is based.
life, this is

a

As

Lenin asserted in the last year of his

struggle against capitalism and "there can be
not

shadow of doubt as to the final conclusion of the
world struggle.
this respect, the final

guaranteed.

"^^^

victory of socialism

is

a

In

fully and unconditionally
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CHAPTER

V

THE POLICY OF DETENTE AS
IMPLEMENTED BY BREZHNEV
The Soviet Union, during the
tenure of Leonid Brezhnev has,
as

the following evidence will

indicate, employed the process
of detente,

as originally designed by Lenin.

However, as will be shown, the
present

regime has incorporated some basic changes
in the eight-part detente

strategy that was initially created in 1918.

Some of these revisions

were inherited by the present leadership
from the predecessors of
Brezhnev.

A brief overview of these regimes is
therefore, in order, so

that the historical and ideological continuity
of detente from Lenin to

Brezhnev, from 1918 to the present, can be more
clearly shown.

The Stalinist Perception of Detente

Historical evidence indicates that the policy of detente that was

developed by Lenin was both recognized and continued by Stalin.

Stalin

both conceded the existence of detente and acknowledged its now long-term

nature.

In

his report at the 14th Congress of the C.P.S.U.

in 1925,

Stalin claimed:

There is now, as it were, a kind of "peaceful cohabitation" between the land of the Soviets and the lands where
capitalism prevails. What seemed at first as if were only
to be a short breathing space after the war, has become a
whole epoch of comparative repose. That is why there is an
equilibrium of forces; that is why there is a period of
"peaceful co-habitation" between the bourgeois world and the
proletarian world.
It then became important for Stalin to ensure the fact that this
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^

^

"co-habitation-' would continue, for
the purpose of further
strengthening
the Soviet state.
In 1925 therefore, Stalin
informed party .e.bers that
the first task of the party was
to "carry on the struggle
against new
wars, the struggle to maintain peace
and to secure the persistence
of

the so-called normal relationships
towards capitalist countries

It

.

can be reasoned that the major motivating
factor for the maintenance of

peaceful relations with the West in the
late 1920's was identical to that
of 1918.
all

Stalin was still forced, by the devastation
of the war, to do

that he could to restore the Soviet economy
to its pre-war levels.

This effort, pursued within the confines
of the five year plan, necessi-

tated, in Stalin's mind,

a

detente relationship with the West.

In the

words of the then Vice-Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, Maxim Litvinov:
The new, additional, and wholly objective proof
of our
peaceful aspirations is provided by our five year plan;
to
carry out our plan we must strive for conditions of uninterrupted peace.
It should be clear to everybody that it
would be insane to start out on this gigantic plan... if at
the same time we had not resolutely determined. .not to
allow the peace to be broken.
.

Upon his appointment to the position of Commissar for Foreign

Affairs, Litvinov expanded on the philosophy of detente:
We have to build socialism in our own country, surrounded
by capitalist countries occupying five-sixths of the earth's
surface... we are therefore trying to discover and put into
operation methods for the peaceful co-existence of the two
social systems.
We have, and shall have in the future, to
make the greatest efforts to combat the aggressive tendencies
of certain capitalist groups making for the creation of constant disputes and conflicts between the two systems; therefore,
these efforts will be directed to the consolidation and
maintenance of peace among the nations.

The manner in which this maintenance of peace was developed con-

tinually shifted throughout Stalin's reasonably long tenure in power.
Yet, throughout

a

period in history that saw local wars,

a

world war,

alliances, communist expansion, socialism in one country, containment,
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encirclement, purges, and

a

host of other diverse
policies and actions,

the underlying current of detente
was not lost.

This 1s not to say that

Stalin was motivated solely by
Ideological concerns.
Is

evidence to show that Stalin was
pragmatic

Soviet foreign policy.
can be seen as showing

Certainly, there

in his

development of

In fact, many of the
policies outlined above
a

blend of ideological and
pragmatic determinants

on Stalin's part.
It was

or national

mentioned above that the separation
of short-term, pragmatic,

interest objectives from long-term
ideological objectives

might lead one to conclude that the
Soviet Union

is

motivated solely by

concerns of national interest to the
exclusion of ideology.

A brief glance

at two (2) foreign policy developments
during Stalin's rule might clarify

this point in regard to the foreign policy
of Stalin.

In the first place,

it can be argued that Stalin's military
alliance with the West during

World War

II

was pragmatic in nature in that it addressed
the needs of

survival for the Soviet state in the face of the
invasion by Nazi Germany.

However, it is also reasonable to assume that Stalin,
who did not abandon
the goal of the worldwide victory of socialism, could
not achieve this
goal

if the Soviet Union were permanently crushed by Hitler.

Secondly,

in the aftermath of World War II, and in light of the military and

territorial victories enjoyed by the U.S.S.R., albeit with
loss of Soviet lives, Stalin reverted

the West.

a

staggering

to pre-war animosities with

Stalin's "two camp thesis" of 1946, among other pronouncements,

re-affirmed the Soviet belief that the world was still divided into two
opposing camps with totally irreconcilable ideologies and socio-economic
structures, with one destined to eventually triumph over the other.
can be argued that Stalin was motivated in breaking the alliance with

It

the West by pragmatic concerns
of Soviet national
interest, i.e. the
need to be intransigent in
consolidating Soviet gains
in post-war
Europe and to establish "friendly
nations there so as to
protect the
Soviet European flank against
any future attack, to
protect Soviet
security on its borders, etc.
In light of a central
thesis of this study,
it can also be reasoned that
Stalin had favorably addressed
the cause of
achieving the eventual worldwide
victory of socialism by altering
the

correlation of world forces to the
benefit of socialism.

Whether inspired

by pragmatism or dogmatism, Stalin,
as Vojtech Mastny argues in
his

Communism,

1

941-194 5, can be assumed to bear
the responsibility for the

disintegration of the wartime alliance and
the creation of the Cold War.
Stalin's designs and the incompetence of
the leaders of the West in dealing
with Stalin, as argued by Professor Mastny,
served as the major determining

factors for the consolidation of Soviet gains
and the emergence of the
Cold War.^
The point to be made here is that Stalin, as
Lenin before him and

Khrushchev and Brezhnev after him, did not abandon the
long-term goal of

Marxist-Leninist ideology, the eventual worldwide triumph of
socialism.
Thus, it can be argued that Stalin was not devoid of any
theoretical

motivations,
of

a

and that his short-term pragmatic objectives were components

much larger long-term ideological goal that the U.S.S.R. has not

rel inquished

The eight components of Leninist detente, when analyzed against
the background of Stalin's rule, would provide the best means of assessing
the continuity of detente through 1953.

Stalin, as did Lenin, required

a

continued breathing spell,

a
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respite by which he could consolidate
the domestic problems
confronting
the Soviet government.
In many ways, it can be
argued that Stalin
created his own domestic concerns that
necessitated
with the West.

a

position of detente

Forced collectivization, rapid
industrialization, and

the blood purges consumed

not its basic strength.

beyond his control.

a

good deal of the country's
attention, if

Much of Stalin's concerns were, of
course,

The inherited ravages of World War

destruction of World War

II

placed Stalin in

I

and the eventful

position of constantly

a

consolidating internal strength.
The Soviet Union remained an "oasis" in

a

sea of capitalists

during Stalin's early years in power, owing to the
continued failure
of the socialist revolution in Europe, particularly
in Germany.

Yet, at

his death the East-West balance of forces had
tilted to the side of the

socialist camp.

The second Leninist variable had therefore, been decreased

as a source of concern for the Soviets who would now be
free to render

"assistance" to the worldwide socialist movement.
Stalin greatly improved, but did not eliminate, the military

imbalance that favored the United States.

In

the transition from the

conventional to the nuclear age of weaponry, Stalin consistently found
a

quantitative and qualitative superiority enjoyed by his imperialist

adversary.

Hence, Stalin was always forced to concentrate his efforts

at eliminating the military superiority of the United States, which, it

can be reasoned, had effectively precluded any Soviet-inspired confron-

tation between the two.
Stalin fully adhered to the belief that

a

final

and fatalistic

confrontation between the East and West was an historical inevitability.
In fact,

Stalin felt that the growing might of the Soviet Union, in the

face of renewed crises and intensified
antagonisnis within the imperialist

camp, would hasten this eventual confrontation.

Threats of intervention and armed assaults
against the U.S.S.R.

were also seen by Stalin.

It can be argued that imperialist
crises,

the rise of Nazism in Germany, the Great
Depression, and the capitalist

fear and mistrust of the Soviet Union all
contributed, in Stalin's mind,
to the belief that an anti-Soviet alliance and
eventual

invasion were

imminent.

Stalin fully realized the need for, and reaped the
benefits of,

economic assistance and trade relations with the West.
as

It was equally

necessary for Stalin as it was for Lenin to secure the tools of

production and scientific and technological expertise in industry and

agriculture from the West.
Stalin was also mindful of the need to exploit rivalries and

antagonisms within the imperialist camp so as to preclude any permanent

reconciliation among his adversaries that might eventually evolve into
a

strong anti-Soviet alliance.

to walk

a

It apparently was necessary for Stalin

fine tightrope on this point, however.

To stir up many animos-

ities and tensions could lead to another general war, an action that the

Soviets wanted to avoid at all costs.

It can be reasoned therefore, that

Stalin was quite satisfied with the hostilities that existed between the
nations of the West, until such time as they laid the groundwork for
global war that would certainly involve the U.S.S.R.

not only

a

pragmatist, but

a

a

However, Stalin was

good pupil of Lenin as well, and Lenin had

shown the need to come to an agreement with one imperialist "dog," or

group of "dogs," to avoid being decimated by the rest of the pack.

Stalin shifted from complacency with the imperialist crises, to an

Hence,
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anti-Hitler rapprochement of sorts, to
the Nazi-Soviet
non-aggression
pact, to the anti-Hitler wartime
alliance, and finally back
to the

anti-Western "two camp" Cold War posture.
Historical evidence indicates that
the most important of the

eight components of Lenin's detente
remained intact through Stalin's
reign.
The socialist system would inevitably
conquer its antithesis and create
a

new world order of socialism.

Thus, it can be argued that the
ultimate

defeat of the West and the final victory
of the proletariat was not

smokescreen for Soviet expansionism or

a

a

ritualistic or manipulative

justification for Stalin's actions; it was rather,
an objective of
Stalin's foreign policy.
By way of summary it can be stated that Stalin
maintained the

core of Lenin's detente but made some subtle shifts with
the changing

historical environment.

The Soviet Union was now stronger militarily,

more stable economically, far more secure internally, and
more powerful

internationally as the head of

a

system of socialist states.

Khrushchev's Perception of Detente

The legacy inherited by the Soviet leadership upon the death of

Stalin can be seen as being far more enviable than that which Lenin

bequeathed to his successor.

With the situation of the U.S.S.R. in

a

near stable position, the new leadership saw no immediate need to radically

alter the policy of detente with the United States.

eulogy at Stalin's funeral Georgi

M.

In fact,

in his

Malenkov, the assumed heir to

Stalin's throne, first sanctified the name of "the great genius of mankind," and "the great thinker of our epoch," then gave the official

Bolshevik blessing to the policy of detente:

8
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The peoples of all lands know
Comrade Stalin as the
great standard bearer of peace.
Comrade Stalin d recLd
the great force of his genius
toward championing the Jause
of peace for the peoples of the
countries
.The Sovie^Union
has waged and is waging a consistent
policy of preserJat?in
and strengthening of peace, a policy
of i nLrnat^oLTcoiperation and development of business
relations with all countries
a policy based on the Lenin-Stalin
premise of the poss?b lUy
of prolonged coexistence and peaceful
competition of two
different systems, capitalist and socialist.
.

It has

been said, however, that all things
are subject to change,

and in the Soviet Union these changes often
assume

metamorphic nature.
a

'

a

drastic if not

Stalin would soon lose his position in
history as

"great genius," as "the great thinker" who served
as

with Lenin, and as

a

Leninist ideology.

a

comrade in arms

great contributor to the holy scripture of Marxist-

Malenkov would never succeed in replacing Stalin
as

the acknowledged head of the U.S.S.R.

In each case, Nikita Khrushchev

proved to be the major catalyst, as he both disposed of Malenkov
as

a

serious political challenger and disposed of the memory of Stalin and
his policies.

Unlike Stalin and Malenkov, however, detente would not become
an "unpolicy" under Khrushchev.

Stalin was "de-stal inized

,"

the

"anti-party group" was purged, and Soviet foreign policy changed its
course sometimes subtly and sometimes drastically during the Khrushchev
reign.

Yet, while Khrushchev altered many of the basic guidelines for

Soviet foreign policy, he did not eliminate detente as the cornerstone
of Soviet activity in the international forum.

Indeed, with the many

variations added by Khrushchev, it can be argued that detente became

a

very strong policy that served as the catalyst for all aspects of Soviet
foreign policy.
While Khrushchev did not eliminate detente, he did give the policy
a

thorough facelift.

The Khrushchev application of detente might best
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be judged against Lenin's eight
criteria.

First, it can be argued that
Khrushchev no longer needed the

breathing spell that detente had afforded
his predecessors.

At least

Khrushchev did not require this respite
as desperately as Lenin and

Stalin since the Soviet government and
the C.P.S.U. had consolidated
their strength rather well and the country
had overcome the awesome

domestic problems that had confronted it.
faced with

a

Khrushchev may not have been

major post-war reconstruction effort,

a

civil war, or general

havoc, but his own political struggles, purges,
an attempted ouster,

"thaws," and economic miseries appear to have all
contributed to an

environment that necessitated peaceful relations with the
West.
Khrushchev inherited an international environment that
saw the
U.S.S.R.

far-removed from the position of an "oasis," as the "socialist

transformation" had taken place in

a

number of countries.

This evolution

may have been brought to these nations by the Red Army, Chinese peasantsoldiers, and Cuban guerillas as much as by any principles of MarxismLeninism.

Nonetheless, the socialist-capitalist balance of forces now

favored the socialist camp and Khrushchev was at the helm of
and eventually fragmented, communist world.

a

monolithic,

This, and Khrushchev's

incessant, though peaceful, drive to further augment the ranks of the

"friendly and fraternal" commonwealth of nations provided
fuel

a

renewed

for detente.
The continued East-West military imbalance that had plagued

Lenin and Stalin continued to haunt Khrushchev as well.

The arena for

this military competition had shifted from the conventional to the

strategic realm and Khrushchev, it can be argued, constantly found the
technological superiority of the United States in this area to be

a
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deterrent to any excessively hostile
Soviet action,

m

an apparent

attempt to lessen the impact of his
nuclear inferiority Khrushchev
unleashed his short-lived "sputnik
diplomacy" and his short-sighted
Cuban missile venture.
The missile

"gap" «as shown to be on
the Soviet

side, strategic parity was never
achieved, and continued peace
with the
United States remained a necessity.
The major innovation that Khrushchev
added to the detente

formula, in this writer's view, had to do
with the theory of war and

violent means to achieve revolutionary ends.

Unlike Lenin who saw wars

and violent revolutions as necessary
components of revolutionary change,

Khrushchev implemented the strategies of "peaceful
transition to socialism,"

"non-violent roads to power," and the "non-capitalist
path of development,"
among others.

In

addition, Khrushchev radically altered the Leninist

concept of the inevitable cataclysmic clash between the
Soviet state and
world capitalism.

Arguing from his new premise of gradual and peaceful

erosion of the capitalist system, Khrushchev reasoned that wars
between
the two camps were no longer "fatalistically inevitable."

Moreover,

wars of any kind that might provoke an East-West, or more importantly
a

U.S. -Soviet, confrontation were no longer seen as viable options for

the U.S.S.R.

In their place Khrushchev would use economic, diplomatic,

and peaceful efforts to attract the non-socialist, and especially Third

World nations, away from the American sphere of influence.
The prospects of an anti-Soviet alliance and invasion had

diminished in one regard as the growing military might of the Soviet
Union coupled with the ever-expanding socialist camp would serve, in
the Soviet view, as

a

viable deterrent to such intentions.

On the other

hand, it was reasoned that these same factors could serve to provoke

a
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reckless attempt by the capitalist-imperialist
system to thwart the

threatening and unstoppable march of
communism.

In short, the rationale

for the phobia had changed but the fear
remained.

The reliance on favorable economic
relations with the West

remained

a

viable tactic for Khrushchev whose
"hare-brained schemes,"

according to his successors, may have done as
much to create as to solve
the many problems facing the Soviet economy.

Advantageous trade agree-

ments, foreign credits, and an influx of Western
technology were still
vital aspects of the Soviet policy of peaceful
relations.

An inordinate

share of the Soviet wealth was being allocated to
military and space-related

expenditures, leaving precious little to appropriate to other
commodities.
It was

incumbent upon Khrushchev therefore, as it was for his
predecessors

and would be for his successors, to turn to the West for economic
assistance.
It remained quite necessary,

from Khrushchev's perspective, to

exploit the inherent contradictions and antagonisms within the imperialist
camp, although the rationale was again changed.

syndrome was no longer primarily seen as

a

The "divide

and

conquer"

means for postponing the anti-

Soviet alliance (although the possibility of such was still conceivable
in

Khrushchev's mind) or for providing the catalyst for open warfare among

the imperialists.

Rather, it can be shown that this strategy now provided

the possibility to breach the capitalist front and open opportunities
for American-controlled, non-aligned, and Third World nations to move into

the "non-capitalist" Soviet sphere of influence.
Lastly, the Leninist view of the ultimate victory of socialism
and the concomitant demise of capitalism-imperialism remained as the

main objective of detente throughout the Khrushchev years.

Yet,

Khrushchev had taken Lenin one step further in regard to the tactical
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means by which to achieve this final
goal.

Lenin had told us in his

aforementioned analogy that the best way to
capture Port Arthur was to
use the time-saving direct approach,
i.e.,

frontal military assault.

a

When that fails, however, Lenin preached
the time-consuming graudal

approach, i.e.,

a

long military siege.

Khrushchev added

a

new wrinkle

to Lenin's parable and advocated the much
longer incremental and peaceful

approach that, under the right conditions, would
not even require an
army.

Detente had now come full circle.

Conceived as

a

desperation

policy aimed at buying time, detente had now become
the means by which

Soviet/communist goals could be realized.
defensive ploy,

a

means by which

a

respite,

Detente was originally
a

a

breathing spell could be

bought so that the Soviet state could prepare itself for the
inevitable

military confrontation with the United States and the rest of the capitalist
system.

Khrushchev transformed detente into an offensive strategy,

a

policy that would allow the U.S.S.R. to tilt the global correlation of
forces heavily, if not totally, to the Soviet sphere and throughout it
all

never provoke an American military response.
Yet, the detente formula was not complete, in this writer's view,

as the Soviets had yet to achieve thermonuclear parity or superiority.
It remained for the successors of Khrushchev to add this last variable

and revitalize detente as we know it today.

The Brezhnev Adaptation of Detente. 1972-197 6

The purge of Khrushchev in 1964 brought the "collective

leadership" of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny to the helm of Soviet
power.

By relative comparison to their predecessor the three new Soviet
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leaders gave some the impression of
being far less ambitious,
aggressive,
and unpredictable.
In fact, the new triumvirate
was often stigmatized
as being overly bureaucratic,
slow to move, and as lacking
revolutionary
zeal.
The fact that there were three
apparent co-equals did much to
foster the belief that the new bureaucratic
leadership might well herald
a

period of status quo, and certainly

a

period of reduced Soviet

aggressiveness in the international arena.

After all, none of the three

had actively participated in the Bolshevik
revolution and could not be

expected to produce the inspiration or charisma
that was Lenin's.
Certainly, the new leadership could not, in
the view of most observers,

achieve the level of personal dominance and complete
control possessed by
Stalin.

Even Khrushchev's unique brand of charisma and
party dominance

may have seemed to be beyond the reach of the new uninspiring
Soviet
leadership.
It became fashionable therefore, to look upon the new
Soviet

regime as

a

rather unexciting group that would pose no serious immediate

threat to American interests abroad, and one that would not embark on
any provocative or terribly hostile foreign policy ventures.

It is

understandable that this view was espoused in the early days of the new
Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny regime, as indeed the new collective

leadership did not appear to be extremely dynamic by any standard.
such

a

view persisted for

a

That

number of years however, both underscores

the misinterpretation of the Brezhnev style of detente, in this writer's

view, and pays
a

a

good deal of tribute to the effectiveness of detente as

functional tool of Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev.
Detente, as will be reasoned below, did not become

a

passive

policy under Brezhnev, and Soviet foreign policy did not become stagnated
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with the changing of the guard in
the Kre.lin.
that detente became

a

Rather, it will be shown

far more ominous weapon in
the Soviet foreign

policy arsenal as the new leadership
embarked upon

course of relations with the West.
emphasized.
the West with

It is

a

more forceful

important that this point be

Khrushchev, as historical evidence
indicates, had presented
a

very direct, and oftentimes threatening
posture, as visibly

manifested in Berlin and Cuba.

The response from the United
States was

predictably strong and tended to thwart any
major Soviet aspirations
that threatened American interests.

Consequently, Khrushchev may not

have achieved tremendous foreign policy successes
as the American govern-

ment easily justified

a

firm response to an easily identified
enemy who

had promised Americans that their grandchildren
would grow up under

communism.
It can be reasoned that Brezhnev realized that it
was counter-

productive to maintain the United States in

state of total preparedness

a

against Soviet aggression and, at the same time to achieve any measure of
success in foreign policy.

To present a constant and ominous threat to

the United States, whose economic, military, scientific, and technological

resources far exceeded those of the U.S.S.R., would, in this view,

permanently drain the weak Soviet economy and perpetuate the status quo
in the relative position of each country.

Thus, it was necessary for

Brezhnev to reduce the visible threat and replace tanks in Berlin, missiles
in Cuba,

and "sputnik diplomacy" with cultural exchanges, economic

cooperation, and Soyuz-Apollo space ventures.

Brezhnev, rather than promising

communism for Americans' grandchildren, chose to speak on American television
about "greetings," "friendly feelings" and

a

commitment toward "improving

relations between our countries and strengthening universal peace."

9
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Thus, to play on the naivite^ of the
enemy could, in Brezhnev's
.ind,

yield tremendous results.

The more threatening

posture presented to

a

the United States, the more direct
and unified the response
to the Soviet
Union would be.
If this point had become lost
on Brezhnev he need only
have been reminded of the American
reaction to Khrushchev's flagrant

flaunting of his "sputnik diplomacy."
of

a

Alarmed by the imposed menace

strategically superior Soviet space program,
the dormant American

space enterprise in an extremely short
period of time was able to match
and then far surpass the Soviet effort.

economic resources, and backed by

a

By harnessing its vastly superior

unified popular consensus, the United

States had easily rendered useless what had been

foreign policy.

a

key component of Soviet

Brezhnev could not possibly sustain the same
firm

American response in the political and military field for
any long period
of time.

Yet, Brezhnev, as he has often stated, was firmly
committed to

the pursuit of foreign policy objectives that would permanently
tilt
the balance of forces to the Soviet side at the direct

interests, thus precluding

a

realistic peaceful rapprochement or status

quo posture with the United States.

with
a

a

expense of American

However, to alarm the United States

menacing and hostile picture of Soviet aggression would

elicit

firm and tenacious American reaction, and Brezhnev's economy was no

better suited for this intense competition than was Khrushchev's.

It

became imperative therefore, to revitalize detente, this time under the

guise of the Peace Program.
The creation of the Peace Program can be seen as

a

manifestation

of both the importance of the policy of detente, in the Soviet view, and
the personal primacy of the architect of the latest variation of Soviet

detente, Leonid Brezhnev.

In his

keynote address at the 25th C.P.S.U.
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Congress Brezhnev asserted that:
^^^^'^^
24th Congress set
fnrih
forth the r'"^"^
Peace Program.
Its main purpose was
relvinn nn
the might, solidarity and
activeness o^world socill
on ns strengthening alliance
with all progrL ?$e a d
oeace
loving forces to bring about
a change of di'rection
?n
thl
development of international relations.
A change ?rom the
"-^'^^-^
states"^t^dif^f^^nt
je^^^^^"^

soi?ar:ys?ems

Throughout the course of the 25th
Congress, almost all delegates,
including Brezhnev, called for the
further strengthening of the
widely
acclaimed Peace Program, established at
the 24th Congress.

In

his report

Brezhnev reported that in regard to the
newly-presented proposals of
the 25th Congress:
We regard these proposals as an organic
continuation and
development of the Peace Program advanced by
the 24th Party
Congress, as a program of further struggle for
peace and
international cooperation and for the freedom and
independence

of the peopl es

.

1

I

important to note, however, that in the
documents

It is

of the 24th C.P.S.U. Congress in 1971, and in praticular
Brezhnev's report
at that congress, no mention is made of

a

Peace Program as such.

To be

sure, Brezhnev, in his address, made repeated references to
the "Soviet

Union's struggle for peace," "peaceful coexistence," the "defense of peace"
and so on.

In

addition, the report addressed in summary form much of

what would later constitute the actual Peace Program.

""^

Yet, it remainsa fact,

that no new program was actually unveiled by Brezhnev at the 1971 congress.
In the years

since the congress the Brezhnev report itself has been

acclaimed as the actual Program of Peace.
fore, why such

a

One can logically question, there-

heralded program was never presented in the form of

a

document at the congress, was not referred to as such during the congress
proceedings, and was retroactively accorded

a

place of paramount importance
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in the days following the
congress.
It can be argued that Brezhnev's

Congress represented
keynote address at

a

a

keynote address at the
24th

personal gamble for the
General Secretary.

The

Party Congress is generally
not delivered in the form

of a surprise presentation by one
man, but rather is almost
always

scrutinized in close detail and approved
by the Politburo of the
C.P.S.U.
well

in advance of its delivery.

(The report by Brezhnev, as
is customary,

was officially entitled "The Report of
the C.P.S.U. Central

Committee

to the 24th Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union.")

Thus,

it can be reasoned that the Politburo
did not fully endorse any major

program, at least in the form of an official
party document.

(If indeed,

Brezhnev attempted to present his speech in the
form of an officially

sanctioned program.)

Nonetheless, Brezhnev took the initiative at the

congress and was apparently prepared, and allowed, to
either damage or
improve his party position and personal career with the
delivery of his

report and his pursuit of the policy of detente after the congress.

The

historical evidence would indicate that Brezhnev succeeded very well in
this regard as the Peace Program was hailed, and Brezhnev ascended to an

unmatched level of party supremacy in the years between the 24th and 25th
Party Congresses.
It is quite normal

that

a

good deal of attention be paid to

analyzing and discussing the resolutions of the C.P.S.U. Congresses.
Surely, the 24th C.P.S.U. Congress was no exception as widespread notoriety
was given to the decisions of the congress in the Soviet media.

Yet,

nowhere in the mass of early post-congress discussion was mention made
of

a

definitive peace program adopted by the 24th Party Congress.

Brezhnev, in

a

However,

flurry of post-congress activities, used many occasions
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to carefully refer to a
progra. that was developed
at the congress.
Thus, in his May Day speech of
1971, four weeks after
delivering his
report to the 24th Party

Congress, Brezhnev claimed:

True to the behests of the
great Lenin, the 24th Conqress
of our party advanced a clear and
constructive program or
peace-loving foreign policy, which
has met wUh^warm suDDort
from the fraternal socialist
countries and approval from
broad masses of people the world
over.
The st^Sqq e for it.
imp ementation is the correct
path toward the fur er con
o
'-'''''^
strengthen^nrSfthe

T;eZr::%

;He^rh?^

Two weeks later, Brezhnev took the
occasion of the Ceremonial

Session of the Georgian Communist Party
Central Committee and the Georgian
Republic Supreme Soviet to assert:
Leninist traditions of Soviet foreign
policy,
fy.J^ZllT''^
the 24th Congress put forth a comprehensive
program of struggle
for peace and international cooperation,
for the freedom and
independence of peoples. This is a program for
struggle for
the triumph of the principles of peaceful
coexistence, a program
of the friendship of peoples and their free and
independent
development, this is a program of curbing the aggressors
and
preventing a world war. 14

Therefore, Brezhnev had established the fact, at least
in his own
mind, that his report at the 24th Party Congress constituted

a

program,

and that this program was unmistakingly linked with the policy
of peaceful

coexistence.
a

Shortly

thereafter Brezhnev reaffirmed the existence of

party program in his speech at the Eighth Congress of the Socialist

Unity Party of Germany:
A comprehensive program of struggle for peace and international security, for the freedom and independence of the
peoples was put forward at the 24th Congress of the C.P.S.U.
It determines the main tasks and directions of the Soviet
Union's foreign policy activities at the present stage.
It now remained

for Brezhnev to finalize the establishment of

his program and to ensure its widespread acceptance.

the occasion of

a

"friendly meeting" of the heads of

Brezhnev utilized
a

number of communist
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parties who were on "vacation- in
the Soviet Union to
reinforce the
primacy of his peace program.
(This is the first official
reference to
a peace program as such that
this writer has found in
Soviet source
material.) The meeting, which was
held in the Crimea on
August 2, 1971.
was attended by Brezhnev. Podgorny
and Shelest on the Soviet
side and

Zhikov (Bulgaria), Kadar (Hungary),
Honecker (G.D.R.), Tsedenbal

(Mongolia), Gierek (Poland), and Husak
(Czechoslovakia).

It was reported

that the meeting "touched upon urgent
questions of the development of the
world Communist movement, as well as
foreign policy problems of mutual

interest."
program.

Most importantly, the meeting touched
upon the Brezhnev peace
As reported

in the Soviet press:

The meeting participants emphasized the
great importance
of the peace program advanced by the 24th
C.P.S.U. Congress
and supported by the fraternal Communist and
Worker's Parties
The implementation of this program is called
upon to play a
very important role in the genuine easing of
international
tension and in ensuring peace and the security of the
peoples.^
In the

course of the next five years Brezhnev was able to expand

the acceptance of the new program to the point that it was
hailed as

a

momentous contribution to the cause of peace, the cornerstone of all
Soviet foreign policy, and the most critical aspect of contemporary
international life.

Thus, Brezhnev could look back upon his report at

the 24th Party Congress and claim:

Invariably basing its actions on this (Leninist) platform,
our Party, following Lenin's behests and proceeding from the
half-century experience of its peace-loving foreign policy,
came out with the Peace Program at its 24th Congress. This
program laid down a realistic path to the elimination of the
cold war and set clear-cut tasks in the struggle for a transition from the danger of war to peaceful cooperation 17
.

It can be argued therefore,

that Brezhnev, through the presenta-

tion and implemention of the Peace Program, achieved an impressive personal

victory.

In

July, 1973 Brezhnev was awarded the International Lenin Peace

Prize, one of many awards
bestowed on the General
Secretary after the 24th
C.P.S.U. Congress.
In his acceptance speech
Brezhnev demonstrated his
belief that his Peace Program
was a success.
In Brezhnev's words:

^^^^s^s 0^ the great Lenin the
^/L.^^r"^"^^'^^"^"^
24th
Congress of our Party put forward
a realis??c and
as
developments have shown, fruitful Peace
Program
Thai
?
why our Peace Program enjoys
great esteem and recognitl
among workers and peasants, among
all who are engaged
n
'''''
^-"^^^
L^riffe^?;:; sTppo^t^!""^""^
^^'^^ to assure
^
our^Partv'^J^p^^^'
i''"and people
the Soviett'"'"
people,
of
good
will everyluLl IJ:
where

that I will continue to do everything
in my power to
achieve the most wonderful and most
humane objective - the
objective implicit in the very name of
the award conferred ,
upon me, namely, that of strengthening
peace among nations.
It will

be argued that through the
implementation of the Peace

Program, Brezhnev sought to both reduce the
tenacity of American reactions
to Soviet policies and, more importantly,
afford the U.S.S.R. a larger

risk-taking potential in the pursuit of foreign
policy objectives.
Khrushchev's style of detente, although eliminating
the need for

confrontation between the two superpowers, still presented

a

a

direct

visible

threat, and the American government had no difficulty in
responding to
this threat and generally enjoyed widespread support for
taking

line with the Soviet Union.

a

hard

By extending the hand of friendship and

entangling the United States in

a

web of

bi

-lateral accords however,

Brezhnev had made the process of firmly responding to Soviet actions

more difficult one.
given himself

a

a

Consequently, it would appear that Brezhnev had

measure of control over American-Soviet relations to the

degree that he could pursue foreign policy objectives, specifically in
the world of developing nations, without necessarily inviting a hard

line anti-Soviet position in Washington.

Thus, Brezhnev can claim, as

he did in a speech at the White House, that the U.S. -Soviet summits:

.
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...encourage us to make new big
strides durina the
present meeting, to give greater
stability to SoJiej!
American re ations and thereby
increase the con?r bJtion
'''''
'°
P^^^
internatS

deteiit'ej"''^"

It can be reasoned, therefore,
that the initial

image of the new

collective leadership as perceived in
the West was incorrect.
first place, it is questionable whether
or not
ever existed.

a

In the

collective leadership

Leonid Brezhnev as one member of the
new triumvirate had

already suffered two major political
setbacks in his career and consequently
did not seem to possess the ability to
assume sole control of the Soviet

ruling hierarchy.

However, as historical evidence shows, it
did not

take long for Brezhnev to do just that and
to firmly place himself in

position of preeminent stature and importance.

hypothesized that Brezhnev has been accorded

In fact,

a

level

a

it can be

of prestige and

eminence in Soviet politics that surpasses that which was
achieved by
any Soviet political figure save Stalin.

It would appear that Kosygin,

Podgorny and the rest of the Politburo have for some time been
relegated
to a position of secondary importance as Brezhnev has pursued
his own

"cult of the personality."

Moreover, as indicated above, Brezhnev's

stature has been most evident in the area of detente where the General

Secretary has clearly stamped the policy of detente with his personal
imprimatur
Brezhnev therefore, has been able to pursue the policy of detente

without the inhibiting constraints that characterize
ship, oligarchy, or any form of rule short of

a

a

collective leader-

one man dictatorship.

There are, of course, conflicting opinions regarding the overall political

well-being and party dominance of Brezhnev.

20

Yet, in view of his pursuit

of the Peace Program and the acclaim he has received as noted above.
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Brezhnev may be seen as

major determining factor,
certainly more than

a

any political figure of group of
policy makers in the Soviet
Union, in
regard to the formulation and pursuit
of detente with the West in
general and the United States in particular.

Secondly, the image of

a

slow moving, bureaucratic Soviet

leadership may be misleading in light of
some aggressive tendencies

displayed in Soviet foreign policy in the
last ten years.

The Kremlin

regime has, during that time, shown no apparent
unwillingness to confront
the United States in areas that are considered
to be important to American

global

interests.

Furthermore, as will be argued in detail below,
the

U.S.S.R. has clearly set its sights on effecting
pro-Soviet and anti-

Western alterations in nearly all Asian, African,
Latin-American, "Third
World" and non-aligned nations.
part by the existence of

ment leader.

a

Such

a

tendency may well be caused in

dominant if not overwhelming party and govern-

However, it can also be argued that the appearance of an

aggressive Soviet foreign policy stance is equally determined by the

existence of the long sought after parity in thermonuclear capability
between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Together, these two factors may well have contributed to the

creation of

a

detente policy by the U.S.S.R. that is not only rather

dynamic and vigorous in scope but also threatening to American interests.
The threat, in this writer's view, is posed in many ways not the least
of which is the American uncertainty as to how to denounce

a

policy of

peaceful coexistence and reconciliation with the U.S.S.R. both effectively
and wisely.

It would,

it seems, be politically unfeasible for any

American political figure, especially one occupying the White House, to

categorically reject

a

policy of peace and friendly relations with the
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world's other thermonuclear superpower.

Ronald Reagan, the Republ
Iican

Party's presidential nominee, made
fairly direct references to
such a
foreign policy stance during much of
his campaign.
Yet, it has also
become apparent here, despite minority
opposition within his own party,
that Reagan was willing to be advised by
Henry Kissinger, the chief

engineer of the latest U.S. version of
detente with the U.S.S.R.

President Carter pursued what appeared to
be
the Soviet Union, but only after
the U.S.S.R.

in Afghanistan.

a

a

hard line in dealing with

flagrant military intervention by

Even here, the American president was
com-

pelled to utilize such unheralded foreign policy
responses as the boycott
of the Moscow-hosted Olympic Games and

a

partial grain embargo to register

the American opposition to Soviet actions.

The result, and

a

basic hypothesis of this dissertation, is that

the Soviet Union, and Brezhnev in particular, enjoys a
fairly enviable

position at the present time in regard to relations with the West.

The

policy of detente is very aggressive, especially in terms of the pursuit
of Soviet objectives in the "developing nations" of the world, or in the

Soviet vernacular, the nations "seeking national liberation."

Yet,

the Soviet presentation of detente is quite appealing to most, in that
it offers no overt manifestations of hostility or direct confrontation.

Hence, it can be argued that detente becomes quite attractive politically
to those who are weary of

a

cold war posture between the East and West.

Thus, it is not surprising that many West European political leaders,

most notably in France and the Federal Republic of Germany, have found it

difficult to wholeheartedly endorse any American denunciation of the
Soviet Union.

Detente, in the view of most observers, is popular among

the West European masses, and popular support can easily translate into
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election votes as witnessed by
Helmut Schmidt's victory
in October,
1980.
What Brezhnev has been able
to achieve therefore,
is
impressive.

Brezhnev has succeeded in
maintaining the aggressive

tendencies of detente as practiced
by Khrushchev while at
the same time
making the policy attractive, or
at least "un-rejectable"
to the West.
Thus, Brezhnev can outline the
aggressive scope of detente as
follows:
...Our common duty is to move
tirelessly forward alona
the chosen path, to move steadily,
perseverinqlv alona .
a wide front, resolutely
breaking down The resisUn e of
the adversaries of detente, and
the proponents of "cold war
As we in the Soviet Union see it,
the task is to make the
'''''''' '''''
internationai rel^.'
lations ll^lV''.''
stable, durable,
and, what is more, irreversible. 21

"

?.tw

In addition,

Brezhnev can issue

might see

a

detente.

As stated by Brezhnev:

a

warning in regard to those who

passive Soviet foreign policy in light
of the U.S. -Soviet

Let me remind you that Lenin, that greatest
of revolutionaries, used to say:
Revolutions are not made to order or by
compact.
And we might add that neither can revolution,
class
struggle, nor the liberation movements be abolished
to order
or by agreement.
No power on earth is capable of reversing
the inexorable process of the resurgence of social
life.
Wherever there is colonialism, there is bound to be struggle
for national liberation.
Wherever there is exploitation, there
is bound to be struggle for the emancipation of labor.
Whereever there is aggression, there is bound to be resistance. 22
In short, an argument can be made that the style of detente
as

practiced by Leonid Brezhnev has been

a

far more successful enterprise

than that which was implemented by any of his predecessors.

The Soviet

Union under Brezhnev enjoys the military, political, and economic stability

that was never realized by Lenin.

Hence, detente lacks the oftentimes

desperate and "necessary evil" characteristics that marked detente
during Lenin's lifetime.

In much the same way Brezhnev has

found himself

in a much more enviable posture than that which was achieved by Stalin,

who also found detente to be an unpleasant yet quite necessary policy.
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Thus, Brezhnev has been able,
with

a

good deal of success,
to transform

Stalin-s defensive and hostile
detente into an offensive
but apparently
non-threatening device. The achievement
of thermonuclear strategic
parity with the West has also
provided Brezhnev with the final
factor
that rendered the Khrushchev formula
of detente incomplete.
However,
Brezhnev has proven to be

a

better practitioner of detente
than was

Khrushchev and has balanced aggressiveness
with outward signs of

reconciliation and friendliness.
Brezhnev has therefore, given the detente
policy

a

thorough over-

haul and clearly differentiated his
detente from any that was practiced
by preceding Soviet rulers.
is

a

Yet, the Soviets claim that detente
today

continuation of the detente initiated by Lenin.

This is true to

a

degree; the ideological and historical continuity
of the Soviet policy
of detente is quite strong from 1918 to 1980.

In

continuity from Lenin to the present is obvious.

Brezhnev's view, the
In the words of Brezhnev:

The founder of our Soviet state, Valdimir Ilyich Lenin,
put forward and made a persuasive case for the principle of
peaceful coexistence of states belonging to different social
and political systems - this was many decades before the
word detente acquired its present meaning. The principle
demand is that states not interfere in each others internal
affairs and they not use force to decide disputed issues, and
that normal peaceful and businesslike relations be maintained
between socialist and capitalist countries.
Again, as stated by Brezhnev:

...The very notion of peaceful coexistence, which is these
days increasingly becoming the generally recognized foundation
for developing relations between states with differing social
systems, was formulated by the founder of the Soviet state,
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. 24
It is necessary therefore,

to examine the eight detente variables

that Lenin established in 1918 in comparison to those employed by Brezhnev
in

his revital ization of detente.
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Detente as

breathing spell

a

.

It was shown above that
one dominant

characteristic of detente as employed by Lenin
was detente as
spell,

a

a

breathing

respite in war whereby the Soviet Union
could concentrate all

its energy and resources on the tasks of
guaranteeing its basic survival.

Lenin's detente was

a

desperate one and was compelled by the
utmost

necessity of diverting any major military thrust
against the Soviet Union
so that Lenin could establish the conditions
for consolidating the

economic, political, and military strength of his new
regime.

Above all,

detente would establish the necessary preconditions, for
first ensuring
the continued existence of the Soviet state and then
for the construction
of socialism within the U.S.S.R.

Brezhnev was obviously not confronted with the level of desperation that was faced by Lenin, as the very survival of the Soviet Union
was not threatened.

war and for

a

Yet, Brezhnev was equally in need of

peaceful posture with the West.

a

respite from

For Brezhnev this peace

would establish the preconditions not for survival or internal socialist

construction but rather for the worldwide proliferation of socialism and
of communist construction.

The Soviet Union has made no attempt to

conceal the fact that detente provides an advantageous position for the

pursuit of these objectives.

In the words

of Brezhnev:

...I would like to assure you that we shall continue
consistently and steadfastly to implement the principled
class course defined by the Party Program and the decisions
of the Party Congresses, a foreign policy line aimed at the
defense and strengthening of peace and at the creation of the
best international conditions for the construction of a communist society.
We see this as our revolutionary duty to the
Soviet people and to the working people of all countries. 25
In Brezhnev's view,

the pursuit of the Peace Program offered the

U.S.S.R. new opportunities in the international arena.

In

Brezhnev's words

:
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general alignment of forces
°^
in
fh«':;^?/f''7'''^
the world led us several years
aao tn thic rnl.i
,
that a real opportunity e^istL^Lti
n^ ur^^fundr^''
mental change in the international
situation
The imoortant
thing was to furnish a broad basis
for construct
on
and solution of the problems that
had accumulated
These
considerations and our policy were summed
up in the Peace
Program proclaimed by the 24th Congress
of the C.P.S.U 26

vedsSs

Brezhnev can also claim that the Party's
foreign policy is

designed to protect the Soviet Union against
war and "opens vast vistas
for promoting friendship and co-operation
between nations and advances

the cause of social progress on our planet."^''

expressed by Mikhail Suslov,

A similar view is

member of the C.P.S.U. Politburo and the

a

acknowledged party theoretician and ideology expert.

In the words of

Suslov
At the same time, a certain easing of international
tension, the retreat of the policy of war and aggression
and the failure of the "cold war" are opening up to
the world's
progressive forces additional possibilities for developing the
struggle of the working people against the oppression of the
capitalist monopolies and for their own rights and interests
and for upholding and strengthening democratic freedoms. 28
In

analyzing the changes in U.S. -Soviet relations inherent in

the new detente Georgi Arbatov depicts the new relationship in the terms

of Soviet foreign policy.

This foreign policy, according to Arbatov,

"has always been determined by

a

sincere desire to put an end to war and

aggression, to ensure peace and security for the peoples, and to create
for the Soviet people and the peoples of the other socialist countries
the most favorable conditions for the construction of

a

new society."

29

Detente has been criticized by many Western observers as accruing
unilateral advantages to the Soviet cause.

In the face of such

Brezhnev resolutely maintains that detente is, in fact,
to the "supreme good for all

a

criticism

policy geared

peoples and an important condition for the

progress of mankind in our time."

30

In his

keynote address at the 25th
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C.P.S.U. Congress, Brezhnev elaborated
further:
We make no secret of the fact
that we see detente as
path leading to the creation
of more favorable condUions
for peaceful socialist and
communist construct on
TMonlv
confirms that socialism and peace
are indiv i u.'
Whe
w
are reproached for saying this,
it is hard to keep from
thinking that those who reproach
us lack confidence that
capitalism is capable of existing without
resorting to
aggression and threats of arms, without
encroaching on the
independence and interests of other
peoples. 31
a

In an interview granted to French
television some eight months

after the congress, Brezhnev was questioned
on the allegation that detente
did indeed appear as

a

policy that was "advantageous only to
the Soviet

Union and other socialist countries."

claimed that "such

a

In

his response Brezhnev first

viewpoint seems strange to us, to say the
least,"

then continued:
Of course, we have not concealed and do not conceal
the
fact that plans for the internal development of the
Soviet
Union are built on the expectation that peaceful external
conditions will be ensured, and therefore detente is beneficial
to us.
But does peace really threaten something bad for other
peoples? Is there really a people that can hope to win anything
from unleashing a world war using today's means of mass annihilation?32
One of the major components of Brezhnev's detente formula is the

fact that the growing might of the Soviet Union and the alignment of

world forces in favor of socialism have made the creation of this

favorable detente possible.
will

be examined in detail

While this "alignment of world forces" theory
below, it is important to draw the connection

here to the view of detente as

a

necessary breathing spell.

In the words

of Arbatov detente has "become possible thanks to the growing might of
the Soviet Union, and the entire socialist commonwealth, thanks to the

vigorous actions of the international working class and the national

liberation movement and the strengthening of the forces of peace and
progress the world over."

33

Arguing this position, Arbatov can conclude
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that the West was forced to enter
into

a

detente relationship with
the

Soviet Union in the face of the growing
.ight of world socialism.
The
Soviets, in this view, had always
pursued the objectives of world
peace
and relaxation of tensions; yet
as Arbatov
claims:

However the goodwill of the Soviet
Union and the other
'''' ''''''
reaiiza?? n Of
these goa
tSes'e
00 if'l?
s.
It was also necessary to have
definite obiective
preconditions, and these preconditions have
appeared ?n'our
days.
- the willingness and agreement of the
other side the
capitalist world to build its relations
with the woHd o?'
socialism on the foundation of the principles
of peaceful
K'=a^'=iui
^
coexistence. 34

Brezhnev has often claimed that the correlation
of world forces is
an important concern.

As stated by the General

Secretary:

We are deeply convinced that the current
change-about
from "cold war" to detente, from military confrontation
to
a more solid security and to peaceful
cooperation is the main
tendency in present day international relations.
How has this become possible?
The main factor, we are certain, is the general change in
the correlation of world forces - a change that is against
the
exponents of "cold war" and the building up of arms and those
who fancy diverse military ventures, a change in favor of the
forces of peace and progress. 35
In much the same

manner Brezhnev can argue that "thanks to the

growth of the might and international influence of the Soviet Union and
the entire socialist commonwealth.

.

.the cause of easing of tensions has

advanced and the security of the peoples has been strengthened.""^^
Moreover, Brezhnev can claim that:
As a result, international conditions for communist and
socialist construction and for the struggle for the social
progress of the peoples have become more favorable. This
makes it possible for us to an increasing extent to concentrate on the accomplishment of peaceful, constructive tasks.
Naturally, we are satisfied with this course of events.

Lenin had always claimed that the primary objective of the

detente policy was the immediate internal consolidation of power and
socialist construction within the U.S.S.R.

By accomplishing this goal
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Lenin, as well as Stalin and Khrushchev
later, felt that the Soviet

Union could better render assistance
to the worldwide socialist
movement.
The first task, however, was internal
consolidation and construction.

Much the same sentiment is echoed by
Brezhnev in implementing the
latest detente.

While detente does provide favorable
conditions for

the further dissemination of socialism
abroad, it also provides the

needed breathing spell for the internal
"construction of
as outlined above.

Brezhnev therefore, draws

a

a

new society"

direct link between the

foreign and domestic components of detente:
Our Party, loyal to the great ideas of proletarian
internationalism, has never separated the destiny of the
Soviet
land from the destiny of the countries of Europe
and the whole
world.
The U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy aimed at consolidating
peace and the freedom of peoples, and our domestic
policy,
whose goal is the building of communism, not only
correspond
to the fundamental interests of the Soviet people but
also, we
are convinced, are our contribution to the common struggle'of-Q
the whole world's Communists for a better future for mankind.^
In a

similar fashion, Brezhnev can argue as follows:

Our peaceable foreign policy is an expression of the
very essence of our society, an expression of its profound
internal requisites
Our aim is to ensure that tomorrow
the Soviet people will live even better than today.
Soviet
people feel tangibly the results of these collective efforts.

Lenin's respite was transient in nature and would come to an

abrupt end when the Soviet state was capable of waging
war against the West.

a

victorious

Brezhnev's breathing spell, under the right con-

ditions would be nearly eternal, and would end only after the victorious

construction of communism, first in the Soviet Union, then in the rest
of the socialist and non-socialist world.

The Soviets have long advocated

that detente should be made irreversible and that the breathing spell

offered by detente should be transformed into
Lenin's breathing spell was

a

a

permanent peace.

While

respite between wars, Brezhnev's breathing
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spell would be the catalyst for
permanent communist construction
without
the need for any war.
As Brezhnev has stated:

The best way of defending peace is
to continue actively
pursuing our policy of peace, to
continue our - as people
^
now call it - peace offensive.

^

P^en^p Meeting in April, the Central
Committee
of
of ^IJl'
the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union instructed the
Politburo to carry on its vigorous efforts
to implement the
Peace Program in its entirety and to
make irreversible the
favorable changes that are now being increasingly
felt in
^
the international situation. 40
In

analyzing the Leninist detente format, Soviet
cormientators

can claim that "it took the genius and
unbending will of Lenin and the

wisdom and political maturity of the Party that
he reared to work out
and then to consistently implement the only
correct policy

peaceful coexistence.

.

-

a

policy of

.of two systems of ownership, two opposing
economic

and socio-political systems. "^^

Yet, in the words of Politburo member

Yuri Andropov, this policy was a temporary one aimed at
providing the

much needed breathing spell:
Of course, at that time there could be no talk of excluding
war from the people's lives.
As a great realist, Lenin realized
that the imperialist powers would not leave revolutionary Russia
alone, that the peace won in a painful struggle would only be a
"postponement of war," only a breathing space of peace.
And our country received this breathing space.
We gained two
decades.
This helped us to be victorious in a war that was the
most terrible, the most bloody of all wars mankind has gone
through... 42

The Soviet Union does not attempt to conceal the fact that detente
has provided and continues to provide the breathing spell

that is quite

necessary for internal consolidation and/or socialist or communist construction.

However, the theory of detente as

a

breathing spell for Lenin

must be added to the theory of the present alignment of forces in favor
of socialism, to show the permanent nature of the present respite.

By

continuing the reasoning of the Leninist breathing spell, it can be argued
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that "today this question

-

which is certainly not

posed and resolved in a different way."^^

new one

a

-

is

^^.^ ^^f^,,,,^
^^^^

being

^^^^^^^

dictated by the "alignment of world
forces" in favor of socialism,
which "creates the prerequisites for...
the total elimination of the
is

danger of

new world war... and expands the limits
of peaceful
44
coexistence."
Andropov can conclude the argument
then by asserting
a

'The Party now sets itself the goal not
of winning

peace but of establishing

a

breathing space of

a

lasting and just peace on earth. "^^

Soviet spokesmen from

Lenin to Brezhnev have always argued
that

the prerequisite for internal consolidation and
the building of

socialist/communist society is the absence of war.
would be foolish

that:

a

Lenin told us that it

to embark upon the goals of domestic construction
in

the face of anything but peaceful relations with the
capitalist-imperialist

world.

Peace, in Lenin's mind created the most favorable, indeed the

only, condition

for the creation of his new society.

Likewise, Soviet

commentators in the era of the new detente realize the same truism:
It is a class policy (the policy of detente) because
above all else it is based on the vital interests of socialism and the interests of socialist and communist construction.
The new society needs peace - it is easier for the new society
to build in conditions of detente and a diminished arms burden.

It is also easier for the "new society" to build in an era when

vast amounts of financial resources from

economy are not allocated to

a

a

limited and relatively weak

burgeoning arms race.

As mentioned above,

the Soviet Union has appropriated an inordinate percentage of its

national economy to its military/defense budget.

With

a

Gross National

Product far inferior to that of the United States, the U.S.S.R. still

matches its chief rival in military expenditures.

Accordingly, it can

be argued that the "new society" must be built with the relatively low
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budget that remains after the
military appropriation
has been made.
As
outlined above, Brezhnev cannot
sustain this intense rublefor-dollar
military spending and still hope to
achieve any measure of
success in
addressing major domestic concerns.
The breathing spell therefore,
would afford Brezhnev the opportunity
to divert funds to just
such

domestic enterprises.

In speaking of the arms
race, and specifically

the unanswered questions of arms
limitation, Brezhnev asserted that:

However they remain on the agenda.
There is really no
^"^i^l their implementation
would be for
Ih!
the strengthening of mutual confidence.
Moreover, both sides
would receive an opportunity to save
substantial sums of
money and to use this money for productive
purposes, for improving people's lives. 47
It is reasonable to surmise that Brezhnev
has

had to temper his

policy of detente with assurances that military
vigilance and military

expenditures would not be drastically reduced.

Hence, he has repeatedly

claimed that the Soviet Union will "continue to
maintain the country's
Armed Forces at

a

high level, so that Soviet fighting men will always

have the most up-to-date weapons, arms that the imperialists
must take
into account

sacred duty."
a

-

48

this is our duty to the people, and we will fulfill this
Yet, Brezhnev again is mindful of the need to secure

breathing spell so as to re-channel much of this military spending into

other areas of the Soviet economy.

Therefore, after promising military

and defense vigilance at the highest level, Brezhnev can argue as follows:

At the same time, we have no greater desire than to
transfer the resources that are now of necessity diverted
from the national economy into raising the working people's
living standard, into constructive purposes. We are prepared tomorrow to start disarmament measures - either major,
radical measures or, as a start, partial ones - on a
genuinely fair reciprocal basis. ^9
It can be argued that

a

constant state of intense competition with

the United States, be it in the military, economic, or foreign policy
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realm, has never suited the needs of
the Soviet Union.

always placed the U.S.S.R. in

a

Such

a

state has

disadvantageous position vis-a-vis
its

more economically powerful adversary.

Hence,

a

breathing spell has often

been quite necessary for the Kremlin
regime from the earliest days of

Soviet power.

Lenin, of course, needed this
breathing spell to survive.

Brezhnev, assured of his nation's survival,
needs this respite to focus
energies on some rather ambitious domestic
objectives.
unlike Lenin,

is

However, Brezhnev,

in a fairly good position to make
his breathing spell

a

permanent fixture of Soviet foreign policy and an
irreversible component
of East-West relations.

The Soviet Union as

a

socialist oasis

.

One of the major determining

factors motivating Lenin to embark upon detente in 1918 was
the fact
that Soviet Russia was, as he depicted it, "an oasis in

imperialism."

a

raging sea of

Hopelessly outnumbered by his more formidable capitalist-

imperialist enemies, and thwarted by the abortive socialist upheaval
in Germany,

Lenin reasoned that he had no choice but to reach an accommoda-

tion of sorts with the West.

This may have been the most evil of

necessities for Lenin, yet until the balance of power could be shifted or
allies found, he had no choice but to coexist with his hated enemies.

Brezhnev has not been confronted with such

a

desperate position.

Far removed from the position of an oasis, the Soviet Union has for some

time stood at the head of an ever-increasing commonwealth of socialist
states.

Soviet influence may have been forced upon many countries, allies

may have been created and not earned, and the communist world may have
become fragmented.

Yet, there is no denying that the communist world's

size and strength is impressive and that the Soviet Union is in

a

position of international strength beyond that which Lenin had achieved.

This fact has radically altered
this particular
component of
detente fro. Lenin to Brezhnev.
Lenin found detente to
be a necessity
because of the weakness of Soviet
Russia and the non-existence
of a

socialist camp of allies.

detente to be

a

Brezhnev, on the other hand,
has found

policy that would be forced
upon the West with the

realization there of the growing might
of the Soviet Union and
the new
alignment of world forces in favor of
the socialist camp.
What Lenin
could not achieve was used by Brezhnev
as
new aggressive detente.

a

springboard to launch his

Brezhnev, in analyzing the present
alignment

of world forces, has claimed:
Our optimism is based on the successes
already achieved
by the policy of peaceful coexistence,
on the fact that the
ruling circles in some of the capitalist
countries are
showing a growing appreciation of the real
correlation of
world forces and are coming to realize that
war is unacceptable as a means for solving international
problems. 50

This point has been reinforced by Brezhnev

a

number of times.

Again, in Brezhnev's words:
The relaxation of international tensions has become
possible because a new correlation of forces now exists on
the world
scene.
Today the leaders of the bourgeois world can no longer
seriously expect to decide the historical dispute between
capitalism and socialism by force of arms. 51
Much the same sentiment has been voiced by Suslov:
As a result of the vigorous foreign policy of the Soviet
Union... the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence is
being affirmed more and more in international affairs...
Having run into a resolute rebuff from the united forces of
world socialism, the workers' and national liberation movement and all fighters for peace, international imperialism
has been compelled to retreat, and its representatives are
sitting down at the negotiating table... 52

The Soviet Union on

a

number of occasions, has reiterated this

basic foundation of detente in the 1970's.
was not

a

Detente, in the Soviet view.

mutually agreed to rapprochement between the two conflicting
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socioeconomic systems.

Nor was detente the result
of an American

willingness to peacefully coexist with the
Soviet Union.

Detente,

according to Brezhnev, was always practiced
by the Kremlin rulers, and
was always thwarted by the United States.

The United States agreed to

formalize detente with the U.S.S.R. because it
had no choice but to do
Faced with the awesome military might of
the Soviet Union, and con-

so.

fronted with the alignment of world forces in
favor of socialism, the
United States finally realized the hopelessness of
pursuing an anti-Soviet
and anti-communist foreign policy.

The United States did not agree to

a

detente with the Soviet Union; detente was forced upon the
United States by
its realization of the objective factors underlying
the balance of power in

the world.

Suslov again underscores this point, in relation to the

increased ideological struggle:
...With the changes in the world situation that favor
socialism, the hopelessness of any attempts to bring military,
economic, or political pressure to bear on the Soviet Union
or the socialist commonwealth as a whole becomes more and more
obvious.
This being the case, the struggle becomes particularly
acute in the area of ideology, an area in which there is not and
cannot be peaceful coexistence between socialism and capi tal i sm 53
.

In his

keynote address at the 25th C.P.S.U. Congress, Brezhnev

boastfully claimed that "the world is changing before our eyes, and it
changing for the better.

Our people and our Party are not passive

onlookers of these changes.

No, we are active participants in them."

is

54

What Brezhnev saw changing before his eyes was the growth of socialist

influence abroad and the consolidation of strength by the socialist
commonwealth.

Brezhnev could point to victories in Vietnam, national

liberation victories among the developing nations, communist party gains
in Western Europe,

real

socialist construction in Cuba and

or imagined triumphs.

a

host of other

The relations with the capitalist states could
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then be summarized by Brezhnev as follows:
The main element in our policy with
respect to the
capitalist states has been and remains the
struggle for the
affirmation of the principles of peaceful
coexistence for
lasting peace, and for lessening and in
the long run eliminating the danger that a new world war will
break out
The transition from the cold war and
the explosive'confrontation of two worlds to the easing of
tension was connected
alignment of forces in the world
^
Is"
arena
This alignment of forces in the world arena,
and specifically

the alignment in favor of the socialist camp,
provides the main characteristic of international relations from the Soviet
perspective.

Georgi

Arbatov, in analyzing Soviet-American relations reasons
that:
As a matter of fact this constitutes one of the principal
features of the present world situation.
Recent international
events, including events bearing on the relations between the
U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., provide practical confirmation for
these conclusions and show that the change in the alignment of
forces is not some abstract formula but a tangible reality
that makes it possible to bring about major positive changes
in the international situation.
The important shift in the
alignment of forces in the world arena and the favorable new
opportunities that this opens up have been created to a
significant extent by the Soviet Union itself... 57

The Soviet view of the present international environment is

based on an analysis of what the Soviets feel are unquestionable objective

factors.

The most obvious of these objective criteria, and one that

has finally been realized by the United States, is the aforementioned

theory of the alignment of world forces.

Soviet commentators can assert

therefore, that the improvement in U.S. -Soviet relations was conditioned
by a number of factors, and that:

Among these factors, a special place is held by the
alignment of forces in the world arena, which is steadily
In the final analysis, it
changing in favor of socialism.
was this factor that made the capitalist world, after prolonged and fierce resistance, recognize the changes that
have been wrought as a result of socialist revolutions on
a substantial part of the globe - and this is an important
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aspect of what is now taking place
in Europe and in
number of other parts of the world. 58
^

a
^

Brezhnev is especially fond of
asserting the alignment of
world
forces dictum in regard to the
situation in Europe where the
heart of
the Soviet bloc is still to be found
and where communist parties
have

made some impressive inroads.

Brezhnev has often claimed that
con-

temporary Europe is far different from
the continent that was embroiled
in World War II.

This, according to Brezhnev is

a

positive change that

was brought about by the fact that "the
alignment of class forces has

changed, both on the international level and
within many states.

The

role that the working class and its vanguard,
the Communist Parties,
play in European public life has grown tremendously..."^^

This alignment

then yields tremendous benefits, in Brezhnev's
view, for the European

continent:
The Europe of today is to a large extent the fruit of
the successful construction of socialism and communism in
a number of the continent's countries.
It is also the fruit
of the persistent and steadfast struggle for peace the socialist
countries are waging in the international arena...
Today it is clearer than ever that imperialism can no longer
dictate the destiny of Europe. The socialist states and the
workers' and democratic movement in the capitalist countries
now have an important say in deciding this destiny.

The all-European security conference held in Helsinki

was of

great importance to the Soviet Union in that it confirmed many of the

Soviet claims that the re-alignment of world forces in favor of socialism
was a reality on the European continent.

Brezhnev has stated, in light

of the Helsinki accords, that the proper preconditions for solidifying

detente have been created in Europe:
The most important results of the liberation struggle
of the European peoples during World War II and thereafter
have been consolidated.
Preconditions have been created for
lasting peace and good-neighbor cooperation both in Europe
and outside it.^'
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The Helsinki accords, in Brezhnev's
view, have legalized and

accorded widespread recognition of
the post-World War
in Europe.

II

socialist gains

Thus, Brezhnev can claim-

The positions of socialism and the
influence of the concerted policy of the socialist states
are stronge t n E^roDe
The 24th Congress posed the task of
ensuring European securi';
on the basis of recognition of the
territorial and pol ticaP^
realities that came about as a result
of World War II
along these lines that our Central
Committee has acted. 62

ts

The convocation of an all-European
conference on security had been
an objective of the Soviet Union for some
time.^^

successfully complete such

a

To convene and

conference would, in the Soviet view, pro-

vide the means by which the process of detente
could best be served in
Europe.

In effect,

the Helsinki accords provided the means by
which

many of the Soviet objectives inherent in detente could
best be realized.
In the first place,

realize

a

it seems evident that the U.S.S.R. would hope
to

reduction in the U.S. military presence in Europe;

that might be prompted by

a

a

reduced image of the Soviet menace.

reduction
As

Brezhnev has claimed:
Common sense notwithstanding, "responsibility" is
ascribed to the socialist countries for internal political
events in other states and for civil wars and wars of national
liberation.
The man in the street is intimidated by the idea
of 'hordes of Russian tanks" and is told that the U.S.S.R. and
the other Warsaw Treaty countries are building up armaments
on a vast scale and .preparing for "war against Western Europe."
But these fabrications collapse like a house of cards as
soon as we look at facts, at reality. 64

Secondly, it would appear that the Soviet Union hoped to use
detente, as expressed in the Helsinki documents, as

European dependency on American economic assistance.

a

means for reducing
This, it would seem,

could best be accomplished by expanding the levels of intra-European and

Soviet-European trade and economic contacts.
when analyzing the Helsinki accords:

In the words of Brezhnev,
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It is also extremely important
to create, so to soe^^k
material

the

fabric of peaceful cooperation
in
urope Tfll^l
that would strengthen ties among
European peoples 'and tales
and would give them an increasing
stake in the preservation
of peace
for many years to come.
I
have in mind vaHou ?orms
of mutually advantageous cooperation trade and P-^oauction
product on
cooperation and scientific-technical ties. 65
It can

be argued that the Soviet Union
hoped to gain a major

psychological victory through the Helsinki
accords and to demonstrate that
detente had indeed become an irreversible
process on the European continent.

One of the features of this strategy,
again, was to portray the

U.S.S.R.

in terms of a cooperative and non-threatening
neighbor.

As

stated by Brezhnev:
The main thing now is to implement in practice
all the principles
and understandings agreed upon in Helsinki.
The Soviet Union is
acting and will continue to act in precisely this
way.
Recently we
offered certain proposals on the development of
all-European
cooperation in a number of important fields. We shall continue
to
make efforts in this direction. We expect the same approach
from all other participants in the all-European conference.
Thus, there have been achievements in the establishment of
peaceful relations in Europe, and, comrades, these are considerable
achi evements .65
The Helsinki conference would lay the formal groundwork for the

consolidation and official recognition of the favorable realignment of
forces that had already taken place in Europe and provide the means by

which the offensive strategy of detente could further this favorable realignment in the future.

It seemed

important to the Soviet Union that the

final recognition of the widely accepted facts of post-World War

socialist gains in Europe be granted by the West.

II

It appeared to be

imperative that the U.S.S.R. solidify the detente process with the nations
of Western Europe so as to ensure the attainment of Soviet objectives in
the future.

These two concerns, as expressed by Brezhnev, were both

addressed by the signing of the Final Act of the Helsinki conference:
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The results achieved are worth
the efforts expended
THp
collectively reaffirmed
'
^ioU
b??n:TA'''r:'^'P'K"'5
Dility of existing borders.
A set of nrinrinioc
between states wJ worked out,
prlnclpfer a^ u
?]l'Zl
letter and spirit - correspond to
the requirements of Deace?ul
coexistence. Jhus, favorable conditions
have bee crea^eS for
the^preservation and consolidation of
peace throughouf^he con-

Z

conference's results are aimed at
the

^'"^

futJ?e!67^'
It has

'

been claimed that the Soviet victory
at Helsinki was not

major one in that the Soviet hegemony

legitimate after August,

1

in Eastern Europe was no, more

975 than it was before'.^^

for the reasons outlined above, holds

a

a

The Soviet Union,

vastly different view.

In the

words of Brezhnev:
The principles of peaceful coexistence have become
the
leading trend in relations among states. The most
complete
reflection of this was the successful holding of the allEuropean conference, in which the U.S. and Canada participated...
This was an enormous political victory for the forces
of peace.

However, it is specifically in regard to the United States that
the Soviet Union has most adamantly asserted the theory of the
alignment

of world forces.

For, as Brezhnev has claimed;

"speaking of our relations

with the United States, we regard their improvement as an organic component in the overall progress of fundamental changes in the international

climate on our planet.

"^'^

The United States not only represents the

most formidable opponent that the Soviets must face, it also embodies
what the U.S.S.R. has claimed is the essence of hostile anti-Soviet
activity.

To transform U.S. -Soviet relations, and more importantly to

force the United States to recognize the objective international factors

confronting it, represents

a

triumph in the Soviet view.

It was

in the

United States that the U.S.S.R. was confronted with the "most primitive
forms of bellicose anticommunism," with charges of the "red menace," and

with the policy of communist containment, among others.

However, the
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Soviets can now claim, by reasoning
from their analysis of the
new

"objective" international factors, that:
In the new conditions, the
complete bankruptcy of the
former view of the world, a view dictated
by rabid anti!
communism, a view according to which the
main and most
important goal of the U.S. foreign policy
was to inflict
the greatest possible damage on the
Soviet Union and the
other socialist countries, became apparent. 71

As will

be shown below the U.S.S.R. steadfastly
adheres to the

belief that the realization of these factors
does not in any way diminish
the ideological struggle between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
On the contrary,

the new detente presupposes an increased
ideological

warfare with the United States which now must resign
itself to
of coexistence with the U.S.S.R.

a

position

Thus, Suslov can claim that:

The fact that anti communism faces inevitable doom in
no
way signifies that it will lay down arms of its own free
will, however.
Our class enemies are trying to compensate
for the inner shakiness of their ideological positions by
intensified development of the mass media and employment of
the most sophisticated methods of ideological sabotage.
They are building up the capability of the press, radio and
television, and they are evidencing a clear intent to make
their progaganda global in character. ^2
In regard

claims that:

to the new alignment of forces, the Soviet Union

"Needless to say, this does not mean that the American

monopolies revised their attitude toward socialism and communist ideas.
No, nothing changed in this respect."
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Yet, as Arbatov is quick to

point out:
But the world in which the imperialist powers have to
live and act has changed.
It is to these changes, to the
objective reality of the present situation, that they have
to adapt their domestic and foreign policy. 74

The stark realization by the United States of the objective

correlation of world forces and increased might of the Soviet Union
not, in the Soviet view, limited to any one political party or

is

1

presidential administration.
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Richard Nixon may have
been the first to

recognize these objective factors.

Yet, Gerald Ford, and
any succeeding

chief executive, would be equally
compelled to pursue the only
rational
course of action with the U.S.S.R.;
the detente course.
The Ford-Carter
presidential campaign was quite closely
observed by the Soviet Union
in regard

to the question of detente.

Brezhnev, in analyzing the

campaign, was concerned with the hard line
posture with the Soviet Union
and the calls for increased defense
appropriations.

However, in summary

the C.P.S.U.'s General Secretary was led
to conclude:

Nevertheless, no matter who is in power in
Washington
after the election, the United States apparently
will have
to reckon with the actual alignment of
forces in the world
which in recent years has impelled American
ruling circles'
after soberly appraising the situation, to begin
a search
for accords with the socialist world... 75
'

By way of summary, it can be argued that the
Leninist position as
a

socialist "oasis" in

a

capitalist world does not pertain to the situation

during the period of rule by Brezhnev.

In fact,

the Soviet Union today

could argue that the present international environment, replete
with
the favorable alignment of forces in the world arena, is the antithesis

of the international situation as it existed during Lenin's lifetime.

Detente in 1918 was forced upon Lenin by his recognition of the objective

reality confronting him.

Detente in 1980 is being forced upon the United

States by its recognition of the same objective factors; the international

balance of power that has shifted heavily to the camp of the enemy.

Detente as

a

reaction to American military superiority

.

A serious

constraint placed upon Lenin in his quest to expand Soviet influence
abroad was the inordinate military superiority that was enjoyed by the

capitalist-imperialist camp.

In fact,

the elimination of the military

1

imbalance favoring the West became
the main objective
of Lenin's longterm detente strategy.
Arguing from his theory of
war and its

inevitability, Lenin reasoned that
military equality, and
eventual
superiority by the Soviet Union, was
of utmost necessity if he
were to
realize any success in foreign policy.
War would be the handmaiden
for
the exportation of Lenin's revolution,
yet war could not be waged until

the Soviet Union was assured of military
victory.
This particular component of Lenin's
detente has changed con-

siderably.

In the first place, the Soviet
Union since 1956 has advocated

the theory that wars, especially in the
form of life and death struggles

between the two opposing sociopolitical
systems, are not inevitable.

There is, to be sure,
of

a

a

persistent danger of war, especially in the
form

reckless anti-Soviet thrust by the hopelessly
frustrated capitalist-

imperialist states.
threat of war.

Brezhnev has often elaborated on the persistent

In Brezhnev's words:

Imperialism's forces of aggression will evidently not
lay down their arms for a long time.
There are still
adventurers who are capable of kindling another military
conflagration in order to further their own mercenary
interests.
We therefore consider that it is our sacred
duty to conduct our policy in such a way as to avoid
being caught unawares by any emergency and firmly to
counter any attempt at returning the world to "cold war"
days. 76
Yet, Lenin's view of the inevitability of such wars is not

shared by Brezhnev.

Thus, in addressing an American audience, Brezhnev

can assert:

There is bound to be an ideological debate between us
as to whose world view is more correct and whose way of
life is better.
Here there is bound to be competition
between the two systems.
But let us agree that the historical dispute cannot be decided on the battlefield of
nuclear war.
History will in due course deliver its
verdict .77
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Secondly, and most importantly,
the Soviet Union has
made impressive
gains in this area, and is no longer
a vastly unequal
adversary of the
United States.

achieved

a

In fact,

the U.S.S.R. by most accepted
standards has now

relative military parity with the
United States.

It is this

military equality between the United States
and the Soviet Union that
clearly separates Brezhnev's detente from
any of its previous forms
and, it can be argued, which makes
detente under Brezhnev
and threatening component of Soviet foreign
policy.

a

more aggressive

Brezhnev has

alluded to the existence of strategic parity in
the following manner:
Our efforts are directed precisely at averting
the first
strike and the second strike, indeed at averting
nuclear
war in general.
Our approach on these questions can be
formulated as follows: the defense potential of the
Soviet
Union must be at a level that would deter anyone
from
attempting to disrupt our peaceful life. 78

The history of Soviet-American detente until quite recently
has
been set amidst the background of a vastly superior military
arsenal
of the United States.

Lenin, of course, languished in this setting of

American military might throughout his tenure in power.

Stalin, as

historical evidence shows, made significant gains in altering the
U.S. -Soviet military equation; yet Stalin never achieved

parity between the two countries.

a

realistic

Khrushchev, for his part, made repeated

attempts to offset the strategic inferiority of the Soviet Union.
However, Khrushchev, as did his predecessors, met with little success and
was compelled to conduct Soviet foreign policy in an environment marked
by American hegemony in the field of strategic weapons.

It can be

reasoned that it was the lack of military parity or Soviet military superiority that stood as the missing link in Khrushchev's policy of using

detente as an offensive global strategy.
However, Brezhnev has apparently secured this missing link, and
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has added it to the formula of
Soviet-American detente.

important to emphasize this point.

It is

quite

The achievement of strategic
parity

with the United States has given Brezhnev
the opportunity to greatly

increase the risk-taking potential in Soviet
foreign policy; and Brezhnev
has apparently not allowed this opportunity
to bypass him.

While pur-

suing an aggressive foreign policy line,
Brezhnev is able to temper any

American response with

a

new form of sabre rattling.

Brezhnev has

shown no reticence to continually remind the
United States of the grave
issues involving "weapons of mass annihilation," the
"global destructive

power of nuclear weapons," and the like.

In so doing,

Brezhnev is

reinforcing the stated American goal of detente; to do everything

necessary to avoid

a

thermonuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union.

As was seen above, the United States has shown a willingness
to adhere
to this formula of detente and is ready to moderate its own position
in

some cases so as to avoid inviting

a

thermonuclear holocaust that would

"threaten the very existence of mankind."

Detente under Brezhnev may be

in the guise of the "Peace Program," the hand of friendship may have been

extended to the United States, and Soviet prestige and socialist gains

may be achieved on an incremental basis without the need for

American thermonuclear exchange.

a

Soviet-

Yet, it can be argued that the constant

threat of such an exchange amidst the background of strategic parity
provides the basis by which the constraints and limitations imposed on

Soviet foreign policy have been greatly reduced.
The achievement of strategic parity and the "growing military

might of the Soviet Union," are closely intertwined with the Soviet

dictum of the "alignment of world forces" in favor of socialism.
Together, in the Soviet view, they form the complete East-West formula
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that has forced the United States
to agree to detente
with the Soviet
Union.
In the words of the late
Soviet Defense Minister
Marshall A.A.
Grechko, a member of the Politburo:
The successful implementation
of the Peace Proqram is
conditioned by the existing balance
of world forces and
continued orderly changes in this
balance in favor o?
socialism.
It was prepared by decades
of selfless struanlP
of Soviet people... and by the
U.S.S.R.'s tra
^"to
an invincible fortress of social
ism. .79

sforL?Kto

.

Confronted with the reality of this
"invincible fortress," the
United States was, in the Soviet view,
compelled to re-assess the role
of military force in regard to relations
with the Soviet Union.

According to this view, "the growth of the
Soviet Union's defensive
might have dispelled hopes that the U.S.A. would
be able to achieve

military superiority, which would have enabled it
to reach its goals
with the help of the use of military force, or the
threat of its use."^°
The American recognition of the military might and
strategic capabilities
of the Soviet Union forced the ruling circles in Washington
to re-evaluate

the efficacy of confronting the U.S.S.R. militarily.

This re-assessment

compelled the United States to "come to the conclusion that reliance on

military victory over the socialist commonwealth was groundless and
that

a

nuclear war would in fact prove suicidal for America itself.

"^^

Brezhnev can also claim that the new historical era, characterized by the

growing might of the socialist world, will serve as
In the words

a

barrier against war.

of Brezhnev:

Neither the lessons of history nor what would appear to
be man's natural aversion to killing his like has ever prevented new blood baths, because the forces of war, the role
of those who stood to gain from war, were too great.
In our epoch this state of affairs has changed fundamentally.
Today, the struggle against war has a reliable
basis in the strength of the forces of peace and the forces
g2
of democracy, and in the freedom and independence of nations.
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In terms of strategic weaponry,
the Soviet Union is
quite

convinced that the achievement of parity
with the United States is
a reality.
Hence, Suslov can call for
agreements that "are based on
the principles of the equal security
of both sides and provide no
unila-

teral advantages in the field of
strategic missile arms to either

side..:«3

p,,thermore, the U.S.S.R. appears to be
quite ready to utilize

this equality as

a

major factor in formulating its
foreign policy,

especially as such policies directly pertain
to the United States.

In

the realm of conventional military forces
the Soviet Union

is

equally

convinced that its position vis-a-vis the United
States

at

a

parity.

is

level of

Thus, while the United States may realize the
uselessness of

using thermonuclear weapons against

a

now equal adversary, it is also

important, in the Soviet view, that the same assessment
be made in regard
to conventional military endeavors.

The United States, from the Soviet

perspective, having realized the insanity of using nuclear weapons,
made
an attempt "to expand the

'applicability' of military force by strengthening

the components of that force that would make possible, while refraining

from

a

nuclear war against the U.S.S.R., to wage limited, so-called

local wars with impunity."
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Yet, as the Soviet Union is fond of reminding the world, the

American military endeavor in Vietnam and the eventual victory of the
communist forces of North Vietnam brought forth the objective reality
of the military ineptness of the United States.

Military superiority,

conventional and strategic, had always been the ace card used in the

formulation of American foreign policy.

However, as the Soviets assert,

"the war in Vietnam showed that, given the new alignment of forces in
the world, this card has been trumped," forcing the United States to

A
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"understand that military force
cannot serve as, so to
speak, the 'heart
and soul- Of all foreign policy,
as

presupposed."

the logic of the
'cold «ar'

85

Brezhnev can also present the
view that the Soviet Union
did much to help the Vietnamese
In their successful
struggle against
the United States.
As stated by Brezhnev;
The war in Vietnam, for the
ending of which the Soviet
Union worked firmly and consistently,
has e ded
Relvlno
on the powerful moral and material
^ pport of the So ie?^
Union and other socialist countries
and on the soliS
y
of all the progressive forces in the
world, the patriots

?I»»hL
'""-"/''^"IP
freedom and independence.
86

"P^'^l" t^-^ j'^^t cause of

It became quite necessary for the
United States to eliminate

the Cold War theory of military aggression
and use of military force in

conducting its foreign policy.

In the words of Arbatov:

The course and outcome of the American
aggression in
Vietnam have shown that in today's conditions the
U.S.
cannot also hope for success in "limited" and
"local""wars
on which the American military-political
doctrine of "flexible retaliation" pinned its hopes in the late
1950's
The
entire course of events in the late 1960's and 1970's has
called in question many of the foundations of the U.S.
foreign policy course as it was formulated during the "cold
war" years. 87

The Soviet Union therefore, is able to conduct Soviet-American

detente in the 1970's with what they perceive to be an equal stature
vis-a-vis the United States in the military field.
in

military power can be seen

as a prime

Again, this parity

determining factor in affording

the Soviet Union a more flexible and far-reaching detente policy.

It is

imperative therefore, that the U.S.S.R. sustain this present co-equal
position and not allow the United States to re-assert its military

superiority.

To do so would be to eliminate the very heart of Soviet-

styled detente of 1972-1980, and force the Kremlin regime to limit the

scope and purpose of its foreign policy.

Thus, Brezhnev has repeatedly
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warned that while "we now have fine
equipment," it

is

critical to

remember that "we live in an age
of scientific and
technical progress,
when weapons are being improved
so rapidly
that new forms and systems'

are often created not just within
a year but even within
a shorter
"88
period.
Brezhnev can then logically argue
that "stagnation in this

(military technology) sphere may be
frought with serious consequences.
Our scientists, both civilian and
military, must constantly think
about
this and remember it.-^^

defense spending, irrespective of
Soviet calls

for disarmament, must also be maintained
at

a

high level so as not to

risk losing the vitally necessary
Soviet-American military parity.

As

stated by Brezhnev, in regard to defense, the
U.S.S.R. will "spend on it

exactly as much as

is

needed for the reliable security of the Soviet

Union and for the defense, in conjunction with
the fraternal countries,
of the gains of socialism, so that potential
aggressors will not be

tempted to try by force to decide in their favor the
historical controversy
between the two opposing social systems.

"^'^

It is clear therefore, that Brezhnev stands in a position that
is

far more advantageous than that which was realized by Lenin.

It was

impossible for Lenin to achieve his dream of defeating the nations of
the capitalist-imperialist world without first achieving

a

high level of

military strength and then fighting his enemies on an equal basis.
Brezhnev does not suffer the same handicap.

The Soviet Union of today

believes that it has realized the goal of military equality, thereby

radically altering the rules by which the game of Soviet-American detente
is

played.

Detente as the preparation for the final East-West war

.

As mentioned

above, the Leninist detente formula was based on the fact that

a

respite

190

was needed so as to prepare for the
final cataclysmic confrontation
with
the West.

In

Lenin's mind the ultimate goal of
the destruction of the

worldwide capitalist-imperialist system could
not be achieved without
waging this fatal life and death struggle.
of this Armageddon was unquestionable.

For Lenin the inevitability

What was questionable was the

time when this conflict would take place, and
detente was meant to buy
as much time as

possible before the conflict occurred.

As we have seen, the Soviet Union during the
tenure of Leonid

Brezhnev has altered this basic dictum of
the United States.

a

final

full-scale war with

More specifically, Nikita Khrushchev revised this

line of reasoning with his theory that inter-camp wars were no
longer

"fatalistically inevitable."

In carrying through with this theme

Brezhnev has concluded that while all wars, including nuclear wars, are

permissible, they indeed are not inevitable.

Brezhnev, as will be seen

below has rationalized that "just wars" are completely acceptable and
even necessary components of certain "progressive" changes in the world.
Yet, the unleashing of

a

total thermonuclear confrontation with the

United States is not seen as

a

feasible option for the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev has often repeated his philosophy that detente "is the path
from confrontation to cooperation, from threats and sabre-rattling to
the resolution of disputed questions through negotiations and, on the

whole,

a

reshaping of international relations based on healthy principles

of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and mutual advantage."

91

Brezhnev can claim that:
should like to emphasize that we judge the developI
ment of the international situation primarily by the extent
to which it is possible to make progress in consolidating
In our_
peace and eliminating the threat of nuclear war.
in this
achieved
been
have
results
positive
view, definite
area in recent years.

Moreover,
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In regard to the United States.
Brezhnev asserts that the turn

for the better in U.S. -Soviet relations "has,
of course, been of decisive

importance in lessening the threat of
peace. "^^

a

new world war and in strengthening

It has been argued above that the waging
of

a

total nuclear

war was not

a

or Moscow.

It was also reasoned that detente could
not be viewed

properly as

a

viable option for the ruling circles in either
Washington

policy that was designed to prevent

a

thermonuclear war.

In the Soviet perception detente would, in fact, as

Brezhnev mentioned

above, serve as

danger of such

a

deterrent to nuclear war.

war is not based on the willingness of either side to

a

mutually agree not to destroy the other.
it is

Yet, the lessening of the

Rather, it can be argued that

based on the existence of approximate strategic parity in the realm

of Soviet-American thermonuclear capability.

assured of surviving such

a

holocaust, it becomes logical to look for

other means to settle the dispute.

detente as such

a

Hence, with neither side

The Soviet Union has opted for

means, thus allowing for the active pursuit of foreign

policy objectives while tempering any American retaliation with the prospects
for a devastating and uncertain nuclear war.
It can be reasoned that the Soviet logic here is quite simple.

The final military confrontation with the United States is avoidable,
and is not an attractive option in that the U.S.S.R. can not be assurred

Should the United States attempt to

of surviving

a

thermonuclear war.

conduct such

a

war, however, it too is uncertain of winning, thus allowing

the Soviet Union to exploit this uncertainty as

American actions.

a

deterrent to hostile

Having confronted the United States with the reality of

strategic parity, the U.S.S.R. can then proceed on

a

course of foreign

policy endeavors without resorting to full-scale war and without inviting
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a

total thermonuclear response
from the United
States.

However, while this final
showdown with the West
was no longer
inevitable or desirable, it is
still <,„ite possible.
The fact that

the

soviet union does not wish to
become engaged in
will not in itself guarantee
that such

a

a

thermonuclear war.

war will not be waged,

m

the words of Arbatov:
It hardly needs to be
demonstrated that in todav'.
conditions the prevention of
a new world wa
is b^o^-nq
a mutual interest of
paramount importance.
Even the' nerP

verfbroa
P0sIibiin?L'5I'
especially
'f'l^ons,
because
the reliable,
ine
re ab e IclulTu"'"'
actually guaranteed prevention
of

a thermonuclear war requires not only an
understanding on the
renunciation of conscious attempts to
unleas^such a war
but also a radical improvement in
the whole system ut
of
international relations.
After all
in a world where tension reigns,
where hotbeds of military conflicts are
smoldering, states can be
drawn against their will into an
escalation of events in
which they may lose control over the
situation and a
catastrophe will become inevitable. 94

The major cause for the existence of
"hotbeds of military conflicts"
is, quite naturally in the Soviet view,
the aggressive tendencies of

the United States and its NATO bloc allies.

The United States may have

been compelled to reassess its relations with
the Soviet Union and to

structure them in light of the military might of the
U.S.S.R.

However,

the United States could not be expected to lay down
its arms quietly.
As stated by Soviet Colonel Sidelnikov, "the peace
loving peoples and

the world's progressive public cannot fail to reckon with the
fact that
the aggressive forces of imperialism have not laid down their
arms and

evidently will not do so for

a

long time."

Furthermore, it is argued that

"there is no dearth of adventurers who are capable of kindling

military conflagration and trying to unleash
their own selfish interests."

95

a

a

new

new war for the sake of

Brezhnev can also add

a

somber view of the
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reality of the present situation even
in the era of detente.

As stated

by Brezhnev:

To be sure, we are realists and
cannot help
of a different order as well.
We know all too
and acute international crises are by
no means
aggression in the world, and
III
are able to feel? secure. ^°

seeinq facts
that wars
over.
iLre
not all nations
^^t^n:>

wel

Brezhnev, in writing to an American
audience, has attempted to

demonstrate the hostile anti-detente attitude
that prevails in the United
States.

In Brezhnev's words:

Such (American) readers have come under the
influence
of political forces bent on sabotaging detente.
Actively
using the means of manipulating public opinion,
these
forces present their own private interests as the
interests
of the nation.
They are busy creating log jams in the way
of agreement between our countries on crucial questions
of
arms limitation and the preparation of conditions
for transition to disarmament. 97
The Soviet view of the possibility of

nuclear war with the United States

is

a

large scale thermo-

closely connected to the Soviet

theory of the "alignment of world forces," as well as the Soviet belief
in the attainment of strategic equality with the United States.

As

outlined above, the latter two components, when viewed together, formed
the basis for the United States being forced to accept detente.

new variable, that of an American-initiated thermonuclear war, is

result of the United States making

a

The
a

desperate attempt to counteract the

inalterable process of the alignment of world forces and to thwart the

military might of the Soviet Union.

This belief is accurately summarized

by Brezhnev:

The point is that the aggressive circles of the capitalist
world are reacting to their defeats in social battles, to the
loss of colonial possessions, to the abandonment of capitalism
by more and more countries, to the successes of world socialism
and the growing influence of the Communist Parties in the
bourgeois states - to all these trends - with a feverish buildup of military preparations .. .By relying on these "positions
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of strength " imperialism hopes to
retain the possibility
^'
which IS slipping from its hands, of
ordering^ o?her
countries and peoples around. 98
By reacting in such

a

manner the United States,
according to

Soviet spokesmen, might well attempt to
force the issue in regard to
the ultimate victor in the struggle
between the two diametrically

opposed socio-economic systems.

Claiming that the United States is

"hard pressed" to react, Marshall Grechko
could still claim that "they
are in every way stepping up their opposition
to the process of detente,
and they have not abandoned their plans to
resolve the historic argument

between capitalism and socialism by force of arms."^^
The specter of massive American arms buildup is
then raised as

the barometer for measuring the still-existent aggressive
tendencies
of capitalism-imperialism.

As Brezhnev noted:

We also have no right to forget that, in conditions of
the easing of international tensions, processes that constitute material preparations for a world war are continuing
and even intensifying.
The military budgets of the countries of the North
Atlantic bloc are increasing by $2,000,000,000 to
$3,000,000,000 annually, and behind these figures are more
and more new types of weapons of destruction - new and
increasingly destructive nuclear bombs and warheads, new
and increasingly powerful missiles, tanks, and planes, warships and submarines.
The qualitative improvement of weaponry
has assumed unprecedented scope, 100
Thus, while the Soviets claim that they want no part of

War posture, and certainly want no part of
in their words, recognize that,

a

a

Cold

nuclear war, they must still,

"the possibility of

a

retrograde move-

ment to the 'cold war' has still not been ruled out, although each new
success of the peace policy makes the changes that are taking place

more and more durable and stable.

""'^^

What this translates to in the

Soviet viewpoint is the need "to maintain vigilance and to give

a

firm rebuff
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to all

the schemes of imperialist
reaction.

Hence, the Soviets

can argue that detente, while eliminating
the inevitability of

a

new

world war, requires the continued buildup
of military might in order
to ensure that such a war is not launched
by the United States.

The

Soviet Union in short, must be ready and
willing to wage full-scale
war if necessary.

In the words of Sidelnikov:

Our military-theoretical

thought believes that as lonq
as this complex and difficult problem
remains unsolved and
the aggressive forces of imperialism and
various kinds of
adventurers continue to exist and operate, it
will still
be necessary to be ready to wage war using
any means of

armed struggle. 103

Brezhnev can claim in this regard that "of course
we are

improving our defenses."

"We cannot do otherwise," according to Brezhnev,

because "we have never yielded, and shall never yield, in
matters of our
own security or the security of our allies.

"""^^

In Brezhnev's view, the

need for increased defense expenditures is

a

imperialist-inspired arms race.

by Brezhnev:

As stated

direct result of the

The military preparations of the capitalist states are
compelling the socialist countries to allocate the necessary
funds for defense, diverting them from civilian construction
to which we would like to dedicate all our efforts and all
our material resources.
Dozens of newly independent countries
are also being drawn into the orbit of the arms race, which,
of course, is prompted by the threat to their independence
posed by imperialism now in one part of the world, now in
another.
It is clear therefore, that continued qualitative and quantitative

improvements in the Soviet military arsenal within the overall framework
of detente are quite necessary in the Soviet view.

The necessity is

dictated, according to Soviet spokesmen, not by the desire to wage
nuclear war but rather, by the need to both maintain the vital parity
in strategic arms and to be prepared for any American attempt to unleash
a

new world war.

Throughout this process the U.S.S.R. continually
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bemoans the fact that the United States
maintains the paradox of
increasing its military budget while
signing accords with the
Soviet
Union aimed at limiting arms buildups.
Thus, a Pravda editorial can
cite the logic of the U.S. Senator Edward
Kennedy who "pointed out
the discrepancy between the Pentagon's
desire to expand U.S. strategic

forces and the spirits of the agreements
signed by the U.S.S.R. and the
U.S.A. and currently in effect between them."^°^

At the same however,

the Soviet position, exhibiting a similar
paradox, is quite acceptable.
As stated by Grechko:

Therefore, our Party, in pursuing its active peaceloving foreign policy, constantly provides it with
increased
vigilance and shows tireless concern for strengthening
the
country's defense capability and for increasing the
combat
might of the Armed Forces, outfitting them with up-to-date
military material and weapons and improving their combat
107
readiness
.

.

.

By way of summary it can be noted that Lenin was thoroughly

convinced of the inevitability of

a

final all-inclusive war with the

West, but that Brezhnev is convinced that such
In short,
a

conflict can be avoided.

for a number of reasons Brezhnev would prefer not to opt for

war with the United States.

feels is

a

a

Rather, he has chosen what the U.S.S.R.

more reasonable alternative, the gradual, though forceful,

policy of incremental changes in the East-West balance through the

detente strategy.

Detente as

a

reaction to

a

potential anti-Soviet alliance

.

As

pointed

out above, Lenin was obsessed with the fear that the capitalist-

imperialist nations would, in their own best interests, form

alliance aimed at crushing the Soviet state.

a

military

Lenin reasoned that his

enemies, once freed of their involvement in World War
turn their combined resources toward their common foe.

I,

would naturally
Detente, in this
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respect, was aimed at reducing the
threat presented to the
West and
at precluding such a joint enterprise
by the imperialists.
In

many respects the threat of this
potential anti-Soviet

alliance has changed considerably.
the Soviet Union each has

a

To be sure, the United
States and

bloc of military allies that
could be counted

on for assistance in the time of war.
is

Yet, as far as the Soviet
Union

concerned the predominant imperialist
military adversary that it

must confront is the bastion of
capitalism-imperialism and the "other
camp's" most formidable nation, the United
States.
In the Soviet view, a military
onslaught against the U.S.S.R.

could only be effectively waged with the direct
involvement of the United

States.

A military attack by the United States would
obviously be of

great concern to the U.S.S.R., whether the United States
acted alone or
in conjunction with its military allies.

The Soviet Union is less seriously concerned with

military coalition than Lenin was

as

a

a

Western

direct result of two previously

mentioned variables in the detente formula.

That is, the U.S.S.R. is no

longer an "oasis" isolated from the rest of the world by virtue of its

socialist form of government, and no longer suffers
inferiority in regard to the United States.

a

severe military

Thus, the fear of

a

Western

coalition can be seen as being nearly synonymous with the concomitant
possibility of the United States waging

a

new world war.

Having become

desperate in the face of the reality of the alignment of world forces
in favor of socialism, having recognized the growing military might

of the Soviet Union, and realizing the futulity of stopping the unalter-

able movement of the world toward socialism, the United States in conjunction with its military allies, might well resort to nuclear war.

:
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As will

make

be mentioned below,

the Soviet Union has
attempted to

unified Western coalition, military,
economic, or political in
nature, a difficult task for the
United States to achieve.
Detente with
the U.S.S.R., as cited earlier, is
a more attractive
option for some West
a

European nations than it is for the
American government.

Accordingly,

some Western governments are unwilling
to join the United States in

unified anti-Soviet posture of any kind.

In the

a

military realm the

U.S.S.R. has by virtue of its achievements
through detente, tried to make
an effective anti-Soviet coalition less
realistic.

In the words of

Andropov

Unshakable guarantees that no aggressor or coalition
of
aggressors will be able to gain the upper hand over
socialism have been created and are growing stronger
year by
^
year. 108
However, the Soviet Union feels that the attempt to
create such

a

bloc of anti-Soviet and anti-detente forces is being made
by many reac-

tionary leaders in the West.

While the Soviets claim that such

a

coalition could not prove to be effective militarily, the U.S.S.R. can
still acknowledge the possibility of creating an anti -Soviet front:
We can see that today an international bloc of the
enemies of peace and detente is being formed. Along with
the military-industrial complex, imperialist reaction,
fascists and colonialists, it includes the Maoist leadership of China. 109

The role of the People's Republic of China in relation to the

Soviet perception of and motives within detente is subject to debate.
At any rate, there is evidence to suggest that Soviet concerns with the

C.P.R. provided

of detente.
that

a

a

major stimulus for the pursuit of the latest variation

As mentioned above the Soviet Union may well

have feared

U.S. -China detente would virtually isolate the Soviet Union from

the world's other major superpowers.

As stated by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
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the Soviet Union developed an "obsession"
with China which:

...led to an urgent need or an urgently
felt need both to
tranquilize the European front and to block
any consolidation
of a Chinese-American connection directed
against the Soviet
Union.
The Russians doubtless anticipated
that after the
cultural revolution China for its part would
be equally determined to block any Soviet-American relationship
directed
against itself, and that the Chinese would try
to break out
of diplomatic isolation. HO

Similarly, Hans
is

J.

Morgenthau has noted that the China question

the most important of the three basic reasons that
prompted the Soviet

Union to pursue

a

detente with the United States:

First, they are engaged in a struggle with China which
both sides take with extreme seriousness .. .This being the
case, no country can afford a two-front confrontation, let
alone a two-front war.
In the measure that the relations
between the Soviet Union and China become aggravated, the
Soviet Union has a vital interest in mitigating the tensions
with the West.
Here is the first reason for detente. TH

George Schwab has also noted that ever since China "emerged as

a

troublesome neighbor and one whose nuclear arsenals and delivery systems
are growing and improving, Moscow has been forced for tactical reasons
to open more channels of communication with the West."

112

The reason for

these expanded communications, of course, is to preclude the possibility
"of a military invasion of the Warsaw pact countries, including perhaps

the European part of Russia, at
a

a

moment when Moscow may find itself in

military confrontation with Peking."

113

In a traditional military sense, there would seem to be ample

evidence to support the argument that the U.S.S.R. wanted to avoid

two-front confrontation.

a

Large-scale border clashes between Soviet and

Chinese troops had been reported for some time and the war of polemics
between Moscow and Peking was continuing.

Thus, it would seem plausible

that the Soviet Union would be concerned with reducing tensions on its

Western border so as to avoid being trapped in an East-West crunch
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should the Chinese decide to open
full-scale hostilities.
The C.P.R., however, presents the
Soviet Union with an equally

important problem in regard to the
pursuit of Soviet objectives
within
the framework of detente.
It will be argued

below that the Soviet Union

has maintained the goal of the worldwide
victory of socialism as an

integral part of its detente strategy.

It will

also be reasoned that

the U.S.S.R. hopes to achieve this final
goal through the use of the

strategic objective of continuing the growth
of the alignment of world
forces in favor of socialism.
will

use, as will

The specific strategy that the Soviets

be demonstrated,

is

the alignment of "third world"

or developing nations into the socialist camp,
through the anti-imperialist

pro-socialist national liberation movement.

It is

here that the Soviet

Union must be concerned with the C.P.R. and its revolutionary
activities.
In the first

place, the Chinese appear to be no less bellicose than the

Soviet Union in regard to the primacy of the goal of the ultimate victory
of socialism.

Secondly, the U.S.S.R. has long been forced to compete

with China for influence in the developing nations and in some Asian
nations under communist party control.

Finally, in the wake of the

1972 U.S. -China rapprochement, it has become clear that the C.P.R. has

been intent on branding the Soviet version of revolutionary support as

being militaristic in nature and of serving the cause of Soviet national

interests, specifically in the form of military expansion.
Thus, it would seem incumbent upon the Soviet Union to preclude

any damaging U.S. -China detente and to engage in

detente so as to avoid

a

a

meaningful U.S. -Soviet

two- front military confrontation.

It would also

appear to be of necessity for the Soviet Union to isolate the C.P.R.
from the revolutionary movement in the "third world" and to denounce the

5
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Chinese as "counter-revolutionaries"
and "reactionaries."
keynote address at the 24th C.P.S.U.
Congress

acclaimed as the Program of Peace

-

(a

Thus, in his

report that was later

see above) Brezhnev asserted
that:

About our relations with the Chinese
People's Republic
The Chinese eaders, as is known,
have put forth the?r own
special Ideological-political platform
which is i coLat ble
,
^^"^^"^"^ °^ internationar
'
life
''rr''''''''
life .nd'Jhf
and the world
Communist movement and have demanded
that
we renounce the line of the 20th Congress
and the C P S U
Program
They launched intensive hostile
propaganda against
ourpartyand country, made territorial claims
against the
Soviet Union, and even brought things to
the point of armed
border incioents in the spring and summer
of 1969.114
Brezhnev has claimed that the Soviet Union has
firmly opposed
the Chinese attempts to "distort the teaching of
Marxism-Leninism, to

split the international Communist movement and the ranks
of the fighters

against imperialism." 1

1

Consequently, Brezhnev has been stern in his

rebuff of any anti-Soviet propaganda presented by the Peking regime:
...we, of course, cannot fail to see that the anti -Soviet
line in China's propaganda and policy is continuing and that
the Ninth C.P.C. Congress firmly established this hostile
course toward the Soviet Union in its decisions.
What can be said in this connection?
We resolutely reject the slanderous fabrications concerning the policy of our party and state that are being
disseminated from Peking and instilled in the Chinese
people. 116

This evidence would suggest that the Soviet Union is quite concerned

with the C.P.R., and that this concern

is

expressed most vividly in the

area of Soviet-Chinese competition in the revolutionary movement in the

developing nations.

Thus, while rejecting Chinese polemical attacks

against the Soviet Union, Brezhnev outlined this competition in the form
of anti-Chinese attacks:
In the period under review, attempts from various sides
to attack Marxism-Leninism as the ideological and theoretical

basis for the activity of the Communist movement became very
The Chinese leadership shifted to the creation in a
acute.

9
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number of countries of schismatic
grouoinas nnHpr th.
board of so-called ''Marxist-LeninisrPar?iL "
nh
T^"'
seeking somehow to unite them
'
as'^'oun
^ igh fiJTh
""^'ani
to
tne
international Communist moveraent.il 7
•

That

policy line did not diminish
during the actual impl ementation Of the Peace Program is
evidenced by remarks made by
Brezhnev
during his keynote address at the
thi-s

25th C.P.S.U. Congress.

Here, Brezhnev

claimed that:
Relations with China are. of course, a
special and separate
question.
The po icy of its present leaders
is open y dire Jed
against most of the socialist states.
More than ?hat!
l?nes
up exactly with the positions of the
world's most ext;eme
reactionaries - from militarists and enemies
of detente in the
We tern countries to the racists of
South Africa and the facist
rulers of Chile.
This policy is not only completely
alien
to socialist principles and ideals, in
effect it has become an
important reserve for imperialism in its struggle
against
^
socialism. MS

U

In regard to the possibility of an
anti-Soviet coalition during

the Brezhnev era, the C.P.R.

has therefore, played

increasing the possibility of such.
Lenin saw.

Lenin felt that an imperialist, and certainly not an imperialista

very definite possi-

Brezhnev, however, must be concerned that an imperialist-Maoist

anti-Soviet coalition is

a

potential reality.

Brezhnev, apparently aware that
in

central role in

This is quite different from what

socialist, coalition against the Soviet Union was
bility.

a

Peking is careful to assert that

adversely affect the Chinese.

a

a

similar fear may be realized

U.S. -Soviet detente will

not

In Brezhnev's words:

To all who are aware, if only slightly, of the actual
course of events, of the nature of the development of SovietAmerican relations, it is absolutely clear that the improvement of Soviet-American relations is in no way detrimental
1
to the interests of any third countries
In addition, Brezhnev has also stated that:

It is often said that the idea of creating and ensuring
security in Asia by collective effort is directed against
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'''''^''^^
"surrounding"
contentions are either the
product^of morbid suspicion or a reluctance
to face the

or
isolating
o?'"1soUt?ni"'chinr'"R't'Jh
China.
But these

Again, the main fear that the Soviet
Union expresses in

a

military sense is that the West, hopelessly
frustrated by Soviet and
Soviet-inspired successes, may react in an
aggressive manner.

Brezhnev

has often claimed that detente has
"inspired and strengthened the forces

of peace and progress and heightened their
prestige and influence among

the masses."

121

Yet, as Brezhnev is also quick to point
out:

But it has also alerted and activated the
forces of
reaction and militarism, those who would like to drag
Europe and the whole world back to the time of the
cold war
of teetering on the brink of nuclear catastrophe.
It has
alarmed those who are growing rich on the production of
tools of death and destruction, who cannot conceive of any
political career other than whipping up "crusades" against
the socialist countries, against the Communists .. .122

The Soviet Union is also quite aware that this reaction is

directed mainly at the U.S.S.R. itself.

As Brezhnev has claimed:

...imperialism's aggressive forces and their yes-men
are again putting out the hackneyed myth about the notorious "Soviet menace," which allegedly looms over the
Western countries. Absurd assertions grossly distorting
the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist states
are persistently disseminated - by the mass information
media and frequently by figures holding prominent positions.
To summarize, it can be stated that the Leninist fear of an

anti-Soviet coalition has been changed, but certainly not eliminated,
the thermonuclear world of the 1970's.

in

Yet, while the specific details

of this phobia have been altered, the logic in this variable of Lenin's

detente remains unchanged.

Lenin had argued that the greater the threat

posed by the Soviet state, the greater would be the potential for the

West to jointly crush the menace that threatened it.

reasoned in

a

similar fashion.

Brezhnev has

The greater the threat posed by the U.S.S.R.
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in regard

to the world balance of power,
Soviet military might, and

dissemination of socialism, the greater would
be the risk of

reckless

a

anti-Soviet thrust by the United States (in
conjunction with its allies
and perhaps, the People's Republic of China).

both cases detente

In

has been utilized by the Soviet Union as
a means to forestall such

reactions by the West.

Lenin used detente as

means to convince the

a

West that coexistence with, and not the elimination
of, the Soviet state

would be in its own best interests.

Similarly, Brezhnev through the

selling of the Peace Program has shown the West in general,
and the
United States in particular, that detente with the Soviet Union

is the

only feasible alternative open to them.

Detente as

a

means for securing Western economic assistance

.

One of the

major strategic objectives of the Leninist detente was the acquisition of

much needed Western assistance in the reconstruction of the devastated
Soviet economy.

With the ravages of World War

came the stark reality

I

that the Soviet industrial, agricultural, and overall economic base

could not be restored without foreign support.

As outlined above,

Lenin knew all too well that such support could best be provided by the

imperialists, and most notably by the United States.
A number of aspects of Soviet-American relations have changed

since 1917, and the Soviet Union has made impressive gains in many areas
during that timespan.

Yet, in the realm of economic relations, the

Soviet Union under Brezhnev, has found itself in

situation where

a

its relations with the capitalist world have not changed since Lenin's

time.

True, the Soviet Union did not suffer from

economy from

1

972-1976.

a

war-torn ravaged

At the same time however, the U.S.S.R. was, as

always, plagued with pressing problems in both its industrial and
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agricultural sectors.

In fact,

it can be stated that
one of the

common strands of U.S. -Soviet relations
from their very inception
is
the Soviet need for Western, and
particularly American, economic

assistance in helping to correct Soviet
economic deficiencies.
The reliance on American trade and
expanded economic contacts

with the United States represents
aspects.

one of detente

's

more controversial

The infusion of scientific, technological,
and economic

expertise from the United States has also afforded
the opponents of
detente

a

logical and formidable argument.

Both Lenin and Brezhnev

have outwardly claimed that the final victory
of the forces of socialism
and the ultimate defeat of the capitalist
system are their main objec-

tives.

At the same time they both asserted that American
economic

assistance is

a

necessary prerequisite for achieving that goal.

Reduced to its simplest form the logic employed by Brezhnev, as

defined in detente, reads as follows.

The Soviet Union has achieved

strategic parity with the United States and uses such as
for its relations with the West.
the U.S.S.R.

a

major pillar

To achieve and maintain that parity,

has drained much of its economic resources, thus post-

poning the construction of

domestic concerns.

a

"new society" and creating

a

host of

In order to reduce the burden placed on its economy

the Soviet Union must achieve

a

Soviet-American arms reduction accord,

and, simultaneously engage the assistance of the United States in

solving its economic problems.
It was pointed out above that Brezhnev's economy was not suited

for an intense level of military, scientific-technological, and economic

competition with the United States.

Brezhnev was compelled to reduce

the tenacity of this competition by offering a peaceful and cooperative
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posture to the United States.

It was also shown
that Brezhnev would

like nothing better than to
re-channel part of his
military-defense

allocations to more "constructive"
domestic areas.
require

Yet, to do so would

concrete arms limitation agreement
with the United States,
and negotiations on that front
are more
a

often than not at an impasse.

It was

also mentioned that the sustainment
of strategic parity and

the matching of the United States in
both qualitative and quantitative

military improvements
a

is

of paramount urgency for the
U.S.S.R.

Hence,

logical option for Brezhnev is to employ
the strategy of detente that

on one hand necessitates massive military
spending with which to threaten

and contain the United States, and on the
other calls for American

support to buttress the Soviet economy so that
the military threat can
be sustained and domestic discontent quieted.

The Soviet Union has made no attempt to conceal
the fact that

economic relations with the West form an integral part
of the detente
formula.

Brezhnev has often pointed out that "economic and scientific-

technical ties with the capitalist states are consolidating and

broadening the material base of the policy of peaceful coexistence. "^^^
Furthermore, Brezhnev has cited the fact that the Soviet Union sees
"foreign economic relations as an effective means facilitating the

accomplishment of both political and economic tasks. "^^^
The subject of Soviet-American trade and economic relations in

general between the two countries are subjects too broad in scope to

cover in

a

comprehensive fashion here.

The Soviet line of reasoning

however, as sketched above, is capable of being summarized in

concise manner.
a

a

fairly

The belief in Moscow is that the "Soviet Union attaches

great importance to the expansion of foreign trade, including trade

with the U.S.A.." and that
such relations
^ations "arp
are h».„
becoming a more and
more
promising reserve for increasing
the economic
effectiveness of the
..l^^
U.S.S.R..S national economy.
..
The U.S.S.R. Minister
of Foreign
Trade, Patolichev in analyzing
Soviet trade «ith the
West, summarized
those relations as follows-
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them
Thus, foreign economic ties
offer a more efficW
solution to a number of problems
arising ?n The cour^se
course or
^
economic construction 127
.

Brezhnev, in addressing an American
audience, can show the scope
of the Soviet-American economic
relations that he would hope to
see.

In

the words of Brezhnev:
...Now, I think we all agree that it
isn't sufficient
merely to overcome the anomaly, generated
by the "cold war
of the complete freezing of Soviet-American
trade.
Today
life faces us with much bigger
questions.
I
have in mind,
nrst of all, such forms of economic relations
as stable,
large-scale ties in a number of economic branches,
and
long-term scientific and technological
co-operation,
something that in our age is of great importance 1 28

"
'

.

Brezhnev can also show that while the expansion
of economic

cooperation is very important, it cannot be based on
ideological relaxation or "liberalization."

As stated by Brezhnev:

An important factor in consolidating the positive
political changes in the international arena and in
creating a material basis for a lasting peace is the allround development of economic and scientific-technical links.
It meets the interests of all states and all peoples.
However, there are circles in the West that hope to obtain from
us, in exchange for such links, political and ideological
concessions.
That is a futile undertaking. 129
In discussing the importance of expanding Soviet-American trade,

Brezhnev has claimed that the future successes of detente are, in many
ways, dependent on the success achieved in this area.

Thus, in his speech

at the Second Moscow Session of
the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Trade and Economic
Council, Brezhnev stated:

^t^;Lr^oS^ron!-:r?r„:?er;:.^^re^:^r^d^.^cr^rL:?:t
American peaceful co-operation and
good-neighbor iness niuch
'
^^^^TP^^^^^d throu h joint'eff
'l9
?97?and'lQ7.''%"
and 1974 stands the risk of being
1 973
weakened. 130
In

describing the policy of detente the
Soviet Union

is

careful

to point out that it is a continuation
of the policy established by

Lenin and that there is

a

perfect continuity from Lenin's Decree
on

Peace to Brezhnev's Peace Program.

In the field of

Soviet-American

economic relations the U.S.S.R. is fairly accurate
on this account.

Contemporary Soviet spokesmen assert that:
The Soviet Union's principled attitude toward the
use
of external markets, including the U.S. market, for
the
needs of socialist construction was defined by V.I. Lenin
Back in October, 1919, Lenin said:
"We are decidedly in
favor of an economic understanding with America - with all
countries, but especially with America. "131

The U.S.S.R. can conclude this reasoning with claims that are

quite reminiscent of those made by Lenin.

Soviet spokesmen assert that

this cooperation with the United States "will make it possible for the

Soviet Union to enlist additional material and financial resources in

accelerating the pace of socialist construction; this will not only
satisfy the country's growing domestic requirements but will also pay
for American participation in this construction."

1

"^P

By its own admission therefore, the Soviet Union is seeking

American aid in the socialist construction of the Soviet Union, which
would further heighten the demise of the United States.

The payment

for this would be "mutually advantageous" agreements that would be
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profitable fo. American business
enterprises.

Hence, b. exploiti
both the naivite' and g.eed
of the United
States, the Soviet
Union
would hope to reap tremendous
benefits.
in summary,

it can be stated
that no significant
changes have

manifested themselves in this
area frc. Lenin to
Brezhnev.
Lenin and
Brezhnev both recognized the
necessity of utilizing
American economic
assistance and both added this
to their respective
detente formulas.

world.

Lenin realized full well that
in order to postpone any
potential
anti-Soviet coalition among the
imperialists he would need to
exploit
the antagonisms and contradictions
that existed among them.
By allowing
the capitalists to fight among
themselves, Lenin reasoned that
an

alliance aimed at crushing the Soviet
state would be an impossibility.
Hence, it was necessary for Lenin
to continually point out the
intense

conflict of interests and contradictory
needs of the West, and wherever
possible, to incite feuds and conflicts
among his enemies.
It can be demonstrated that it is
equally important for the

Soviet Union under Brezhnev to highlight and
exploit any fissures that
it may find in the capitalist-imperialist
structure.

It will

be argued

below that Brezhnev finds the necessity of utilizing
discord within the
West because of his realization that an effective economic
and political

coalition aimed at thwarting the goals of the U.S.S.R. would pose
serious problem.

a

very

A complete return to the cold war by the entire West,

under the leadership of the United States, in the Soviet view, would do

irreparable damage to the objectives, both foreign and domestic, that
the Soviet Union has set for itself.

Thus, it is quite imperative for

Brezhnev to show the lack of unity among America's allies, and to claim

that their internal contradictions
and conflicting interests
are
greater than the threat posed by the
Soviet Union. As noted above,
the
U.S.S.R. is still concerned that a
coalition of "anti-Soviet
aggressors
may be attempted by the West, or the
West and China.
The West, under
the onslaught of the advances of
socialism, will continually attempt
to create such an alliance, as Brezhnev
has often claimed:

Incidentally, our common class enemy, the
international
bourgeoisie, shows a good many examples
of the international
coordination of its own actions in the struggle
against
revolutionary forces. Wherever the exploiter
system is in
jeopardy, wherever the forces of national and
social liberation and democratic forces gain the upper
hand in the struggle
imperialism is making feverish attempts to coordinate
i^s
counter-attacks - there are a good many examples
of this in
our days, in Europe, in Africa and in other
places. 133
It is

incumbent upon the Soviet Union therefore, to preclude

any successful coordination of this nature to the point
that it will

serve as

a

U.S.S.R.

has intensified its progaganda efforts aimed at publicizing

deterrent to Soviet actions.

In an attempt to do so the

the growing discord among the nations of the West.

Thus, Brezhnev can

repeatedly claim that "inter-imperialist rivalries and discord within
the Common Market and within NATO have intensified," and that "the

growing power of the international monopolies have made the competitive
struggle still more ruthless."

1

34

This competition, in the Soviet view

then manifests itself in new areas of contradictions and antagonisms

among the imperialists.

As summarized by Brezhnev:

The capitalist countries' governments are making one
attempt after another to smooth out the contradictions and
to reach accords on joint measures to overcome the crises.
But the nature of imperialism is such that each country
strives to obtain advantages at the expense of the others,
Differences come to light in new
to impose its own will.
forms, contradictions flare up with new force. 135
The Soviet Union has gone to great lengths to show the nations
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Of the West that these contradictions
exist and are intensifying.

In

particular, the U.S.S.R. has highlighted
what it sees as an intensification of the discord existing between
the United States and
its

allies in Europe.

Soviet spokesmen have claimed,
for example, that "the

situation in the Middle East has clearly
shown the sharp intensification
of differences between the United
"^^^
States
and its European allies.

Here, the U.S.S.R. can cite the fact
that:

...American circles have been accusing their
NATO
partners of "leaving the U.S.A. in isolation,"..
Western
Europe, for its part, is rebuking the U.S.A.
for acting
without advance consultation with its allies
for rendeHnq
support - above all military support - to Israel
even
while using other countries' territories for
the shipment
of arms
.

i

The Soviet Union has also taken advantage of the
energy crises
in the West to show that the antagonisms within
imperialism are

intensifying.

Thus, the U.S.S.R. can claim that the energy problem
has

demonstrated the "American 'monopoly circles' attempt to exploit the
current fuel shortage in Europe for the defense of their economic and
political positions there. "^^^
Much of what the Soviet Union sees as fertile ground for sowing

discord among the nations of the West

is a result of

specific economic

crises that plagued the capitalist system during this period of detente.
The energy crisis and fuel shortage problem was touched upon in regard
to Europe's antagonisms with the United States.

However, from the

Soviet perspective, this is but one of many specific contradictions and
crises that are confronting the United States.

The Soviet Union has

let it be known that the crises within the United States itself are of

great concern to the West and highlight anew the inherent contradictions

of the capitalist-imperialist system.

It has been noted that these
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conflicts have "emerged with special
force" not only in the
realm of
"serious foreign policy difficulties"
but also in the area of
"inflation
and unemployment, the balance of
payment deficits, the undermining
of
the position of the dollar and the
difficulties in the world market. "^39

These acute difficulties then, in the
words of Arbatov, translate
into
severe social problems, including:
...the problem of poverty in the richest
capitalist
country, the problem of the black population
of America
which is subjected to especially cruel
oppression, the
crises and decay of the big cities, the
monstrous crime
rate, the decline in morals, the growing
hostility of
the younger generation to traditional bourgeois
"values,"
and finally, the economic problems engendered
by a predatory
attitude toward nature. '^^
'

Brezhnev can then paint
is

void of human rights.

...nearly

a

picture of

a

capitalist society that

As stated by Brezhnev:

hundred million people are at present unemployed
Many capitalist states violate
the rights of national minorities and foreign workers, and the
right of women to equal pay for equal work. This is probably
why many Western powers have not yet subscribed to international covenants establishing the social and political rights
of man. 141
a

in the nonsocialist countries.

These internal contradictions are then translated into antagonisms

within the imperialist camp as

a

whole.

Brezhnev has stated that "perhaps

never before in recent decades have the crises of bourgeois democracy
and the progressive internal decay of the political machinery of capitalist

rule been so obvious."

1

42

Then, as Brezhnev states, "in conditions of

these crisis phenomena, which are inevitable and stem from the very

nature of capitalism, an increasing aggravation of the economic and
political contradictions among various capitalist states and their

groupings is taking place..."
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Regardless of the causes, the Soviet Union has pointed out

a

number of different crises, contradictions, and tensions that exist within

.
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the capitalist world, which the
U.S.S.R.

is

quite willing to exploit.

"The processes of international detente
and the bankruptcy of
the antiSoviet, anticommunist 'cold war' myths"
it is claimed, "are
facilitating

the development of crisis phenomena in
the military-political blocs
and

groupings created by the imperialists, which
are directed against the

national-liberation movement
globe and paint

a

.

"^

Soviet spokesmen can then scan the

glowing picture of conflicts among the
alliances formed

by the capitalist-imperialist world:

Already there is sufficient reason to talk about
the
decline of SEATO...
Fissures have also appeared in the edifice of
another
pro-imperialist grouping - the Asian and Pacific Council
(ASPAC)
These are difficult days for CENTO, although recently
imperialist circles have been making intensive efforts
aimed at enlivening this organization...
The Organization of American States (O.A.S.) is going
through a profound crisis ... 1 45
.

.

It was
a

mentioned earlier that the Soviet Union could not sustain

lengthy and intensified economic and military competition with the

United States and still hope to achieve any measure of success in either
the foreign or domestic realm.

could not endure such
of time.

a

It can also be reasoned that the U.S.S.R.

posture with the entire West for

a

long period

Hence, detente has been sold individually by Brezhnev to

number of Western nations.

Should the United States withdraw from

a

a

strong detente posture with the U.S.S.R., the Soviets reason that the

economic and political advantages with America's allies could still

accrue to the Soviet Union.

Thus, Brezhnev, in analyzing the harm done

by anti-detente forces, can claim that:

They managed to prevent the U.S. government from honoring
its promise to end discrimination against the Soviet Union in
As a result the Soviet Union
the fields of trade and credit.
turned to other markets; its trade with other Western

.
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countries grew appreciably, while
U.S. foreian
damage that could easily have been
avoided 1?6

tr;^Hp cu-f^...^
^^"'"^

To briefly look ahead, beyond the
period of 1972 to 1976, it
can
be shown that detente has reaped
some benefits in this area
for the

Soviet Union.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
drew sharp criticism

from the Carter Administration, while
calls for an end to detente,

economic boycotts, and non-participation
in the Olympic Games were
made
by American spokesmen.

Yet,

in the face of American requests
for

a

unified anti-Soviet posture among its allies,
many Western governments
found it unwise to strongly denounce the
U.S.S.R. and to participate in

any joint anti-Soviet activity whether it be
economic, political, or

athletic
Thus, the "divide and conquer" syndrome employed
by Lenin,

although changed by virtue of the means by which to conquer,
has persisted as

variable in the detente formula of Brezhnev.

a

Lenin hoped

to exploit inter-capitalist rivalries as a means to postpone
an

onslaught against the Soviet state by the imperialists.

Brezhnev, it

can be argued, has hoped to exploit these differences as

a

solidifying detente and for precluding

a

means for

total relapse into the costly

Cold War years.

Detente as

a

means for achieving the final victory of socialism

.

The

single most important factor in the formulation of detente by Lenin was
the fulfillment of his most sacred duty; the achievement of the world-

wide victory of socialism and the concomitant final and total defeat
of the capitalist-imperialist system.

Lenin had told us that the two

opposing systems could not survive together for

a

long period of time,

that in the end one or the other must triumph by destroying the

.
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antithetical system.

The realization of this
triumph, for which

detente was created, remained, in this
writer's view, as the primary
motivating force for Lenin throughout
his lifetime.

While many of Lenin's eight detente
components have been altered
over the years, the goal of worldwide
communist domination has not
changed.

The timing and the means of realizing
that objective may

have been revised, but the objective
itself, the final victory of

socialism and the complete collapse of
capitalism-imperialism, has not
been modified.
us

Moreover, Brezhnev and other Soviet
spokesmen have told

that recent events have manifested the
irreversible nature of the

march to

a

worldwide socialist victory.

The U.S.S.R.

is

quite confident

that the benefits of detente, the growing might
of world socialism,
and the decay of the capitalist system are realistic,
objective criteria

that clearly demonstrate the favorable position of the
Soviet Union in

regard to achieving its ultimate goal.

Hence, Brezhnev can claim that:

...the Soviet Union's international position has never
been stronger.
The security of the Soviet people is more
reliably ensured than ever before. Our people are working
under the banner of peace and are carrying on the struggle
for peace in the cause of the emancipation of labor. 14/

Suslov has also made it clear that the final victory of socialism
is

the ultimate goal of world communists.

In Suslov's words:

In struggling for democracy and the satisfaction of the
working peoples' economic and social demands, the Communists
never forget about the ultimate goals of their struggle - the
elimination of capitalism and the establishment of a new, just
socialist system. The ideas and policies of reformism and the
theories of class cooperation with the exploiters have always
been rejected and continue to be rejected by the Communists

Many of the eight detente variables analyzed here also point to
a

picture of confidence for the U.S.S.R. in regard to the final victory

of socialism.

In the first place, the Soviet Union is no longer an

:
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oasis of socialism in

a

world dominated by the forces
of imperialism.

The alignment of world forces in favor
of socialism, the consolidation
of power by the socialist commonwealth,
and the successes of communist

parties in the capitalist world have all made
the world of imperialism,
and not socialism, the minority system in
the East-West balance of

power.

The Soviets also feel that the achievement
of strategic parity

and overall military equality have made the
Soviet Union, and thereby

the entire socialist world,

a

formidable adversary to the West.

It has

also afforded the Soviet Union an unprecedented opportunity
to further
shift the balance of power to the socialist side.

Finally, the crises

and antagonisms in imperialism have, in the Soviet view,
done much to

further hasten the demise of that system, and make socialism

attractive and realistic alternative.

a

far more

Brezhnev has often repeated his

belief that the Soviet Union is watching over the unstoppable march of

socialism and the simultaneous decline of capitalism.

In Brezhnev's words:

The ideological political crisis of bourgeois society
It af fleets the institutions of power
and the bourgeois political parties and shatters elementary
moral norms.
Corruption is becoming more and more open,
even in the highest levels of the state machinery.
The
decline of spiritual culture is continuing, and crime is
on the increase.
is intensifying.

The crises of capitalism, in conjunction with the further spread
and strengthening of socialism, is seen by the Soviets as

a

realistic

gauge for measuring the success of the ultimate communist goal.

However,

this goal, while attainable, is still subject to the terms of the new

detente, i.e.,
of

a

a

gradual victory over capitalism within the parameters

"peaceful" erosion of the capitalist system.

Brezhnev

In the words of
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The Communists are by no means
predictinq the "a.itn
matic collapse-' of capitalism.
It stilf a
considerable
reserves.
However, events of recent years
confirm
wUh
new force that capitalism is a
societ^ withou?

aTtire.^^O

In the

Soviet view the United States has
pursued goals and

objectives that, while anti-socialist in
nature, lack any long-term
philosophical objectives and are concerned
with more limited imperialist
goals.

The U.S.S.R. claims that "an important
feature of Soviet

foreign policy is that it organically ties
up the burning issues of the
day with long-term problems and main goals"
which, it is stated, "makes
it possible to overcome the narrow bounds
inherent in the policy of

the capitalist countries,

a

policy which so often is being guided by

purely pragmatic considerations

.

"^

From the Soviet Union's perspective,

the goals of Soviet foreign policy do not lack

such limited objectives,

but are guided by the desire to achieve the ultimate long-term
victory.

Thus, the Soviets can claim that:
...As to its consequences, the implementation of our
foreign policy programme designed for a long historical
period will be tantamount to a major victory of the forces
of peace over the forces of aggression and war.
It will
also radically alter the entire structure of international
relations.
It is only natural that such an aim can be
achieved only through struggle for a stage-by-stage implementation of the corresponding tasks and only by overcoming
the stubborn resistance put up by the aggressive imperialist
circles interested in preserving and fanning the hotbeds of
tension .and conclict, and in maintaining the atmosphere of a
war danger. 152

Brezhnev has often claimed that the objectives of Soviet foreign

policy are not determined by any short-term or temporary concerns.

Thus,

Brezhnev can refer to the "consistent and unchanging course of the Soviet
Union in foreign policy,

a

course for the peaceful coexistence and

co-operation of states, irrespective of differences between their social
and political systems, a course for detente,

a

course that is unaffected
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by momentary considerations of
expediency. -^^S

Brezhnev has also claimed

that:
For us Soviet people the active
struggle for peace is
not atenporary task dictated by
the moment.
It is our
principled deliberate, and consistent
policy, which we
pursue in fraternal unity with all the
countr
i-r it^i.
es or
of ine
the
socialist community.
With great insight into the future of
social development Marx wrote that when the working
class builds its own
socialist, society, its "international
rule will be Peace
national ruler will be everywhere the
saiF^^'
Labor
.

'

The ultimate objective of detente for
Brezhnev is therefore,

identical to that of Lenin.

Lenin may have been more impatient than

Brezhnev, and may have wanted detente to afford
him the time by which to

prepare himself for the destruction of capitalism.

Yet, Brezhnev, while

delaying the attainment of this goal, and eliminating

a

total war as a

means for success in this endeavor, has not lost sight of this
most basic
and all-encompassing objective.

Thus, Brezhnev can assert that:

We shall continue to wage a vigorous struggle for
international detente, for the elimination of hotbeds of
war danger, for an end to the arms race. We shall continue
to administer a resolute rebuff to those forces that want to
reverse world development. We are convinced that our rightful
cause of the struggle for peace and social progress will
triumph. 55
"1

The Limitations of Detente

The evidence cited to this point would suggest that the policy
of detente as defined by Brezhnev has the final victory of socialism as
its main objective.

Yet, as Brezhnev has pointed out, the attainment

of this goal will not be realized immediately as the forces of imperialism
will not quietly lay down their arms, modify their inherent aggressive

nature, or willingly accept the demise of their system in the face of
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the inalterable victorious march
of socialism.

Thus, as Soviet
spokesmen have repeatedly pointed
out, an intense struggle
with the
West, and in particular with the
United States, is an inherent
character-

istic of detente.

Brezhnev has stated in this
regard that, despite -the

successes in relaxing international
tensions,
the enemies of peace, national and
social

a

hard struggle against

liberation faces us."^^^

The

form that this struggle will take will
be, as Soviet spokesman claim,
in the field of economics, science,
and the military.

More importantly,

this struggle will be increased in the
realm of ideas, in an acute

intensification of the ideological warfare between
capitalism and socialism.
"It must be stressed absolutely clearly,"
the Soviets tell us "that

the improvements of relations between the
Soviet Union and the United

States in no way means an easing of the ideological
"^^^
struggle.

Rather than signalling an end to the ideological
confrontation between
East and West, detente will ensure that this struggle will
become more

intense and acute.

ready for

a

As the Soviets have claimed,

"it is necessary to be

situation in which the weaker the positions of aggressive

militarist circles, the greater the extent to which the ideological
struggle will intensify and become an increasingly acute form of confrontation between the two social systems. "^^^
prepared for

a

Hence, the Soviet Union has

fairly lengthy and fierce struggle with the United States,

as outlined in the strategy of detente.

As noted by Soviet commentators,

"Marxist-Leninists have consistently associated peaceful coexistence
with the prospect of further deepening and extending the inevitable

development of the world revolutionary process."

159

By so doing, the

Soviet Union, in the face of American opposition to this process, regards
"peaceful coexistence as

a

form of confrontation between the two social

systems."

160

will involve

Brezhnev has noted on
a

a

number of occasions that
detente

hard struggle on the part of the
"forces of peace."

Hence, in addressing the World Congress
of Peace Forces, Brezhnev
can
claim:
...But I would like to stress most
emphatically that
neither peace nor detente will descend
on the world in a
manner of some divine blessing.
Peace and detente can only
be the result of persistent and
tireless struggle by all
peace forces - the states, political parties
and tendencies,
public bodies and individuals - against
everything resisting
detente, imperiling peace, and creating the
danger of war. 161

Brezhnev has also claimed that this struggle will
not be an easy
one.

In Brezhnev's words:

The struggle for the triumph of reason in international
relations can hardly be an easy one.
Every gain on the road
to lasting peace comes about through struggle, through
fierce
clashes with the most reactionary circles of imperialism and
their accompl ices .1 62
If the Soviet Union is to engage in this kind of confrontation

with the United States, and if the Soviet-designed detente policy is
the catalyst for this struggle, then it is logical for the U.S.S.R. to

establish the "rules of the game" that will govern this conflict.

The

Soviet Union has, in fact, codified the rules governing detente, and has

established clear limitations on what it sees
through this policy.

To do so the U.S.S.R.

as

permissible action

has employed the one-sided

perspective of Marxist-Leninist ideology and has arrived at conclusions
that can be seen as
is

quite simple.

a

product of that ideology.

The Soviet logic here

The Soviet Union is the champion of peace, friendship,

social progress, democracy, freedom, etc.

The United States, on the

other hand, is the promoter of war, aggression, exploitation of the

masses, oppression, and the denial of freedom and national liberation,
among others.

The goals of detente are the elimination of war, aggression.
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exploitation, and national oppression, and
the promotion of peace,
social progress, and national liberation.

Hence, by definition Soviet

activities are adjudged as being consistent
with the cause of detente,

while American actions are quite obviously
inappropriate if they are
at odds with the objectives of the U.S.S.R.

Detente, from the Soviet view

therefore, establishes unilateral

restraints on the United States, while affording
the Soviet Union freedom
in pursuing actions that it assesses as being
consistent with the cause

of worldwide socialist gains.

In analyzing the third Nixon-Brezhnev

summit meeting held in Moscow, the U.S.S.R., immediately
following the
U.S.

president's departure, noted that the policy of detente,

as defined

in the summit reinforced the Soviet quest to:

rebuff the intrigues of aggressive imperialist forces,
to strengthen the socialist commonwealth, to ensure further
growth in the U.S.S.R. 's economic and political might and
an increase in the Soviet peoples' well-being, and to
facilitate in every way the safeguarding of lasting peace
on earth and the social progress of the peoples. 163
The Soviet Union has applied these unilateral restrictions on

American foreign policy in many areas of Soviet-American relations.
Yet, it can be reasoned that it is in the realm of the national liber-

ation struggle that the obvious nature of these limitations becomes

most visible.

The U.S.S.R. has shown that the national liberation

struggle, and the Soviet support in any fashion for this struggle
legitimate.

While detente

is

is

quite

characterized by an absence of war and the

existence of relaxation of tensions, it does not pertain to Western
relations with the developing countries.

As the Soviets have pointed out:

...there can be no peaceful coexistence between the
oppressed and the oppressors, between the exploiters and
the exploited, between the imperialist states and their
There can be no peaceful coexistence in the
colonies.
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context of the internal processes
of the cla.. .nH
national liberation struggle in
.
the caoit^
capitalist countries
and their colonies J 64
•

Thus, the United States is told
that the restraints
imposed
upon it by detente eliminate the
potential for suppressing
the national
liberation movement in any of the
developing nations. More
importantly,
the Soviet Union is allowed to
render any kind of support,
including

military, to strengthen revolutionary
forces which are striving to
assert national independence. As noted
above, relaxation of tensions.
peace, and friendship, the cornerstones
of detente, do not apply to

relations between the West and the developing
world.

However, as Brezhnev

has often repeated, detente most definitely
applies to Soviet support for

the developing nations.

As stated by Brezhnev:

Moreover, as we have done in past years, we shall
pav
great attention to promoting our relations with the
nationalliberation forces, and with the new states of Asia and
Africa
that, having taken the path of freedom, are now
endeavoring
to consolidate their independence and promote their
economic
and social development. 165
Brezhnev can also claim that:
The entire course of postwar development has proved
convincingly that colonialism and aggression, the policy
of colonial tyranny and the policy of force, are essentially
two sides of the same coin.
There is therefore every justification for the fact that in the very name of your Congress
(World Congress of Peace Forces) the struggle for peace is
associated with the struggle for national liberation. 166
It is not surprising therefore, that the U.S.S.R.

ideological logic to the question of war as

a

can apply this

means of achieving objectives

during an era of detente.

The Soviet Union has consistently argued that

the renunciation of war as

a

means for solving differences in the world is

one of the primary goals of detente.

"The Leninist policy of peaceful

coexistence," we are told "embodies the irrefutable fact that wars as
a

means of achieving political aims are alien to the

verj^

nature of

:

socialisn,."
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"
Vet, in the Soviet view, all
wars are not the sa.e.

The Soviet Union has gone to great
lengths to lecture the
United States
on the subject of wars during the new
detente era, and to show that

Soviet-inspired and/or Soviet supported
wars of national liberation
are
quite legitimate and not contradictory to
the
principles of detente.

The Soviet lexicon therefore, provides
the following definitions of
just
and unjust wars
A war is just if it is a continuation
of a policy of the
defense of revolutionary gains, the freedom and
independence
of peoples and the cause of socialism and
communism
A war
IS unjust and reactionary if it is a
continuation of a policy
aimed at suppressing revolutionary struggle, the
freedom and
independence of one people or another or the socialist
gains
of the working people, or at subjugating a particular
""^^
country.

Brezhnev has claimed that such "unjust wars" take the form
of
local wars.

In Brezhnev's words:

We must not forget that wars will keep breaking out, people
are still being killed, and cities, factories, villages, and
objects of cultural value are being destroyed in various parts
of the world.
These are what politicians have become accustomed
to calling "local wars," that is, wars confined to the relatively narrow boundries of some geographical region. Past
experience shows that, as a rule, in modern conditions, these
break out wherever and whenever the forces of imperialism and
reaction attempt to put down liberation movements, or to
obstruct the free and independent development of states that
have opted for progressive internal development and the antiimperialist line in foreign policy. 169

What the Soviet Union is saying, in this writer's view,

is

that

detente affords the socialist world under the leadership of the U.S.S.R.
a

carte blanche in regard to the conduct of its foreign policy.

An

analysis of the "objective" laws of Marxist-Leninist ideology will show,
as the Soviets claim, that the justifiable nature of the actions pursued

by the country advocating that ideology is true by definition.

At the

same time, the United States is reacting in an aggressive manner to
the further dissemination of the socialist cause, thus rendering its
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foreign policy

a

hostile and inappropriate one.

In this context, the

United States can expect wars of national
liberation to be waged against
it or its supported governments, with the
support of the U.S.S.R.

Yet,

the United States is told that any response
on its part to these wars
are reactionary in nature and will meet with
a firm rebuff by the

Soviet Union.
The U.S.S.R. has therefore, attempted to place
one-sided restraints
on the United States, while pursuing its own
objectives in an unabated

manner.

The Soviet Union, during the latest detente has
provided consider-

able support to the revolutionary causes of the developing nations,

confronted the United States in Angola and the Middle East, and militarily
intervened in Afghanistan.

In all

these areas, among others, the Soviet

Union has expressed shock and dismay at the critical American response.
The Soviet Union has repeatedly asserted that these actions are not only

beyond criticism from the perspective of detente, but are guaranteed

components of that process.

Soviet Objectives Within Detente

The detente of Leonid Brezhnev differs in the areas outlined above

from the detente of Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev by virtue of the means
used to achieve the ultimate objective of detente, the worldwide

victory of socialism.

Lenin, it was shown, argued on the basis of his

revolutionary philosophy that the Soviet Union could not coexist with the
West for

a

long period of time and would therefore wage a life-and-death

struggle with its ideological antithesis in the foreseeable future.
This total, cataclysmic war syndrome, as mentioned above, was revised by

Khrushchev who transformed detente from

a

defensive maneuver to an offensive
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strategy.

Brezhnev, in continuing the
Khrushchev method of utilizing

detente in the mode of

strategic parity and
making it

a

peaceful offensive, added the
factors of

a

less bellicose image to his
foreign policy, thus

a

more acceptable process for the
capitalist-imperialist states.

It has been argued throughout this
dissertation that Brezhnev,

while altering the strategic basis of detente,
has maintained detente
as a policy that serves the cause of the
worldwide victory of socialism.
It remains to be shown how Brezhnev, through
short-term objectives and

strategies, hopes to use detente as

Soviet Union's long-term objectives.

a

tool

for achieving his and the

Stated very simply, it can be argued

that the spectrum of Soviet goals reads as follows:
1.

)

The final objective

-

the complete and final victory of socialism

led by the Soviet Union.
2.

)

Strategic objective

-

the continued growth of the alignment of

world forces in favor of socialism.
3.

)

Specific strategy

-

the alignment of "Third World" or developing

nations into the socialist camp, through the anti-imperialist,

pro-socialist national liberation movement.
These objectives are distinct, in this writer's view from the

specific strategies or means used to achieve them, i.e., placing unilateral

constraints upon the United States, eliminating the need for

a

thermo-

nuclear war, exploiting antagonisms within the Western camp, maintaining

strategic and conventional military parity, precluding an anti-Soviet
alliance, utilizing economic assistance from the United States, etc.
These tactical maneuvers might best be viewed as specific procedures

detailing the general blueprint for action as outlined in the objectives
of the U.S.S.R.
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The final objective of detente
has been dealt with in
some
detail above and need not be repeated
here.

However, the strategic

objective, that of continuing the shift
in the balance of world
forces
to the socialist side, deserves a
careful analysis.

It has been shown

that the alignment of world forces in favor
of socialism is, in the

Soviet view, an accomplished fact.

Indeed, in the Soviet view, the

manifestation of this pro-socialist shift was the
primary motivation
for the West and specifically the United States
to reassess its foreign

policy and to agree to

a

detente with the Soviet Union.

However, the

Soviet Union is obviously not satisfied with maintaining
the balance
of world forces as it now exists, and is clearly intent
upon further

augmenting the ranks of the pro-socialist nations.

The Soviet Union has

repeatedly stressed that detente in no way signifies the preservation
of
the status quo in regard to political or social developments.

As stated

by Arbatov:

...in launching a broad peace offensive and a vigorous
and consistent struggle for detente and for the triumph of
the principles of peaceful coexistence in international
relations, the Soviet Union and the other socialist
countries did not assume, and indeed could not assume, a
commitment to guarantee the social "status quo" in the
world and to halt the processes of class and national
liberation struggle engendered by the objective laws of
historical development. .170
.

In the view of Suslov,

the crises of capitalism have shown that

"the absence of historical prospects for imperialism is becoming

increasingly obvious at the present stage. "^^^

This, in conjunction with

class struggles and antagonisms within "the entire world of capital,"
leads Suslov to conclude that the prospects for socialist expansion

improving.

In Suslov's words:

are
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The working people's desire for unity
is increasina in
positions Of the Communist^
k^^^
°I of all left
Parties and
wing forces have become considerably
stronger.
The national-liberation movement
is dealing
^ heavy
blows to imperialism. 172

UrftT

TK^'f

It was mentioned earlier that the United
States, in the words of

Henry Kissinger, hoped to use detente as

a

means of displaying Western

innovations and advancements to the public in the
socialist world.

The

Soviet Union had apparent cause to be concerned, as
the commodity-starved
Soviet consumer might well find this array of Western
goods to be quite
attractive.

Thus, Brezhnev continuously exhorted his and the East

European bloc's communist parties to strengthen their ideological

vigilance and cooperation.

By so doing, Brezhnev argued that the increased

contacts in detente could well serve the cause of socialist alignment.
In

Brezhnev

'

s

words

:

We are convinced of the rightness of our path and of our
Marxist-Leninist ideology, and we have no doubt that the expansion of contacts, which is natural in conditions of detente,
exchanges of spiritual values and information and the development of ties between the publics of various countries will
serve well to disseminate the truth about socialism and to win
more and more new supporters to the side of the ideas of
scientific communism. 73
'

Brezhnev, in advocating the policy of detente, has undoubtedly
been mindful of conservative criticism within his own party.

Brezhnev

has taken the occasion of rebutting any anti-detente sentiment to

reinforce the point that detente does not mean being "soft on capitalism,"
nor does it entail the maintenance of the status quo.

In his address

at the 25th C.P.S.U. Congress, Brezhnev again asserted his belief that

detente implies an inherent intensification of the ideological struggle
with the West, and is designed, above all, to create favorable conditions
for the further spread of socialism.

Brezhnev then added:
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refutes the fabrications about "freezing."
Suff ce t to
changes that have Uken place
K'ai-t;
Z'fll
in the Itj'''
world in recent years.
That is how things stand with the
question of the relatinn "
ship between detente and the class
struggle
Fait ^u^lo Ih
revo utionary cause, we Soviet
Communists are fighting and will
continue to fight for peace - the supreme
good for
people
^°ndition for the progress of mankind in
Sur

Ite'm"'^

Much the same sentiment is echoed by
Suslov who states:
We Communists have no illusions with
respect to the antipopular nature and policies of imperialism or
its ideology of
anti communism.
The affirmation in international affairs
of
the principles of peaceful coexistence does not
in the
slightest signify a slackening of the class struggle
on a
worldwide scale or a "reconciliation" between socialism
and
capitalism. They are irreconcilable.
It is a fact of
reality that the class struggle in the international arena
continues to be distinguished by great acerbity. Now, when
the imperialists are becoming increasingly aware of the
impossibility of overcoming socialism by force, this struggle
is more and more often being carried over into the spheres
of
economics, politics and ideology. 175

The economic and political crises that the Soviet Union envisages
in the West are,

in the Soviet view, obvious manifestations of problems

that make the capitalist system less attractive to the developing nations
of the world.

In

conjunction with the already-existing worldwide shift

toward socialism, these crises became major catalysts for an era of
global transition from capitalism to socialism.

"The numerous manifesta-

tions of instability in the economic and political system of imperialism
are not the result of some accidental concurrence of circumstances,"

according to Kosygin.

Rather, this is seen as "an objective developmental

process in the epoch of the general transition from capitalism to socialism."
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This "general transition" will certainly cause some problems for the socialist

world, as the imperialists will do everything in their power to halt this
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process.

However, as Kosygin goes on to
say:

difficulties are that confront
"-Hc international
r^"-^} the
Lernati ona
,
u 1
Sltuatinn
situation as
^'"l ?.'!!:J°_P!^"!'"^-^^^ts Of the pea'-lSving
loving
forces and in the interests of the
peaceful future for
not of the advocates of war.
The alignment of forces b.^v
continuing to change in favor of
social?sri77
'

I

•

itllMl

II

T^l^A^'^l

It has been mentioned throughout
the course of this report

that detente has always provided the Soviet
Union with
a

respite in, or an absence of war.

a

breathing spell,

Peaceful relations with the United

States, be it as an avoidance of war for Lenin,
or an alternative to
the Cold War for Brezhnev, have always, in the
Soviet view, provided
the best conditions for socialist proliferation and
communist construc-

tion.

Hence, it is not surprising that the U.S.S.R., through
the latest

detente, is confident that the alignment of world forces in
favor of

socialism is

a

cause that is best served by the policy of peaceful and

cooperative inter-camp relations.

An authoritative Pravda editorial can

therefore, summarize the objectives of detente as follows:
Peaceful coexistence creates favorable conditions for
the comprehensive development of the class struggle of the
proletariat against the sway of capital and the struggle for
national liberation of oppressed and dependent peoples. To
struggle for peaceful coexistence in our time means to struggle
for the progress of mankind, since favorable opportunities for
the solution of fundamental social problems are created in
conditions of peace... ^78
The strategic objective of Soviet foreign policy, as defined
in detente and explained by Soviet spokesmen, is quite clear.

avoiding

a

While

thermonuclear war, and utilizing American economic assistance,

the U.S.S.R.

is

clearly attempting to further the process of shifting

the balance of power in East-West relations in favor of the socialist

commonwealth of nations.

Such a course is consistent with the Soviet

view of the final objective of detente, and is

a

reflection of

a

more

gradual and incremental means by
which to achieve long-term
goals,
specifically the complete victory
of socialism on a
worldwide basis.
Yet, it can be argued that the
U.S.S.R. cannot hope to
achieve equal

success in this regard in all
areas of the world simultaneously.

The

existence of objective pre-conditions
for socialist transformation,
the development of mature communist
parties, the level of capitalist

entrenchment, the ability to wage wars
of national liberation, and
a
host of other factors have made some
geo-political areas more suitabl
than others for the shift to the
socialist camp.

e

The Soviet Union, inn

this regard, has looked upon the world
of developing nations as the area

most appropriate for the influx of socialist
influence and the demise
of American or Western control.

Hence, it can be demonstrated that the

specific strategy underlying the strategic objective
of the further

favorable alignment of world forces

is

the enhancement of the national

liberation movement.
In speaking to the World Congress of Peace Forces,
Brezhnev

asserted:
For millions of people on our planet, there is still no
peace, they are forced, arms in hand, to fight against
imperialist aggressors and their accomplices and against
the tyranny of invaders, for their own freedom and independence and for the elementary right to be masters in their
own home.
Peace partisans cannot fail to draw their own
conclusions from this. 179

The conclusions to be drawn from Brezhnev's point of view are

rather simple.

The Soviet Union claims that the support for struggles

against "invaders," and "imperialist aggressors"
in its

foreign policy.

is an elemental

factor

Moreover, such support, even in the form of

direct military assistance or the use of socialist military personnel
(e.g.

Cuban armed forces),

is

not contradictory to the spirit or intent

231

Of detente.

In fact,

such assistance is an
inherent and unquestionable

component of the process of Soviet-American
detente.

As the Soviet

Union asks in rhetorical fashion:

^o^cerned, isn't the struggle
.n.tnc^'"
"^^^^[l^^
against racism
and apartheid and the defense
of and respect
for the sovereignty of young independent
countries a contribution to the easing of tension and
to the creation on ou?
planet of t e necessary conditions for
a peaceful, happy
life for all peoples, large and small?180

The U.S.S.R. can argue therefore, that
the easing of tension in
the international arena can best be
accomplished by the proliferation of

successful struggles for national liberation and
independence by the

developing countries.
must not appear as

a

This process, replete with full Soviet support,

form of Soviet hegemony, however.

The U.S.S.R. is

careful to show that the alignment of world forces, and not
Soviet

national interests, is served by the victories of national liberation

struggles.

In the words

of Brezhnev:

The Soviet Union's attitude toward the complex
processes in the developing countries is clear and
definite.
The Soviet Union does not interfere in the
internal affairs of other countries and peoples.
Respect
for the sacred right to every people and every country to
choose its own path of development is an immutable principle
of our Leninist foreign policy.
But we do not conceal our
views.
In
the developing countries, as everywhere else, we
are on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and
national independence and regard them as our friends and comrades in struggl e. 181
The national

liberation movement and the alignment of newly-

independent developing countries in the socialist camp is, in the Soviet
view,

a

major component of the Soviet desire to continue the pro-socialist

shift in the balance of world power.

"The Soviet Union is expanding its

political ties with the developing countries,"

we are told, and is

"supporting their endeavor to strengthen their independence, to advance
along the path of social progress, to take an active part in world affairs.
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and to overcome vestiges of inequality
in their foreign
relations. "^82
By

so doing, the U.S.S.R.

hopes to not only increase
its camp of

allies and decrease that of the United
States, but to also make the

process of detente and the pro-socialist
alignment of world forces

irreversible factors of international relations.

Thus, the Soviet Union

can argue as follows:

Acting shoulder to shoulder with world
socialism the
developing countries can bring about genuine
national liberation and the satisfaction of their legitimate
interests and
rights and can make a still weightier contribution
to the
struggle to reinforce the easing of tension and to
make
""^^
the positive changes in international relations
irreversible.
It is

important to emphasize the point that successful national

liberation wars and revolutions are contributing factors to the
easing
of international tension in the Soviet view.

By eliminating the

vestiges of imperialism, neo-colonialism, national oppression, and the
like, the U.S.S.R.

is serving the cause of peace and reducing inter-

national tensions.

Since the agreed upon objective of detente is

precisely this reduction of international tensions and the creation of
world peace, the Soviets can logically argue that detente and national

liberation struggles are synonymous objectives.
In

supporting the cause of national liberation, the Soviet Union

has focused its attention on the developing nations of Asia, Africa,

However, it can be further shown that the U.S.S.R.,

and Latin America.

during the latest detente, has placed special emphasis on the revolutionary
process on the African continent.

It is

here that the U.S.S.R. has hoped

to make significant progress in winning the support of the newly-independent

former colonies.

It is also on the African continent that the objec-

tive preconditions for

almost non-existent.

a

socialist transformation can be seen as being

Yet, the U.S.S.R. has demonstrated the remarkable
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ability, as taught by Lenin, to
adapt and revise
Marxist-Leninist
revolutionary ideology so as to properly
address any given

circumstance.
Hence, Soviet theoreticians have
been able to devise a
prescriptive
format for the "special conditions"
that characterize the
revolutionary,

liberation struggle in Africa.

This special form for the
African revolution-

ary process encompasses three basic
stages:
^'

The national liberation revolutinn

("a broad anti-colonial, anti-

imperialist front is formed in which nearly
all social strata of
the population.
2-

.

.participate to various extents").

The national-democratic revolution,

("the task of this stage is the

struggle to consolidate political independence,
achieve economic
independence and advance along the path of social
progress").
^-

The socialist revolution,

("which presupposes the coming to power of

the working people, headed by the working class").
The Soviet Union, in developing this three stage revolutionary

process, has, in effect, admitted that the goal of socialist construction

may well be
colonies.

a

very distant objective for many former colonies and semi-

In the

Soviet view, the difficulties encountered in underdeveloped

countries "determine the need for

a

relatively long transitional period

during which the socialist revolution develops, deepens and
by the construction of a new society."

1

85

a

crowned

However, the longer the

"transitional period" prior to the construction of
the less attractive the model of

is

a

socialist society,

national liberation/socialist

revolution might be to overly enthusiastic newly- freed colonies.

Thus,

the Soviet Union has continued the Leninist process of adapting ideology
to the present environment, and allowed for a much shorter and more

attractive revolutionary process.

The U.S.S.R. can argue that during the

detente era it is quite possible to
fuse the revolutionary
process
"into a single strea.," thus creating
a

revolution with "an anticapital
ist

and socialist orientation."

It can then be reasoned
that:

Such a revolution, enormously
accelerating the revolutionary process in the given country
and shortening the
intermediate stages of historical
development, calls for
the maximum acceleration of social
development, which
with the support of other socialist
states, can place'on
the agenda the construction of
a socialist society. 186

The launching of an anti-imperialist
and pro-socialist national

liberation revolution, with the full support
of the Soviet Union and the
other socialist nations, is not
near future.

the construction of
a

goal

that is unattainable in the very

Rather, the Soviets argue, this objective can
be realized

almost immediately.

plished in

a

Moreover, from the Soviet perspective, the goal
of
a

"new (i.e. socialist) society" can also be accom-

relatively short period of time.

It is

important to note

that the Soviets feel that it is detente that has created the
necessary

preconditions for this rapid process and which has made the socialist

construction goals possible.

After all, as the U.S.S.R. has often told

us, detente creates the most favorable conditions for the construction of
a

new society.

Soviet spokesmen can therefore, "consider the effect on

Africa of detente, which has become ever more significant under the

influence of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries and progressive forces throughout the world."

1

87

So as to

leave no doubt as to the direct relationship of detente to the African
national liberation movement, Soviet spokesmen can argue as follows:

What has happened and is happening in Africa is the
development of the Portuguese colonial peoples' struggle
for freedom and independence, new trends in relations with
former mother countries and the like - all this has become
possible as a direct result of detente, which has
graphically demonstrated the narrowing of imperialism's
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opportunities.
It is no longer so easy for
imperialist
reactionaries to apply brute force to
maintain their
supremacy in a given sector of the "third
world " Then
too, public opinion in capitalist
countries nowadays
reacts more sharply to all revivals of the
earlier
position of strength" policy. 188
The Soviet Union has therefore, made
little, if any, attempt to

conceal the fact that it will strive to woo the
developing nations
into the pro-socialist, or at a minimum the
non-capitalist, camp.

Further-

more, the policy of detente is seen as the major
catalyst by which the
national liberation struggle is waged.

With the United States now unwilling

or unable to muster a reasonable and meaningful response
to Soviet activity
in the third world,

the U.S.S.R., under the aegis of detente, appears to

be quite comfortabl e in pursuing its objectives there.

The Soviet Union

has also made no effort to hide the fact that it has realized

a

number

of triumphs in the developing world during the most recent detente.

The

U.S.S.R. can both revel in the successes of socialist gains in the third

world and use these triumphs as

a

form of appeal to those non-aligned

nations which have not opted for Soviet support.

Thus, in analyzing the

25th C.P.S.U. Congress, Soviet commentators can reason as follows:
The Congress declared very resolutely that the CPSU has
supported and will continue to support peoples who are
fighting for their freedom. The peoples of Vietnam, Chile,
Laos, and Angola know this very well...
The 25th Congress reconfirmed the unconditional devotion
of our Leninist Party to the fraternal alliance of workers
of all countries and to its consistent course aimed at
uniting the ranks of the world Communist movement and at
strengthening the solidarity of all anti-imperialist forces
in the struggle for common aims... 189

•

Detente under Leonid Brezhnev has established the goals and

objectives outlined above.

As such, Brezhnev's detente appears, at first

glance, to differ significantly from Lenin's detente.

Yet, it can be

reasoned that upon closer examination the differences appear to be less

significant than the common threads that wind
themselves through the
detente policy of these two Soviet leaders.

Both Brezhnev and Lenin

have attempted to augment the ranks of the
socialist camp

and decrease

that of the West, with the ultimate aim of
vanquishing the latter.
Lenin hoped to realize this end with the aid of
socialist revolutions
in Europe, most notably in Germany.

Brezhnev hopes to reach his goals

with national liberation/socialist revolutions in the developing
world.
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CHAPTER

VI

CONCLUSIONS

The introductory chapter of this
dissertation presented three

major hypotheses.

Taken together, these hypotheses
addressed what this

writer felt were the most widely misunderstood
aspects of the policy
of detente.

Moreover, these hypotheses provide

a

concise capsule

summarization of what this writer views as the essence
of detente.
is

important therefore, to examine these hypotheses
here

It

in summary

fashion in light of the evidence presented within the
body of this report.
The first hypothesis posited the belief that detente

is

a

political strategy that was designed by the U.S.S.R., that has
its

theoretical foundation in Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideology, and
is governed

by the dictates of that ideology.

It was shown here that

detente was not mutually developed by the Soviet Union and the United
States.

Rather, detente was and

ceived by the U.S.S.R. as

a

is

a

political strategy that was con-

means by which to properly manage the

temporary coexistence of capitalism-imperialism and socialism.

Having

initiated the policy of detente, the Soviet Union attempted for

a

number of years to have the United States accept the Soviet philosophy
of detente as the only alternative to American decision makers.

It

was only recently, in the Soviet view, that the United States

realistically assessed the alignment of world forces, the growing might
of the Soviet Union, the existence of strategic parity, and the bankruptcy
of pursuing an anti-Soviet course of action.

Thus, the United States,

according to the Soviet perception, has finally been forced to accept
246
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detente, as defined by the Soviet
Union, as
Detente may have been transformed
from

a

a

political necessity.

defensive tactic to an

Offensive strategy and finally to an
aggressive policy with unilateral
constraints placed upon the United
States.
Yet, as was shown, it was

the Soviet Union that initiated
these revisions, and it was
the Soviet
Union that has continually defined the
scope and purpose of detente.
In

addition, it was demonstrated that
detente was created on

the basis of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist
ideology.

While attempting

to achieve the ultimate objective of
communist ideology the Soviet Union

realized that

a

policy of peace with the West was an
urgent need.

Detente was presented here as

a

means by which the U.S.S.R. could best

realize the objective of transforming the world in
the communist order
and of achieving the ultimate and total defeat of
the capitalist-

imperialist system.
Two distinct schools of thought on this subject matter were

analyzed.

The first school presented the general belief that ideology

had been replaced by concerns of national

interest, balance of power,

and power politics as the major determining factors of Soviet foreign

policy.

Characterized by an "end of ideology" posture, this school

looked upon ideology as

a

secondary concern, and as

cosmetic aspect of Soviet foreign policy.

a

manipulative or

However, it was shown that

ideology formed the nucleus of the Soviet policy of detente

earliest formation in 1918.

in its

While many of the tactical components of

detente have been altered or revised in the ensuing sixty-two years,
the central core of the policy has not been changed.

An unswerving

commitment to the ultimate goal of Soviet ideology, the final defeat
of the West, has remained as the major focal point of the Soviet
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policy of detente.
When analyzed amidst the
background of short-term
Soviet
objectives, the detente policy may very
well appear to be a
non-ideological
strategy.
However, it was argued that it
was difficult to separate
shortterm goals of Soviet foreign policy
from its much broader long-term

objectives.

It was

also reasoned that gradual and
incremental shifts in the

balance of power in favor of the U.S.S.R.
are but small pieces in
larger Soviet design.

much

The Soviet Union has repeatedly
informed us that

the goal of the construction of

conditions of peace.

a

a

new society can best be accomplished
in

Detente, in the Soviet view, was created
as the best

means to achieve that peace and the objective of
socialist proliferation
and communist construction.

The second hypothesis stated that detente was

strategy developed by V.I. Lenin in 1918.

political

a

Thus, detente in 1972 or

1980 can be seen as the present variation of

a

policy that was initiated

by the U.S.S.R. shortly after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Soviet

Russia.

It has

become fashionable to apply the term detente to Soviet-

American relations from 1972 to 1980, with the normalization of those
countries' relations under the leadership of Richard Nixon and Leonid
Brezhnev.
a

Yet, it was argued that detente as practiced by Brezhnev is

policy that is both

a

descendant and continuation of

a

strategy that

was conceived by Lenin.
Lenin, confronted with an array of foreign and domestic

difficulties, realized in March of 1918 that he could not guarantee his
political survival without

a

large-scale consolidation of strength.

Furthermore, Lenin knew all too well that he could not pursue the

objective of defeating the capitalist-imperialist system until such time

249
as he was strong enough
to confront his enemies.
a

breathing spell,

Thus. Lenin required

respite in war, by which
he could prepare
hi.self
for the final confrontation
with the West.
Detente was created by
Lenin
as the policy that would
provide this
a

respite.

It was reasoned that in
designing detente,

eight major needs of Soviet
Russia.

Lenin addressed

Detente would provide the
necessary

time, in conditions of peace,
that would allow for the
internal consolidation of strength by the new Soviet
regime.
Detente afforded the Soviet
Union the opportunity to survive as
an "oasis" in a capitalist-imperialist

world until such time as other nations
could join the socialist ranks.
Detente gave Lenin the time to focus
on the inordinate East-West
military

imbalance and to implement the corrective
action necessary to achieve

military parity.
a

total

Detente underscored the objective necessity
of waging

East-West war and provided the means by which
Lenin could best

prepare for this final inter-camp conflict.

Detente afforded Lenin the

opportunity of preparing for the inevitable alliance of
anti-socialist
forces and the eventual onslaught against the U.S.S.R.

Detente provided

the forum by which Lenin could expand East-West economic ties
and secure
the much needed influx of Western economic assistance that was
vital to

the ravaged Soviet economy.

Detente gave Lenin the chance to exploit

any and all antagonisms within the capitalist-imperialist camp, thus

precluding any anti-Soviet alliance among his enemies.

Most importantly,

detente provided Lenin with the best means by which he could achieve the
goal

of gaining the worldwide victory of socialism.

The policy of detente that was created in 1918 and revitalized
in 1920-1921

did not die with the passing of Lenin.

Stalin, in gaining

complete hegemony over Soviet politics during his lifetime, continued

the policy Of detente that was
bequeathed to hi.,

while .aking subtle
shifts in the overall detente formula,
Stalin adhered to the
basic
core of detente as designed by Lenin.
In fact, Stalin was
able to

strengthen the internal and international
position of the U.S.S.R. and
therefore, strengthen the policy of
detente.
Nikita Khrushchev continued the policy
of detente as updated by
his predecessor.

However, Khrushchev realized the
need to alter the

policy and to transform detente from
strategy.

a

defensive tactic to an offensive

Hence, Khrushchev revised many of the
original detente com-

ponents of Lenin and restructured the policy in
the mold of

a

gradual process that did not necessitate the
inevitability of

more
a

final

East-West confrontation.
Brezhnev maintained the basis of detente that he inherited
upon
his assumption of power in the Kremlin.

Yet, Brezhnev realized the need

to reduce the obvious threat presented to the West during the
Cold War

years and to re-design the detente process in the form of
political strategy.

However, Brezhnev was able to add

strain to detente and make the policy, in reality,

a

a

a

more appealing

very aggressive

far greater threat

to American interests.

Thus, the third major hypothesis presented the view that detente,

conceived and implemented by the U.S.S.R., has posed and will continue
to pose serious threats to the interests of the United States.

In fact,

detente, as perceived by the Soviet Union could by definition accrue

unilateral advantages to the cause of world socialism.
that detente was created by the Soviet Union and was

of

a

a

It was shown

direct by-product

revolutionary ideology that has avowed goals and objectives that

are inimical to those of the United States.

Thus, in theory, the Soviet
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policy of detente poses an inherent
threat to American interests.

accepting the terms of detente
as established by the
U.S. S.R.
the united States has not only
given credibility to this
Soviet strategy
but has also increased the threatening
character of the policy.
By
In

condoning Soviet-styled detente, as
the U.S. did from

1

972 to 1976,

the American government, as was argued,
afforded the U.S. S.R. the opportunity to conduct U.S. -Soviet relations in
a manner that gave Moscow
much
to gain and little, if anything, to
lose.
It was shown that the United States
has reassessed the detente

policy recently and has demonstrated an
unwillingness to adhere to the

principles of detente as established by the Kremlin
regime.
the Soviet Union, far from seeing the demise of
is

However,

Soviet-American detente,

doing all in its power to make the process irreversible.

The Soviet

Union has repeatedly informed us in the West that the causes
for the

American dissatisfaction with detente are not only not contradictory
to the spirit of detente, but are necessary and inevitable components

of that policy.

The U.S. S.R. has made no attempt to conceal the fact that

detente established the best conditions for the further dissemination
of socialist influence and the construction of communism.

In short,

detente and the American willingness to accept detente will, in the

Soviet view, provide the catalyst by which the Soviet Union will realize
its ultimate communist objectives.

Hence, it is not surprising that the

U.S. S.R. can assert that detente will signal

a

drastic intensification

of the East-West ideological struggle and that detente will sharpen
and reinforce the class antagonisms with the West.

According to the

Soviet Union, detente has been forced upon the United States by the

American realization of its
weakening position in the
world and the
growing .ight of the Soviet Union.
While the reality of the
alignment
of world forces in favor of
socialism forced the United
States to

accept detente, it will be detente,
in the Soviet view,
that will be
the fulcrum for the further
favorable alignment of world
forces.
The Soviet Union has claimed
that detente has as its ultimate

objective the total collapse of the
West and the complete worldwide

victory of socialism.

In this view,

detente is an irreversible policy

that will not condone the status quo
posture, sustainment of the

present balance of power, or any attempted
convergence with the United
States.

In

addition, detente, from Moscow's perspective,
allows for the

support of the U.S.S.R. for wars of national liberation,
and violent

anti-Western national revolutions.

At the same time, detente is not

applicable to American relations with the newly developing former
colonies and will not allow for any American reaction to national

liberation endeavors.

Detente does not permit the buildup of "aggressive"

military forces by the United States, but at the same time, necessitates
continued increases in Soviet military power.
Stated very simply the Soviet theory of detente would place
unilateral restraints upon the United States and seriously hinder any

American action that would threaten Soviet ideological goals.

Simultan-

eously, detente, from the Soviet perspective, would permit the U.S.S.R.
to conduct its foreign policy with almost no constraints as it is

designed with the objectives of securing "peace" and "freedom" for all
peoples.

It was also argued that the Soviet theory of detente has also

been translated into practice.

Having achieved the long sought after

military parity with the United States, the U.S.S.R. has used the threat
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Of

a

thermonuclear confrontation between
the two superpowers

as a

factor that would seriously hinder
any direct American
response to
hostile Soviet actions. Thus, it can
be reasoned that the
theory and

practice of detente has not only failed
to diminish aggressive and

anti-Western Soviet activity but has allowed
for its more active pursuit.
It was stated earlier that the
history of Soviet-American

relations is, in fact, the history of
Soviet-American detente.

It can

also be argued that this history has been
quite successful for the Soviet
Union and has been less than favorable for the
United States.

Prior to

the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 the United
States was not confronted

with any communist adversary.

When the first communist government

came to power it initiated detente as

a

desperation policy that would buy

the necessary time to ensure its survival.

Amidst the background of

detente the Soviet Union was able not only to ensure its own preservation
but to watch over the spread of communist control to many other nations.
In time,

detente lost its necessary defensive and protective character

and became the means by which the Soviet Union could further proliferate

socialist/communist influence.
with
is

a

In 1981

the United States is confronted

number of communist adversaries as the alignment of world forces

indeed in favor of the socialist world.

The historical progression

from 1918 to 1981 that was inspired by detente can logically continue
as long as detente remains the dominant East-West and Soviet-American

activity.
in 1981.

The non-communist world is the minority socioeconomic system
It can be argued that the continued adherence to detente, as

defined by the U.S.S.R., by the United States will continue to foster
the demise of the non-communist world of nations.

.
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